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ABSTRACT

During the 1983 season, two U.S. longline vessels initiated
the first attempts at the commercial exploitation of swordfish in the Eastern Caribbean.

In 1986, the number of

u.s.

vessels participating in the fishery surpassed 40 with
landings of nearly two million pounds per season.

The sudden influx of participants and technology to the
region has resulted in a variety of user conflicts and
associated policy issues.

Major areas of concern involve

the conservation of a heavily exploited resource and the
distribution of benefits which accrue from resource exploitation among the resource-adjacent island states and U.S.
fishing operations.

This study examines principles of fisheries management, the
international legal framework for highly migratory species,
and regional responses to highly migratory species management.

These experiences are then applied to the Eastern

Caribbean situation.

Management alternatives which are

discussed for. the Eastern Caribbean include:

regional

management; fees and conditions of foreign vessel access;
compliance and enforcement; local development; and related
issues such as stock conservation, recreational species and

ii

by-catch landings.

The study indicates that government

fisheries treaties may involve issues far removed from
fisheries such as strategic interests of the super powers.

The island nations of the Eastern Caribbean have the right
to the benefits associated with the fisheries resources
which occur in their zones of ocean jurisdiction.

However,

the realization of this goal will depend on regional
cooperation, the wise use of scarce resources and longterm commitment.
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INTRODUCTION

The Problem

The swordfish longline fishery is one of the most recently
developed and controversial fisheries of the Eastern
Caribbean.

The Eastern Caribbean Region, as used in this

paper, will include the island nations of the Lesser
Antilles, including their respective zones of ocean
jurisdiction, extending from Puerto Rico to Venezuela.

In

the winter months of 1983 the commercial fishery was
initiated by two U.s. mainland vessels (Campos et aI, 1985).
In 1986 the number of U.s. vessels operating in the region
had grown to at least 40 with landings approaching two
million pounds of swordfish annually (Rolon per. corn. 1987,
SAFMC 1987).

The sudden influx of foreign participants and

technology have resulted in a number of disputes and
associated policy issues (Martin and Woods 1986a).

The swordfish resource of the North and Western Central
Atlantic is highly migratory with a range extending from
Canada to South America.

Stocks pass through the high seas

and at least 15 zones of national jurisdiction.
six major participants in the fishery,
are the United States and Canada.
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There are

the largest of which

Management of the

resource is further complicated by incomplete knowledge of
its biology and population dynamics (Hoey per. com. 1987).
Meanwhile average age at first capture has been dropping
throughout the species range during the 1980s (Conser et aI,
1985a).

It has been determined that the stock exhibits

growth overfishing, a drop in the average size of individuals which make up the stock.

However, recruitment over-

fishing, the decrease of spawning stock biomass below levels
which can sustain the level of recruitment

req~ired

to-

maintain stock levels, has not yet occurred (Conser et al,
1985a).

Of particular importance is the increased effort

which has taken place throughout its range, especially in
the Eastern Caribbean.

It has also been determined that the

Eastern Caribbean is one of the major spawning grounds for
swordfish (Grall et aI, 1981).

The effects of increased

fishing effort in the Eastern Caribbean on the Western
Atlantic swordfish stock are currently unknown although
concern over the health of the resource is growing.
Currently the fishery is not regulated within its range
either by international agreement or within respective zones
of jurisdiction.

The central problem hinges on two interrelated matters
involving international cooperation.

Immediate concerns

focus on the distribution of benefits derived from resource

2

exploitation among foreign participants and resource
adjacent island states.

Meanwhile, the absence of a

regulatory strategy directed toward stock management
throughout the range of the swordfish resource is a concern
of all interested parties for conservation and maximization
of benefits in the future.

Therefore, there is a common

need among all concerned parties to work in concert while
attempting to reach individual goals.

Most small island states of the Eastern Caribbean lack the
resources required to exploit the highly migratory resources
which pass through their Fisheries or Exclusive Economic
Zones.

Distant water fleets of larger and relatively

developed nations are more likely to target these species
because they possess a comparative advantage in respect to
capital, expertise and experience.

Permitting and entry of

foreign vessels to resource adjacent nations' waters is
becoming more common, yet many distant water vessels continue to fish without permission or in a manner which is
inconsistent with entry requirements (San Juan Star 1986).
The island nations of the region lack the resources required
to adequately enforce fisheries law within their respective
200-mile zones.
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Objectives of the Study
The objective of this study is the development of a set of
potential management options for the swordfish fishery with
emphasis on the Eastern Caribbean Region.

The recommended

alternatives are directed toward a distribution of benefits
accruing from resource exploitation, which is acceptable to
concerned parties, while promoting conservation of the
resource throughout its range.

The eventual management measures taken will depend on the
concerned island states, fishing participants and other
coastal states within the range of the species.

Although

most concerned parties would agree that benefit maximization
and conservation are their goals, the definition of each,
and the means by which these goals can be attained, are
usually perceived differently by each interest group.

The

intent of this study is to indicate the alternatives
concerned parties have at their disposal and the implications of each option in relation to the general goals stated
above.

Another principal goal of this study is to indicate where
gaps in information related to management of swordfish
exist.

Research and management institutions will have to be

utilized and strengthened to allow the management process to
move forward.

Yet it must be determined which research

4

areas have priority, which institutions should be utilized
and how they should be strengthened and whether potential
gains outweigh the costs of undertaking these activities.

It should be recognized that the management options
suggested in this study are only the starting point of the
management process.

In the future new information will

become available, society and its social and economic
institutions will change and fish populations will vary.
Therefore one of the most important goals of this study is
acknowledgment that flexibility is required in any management scheme so that questions concerning its institutions,
makeup and direction continue to be asked.

Methods
The principal problems of this study revolve around factors
which include a growing foreign fishery,

resource adjacent

developing states and a highly migratory resource.

In other

parts of the world where similar circumstances exist,
management initiatives have evolved which deal with many of
the same factors.

Management principles in areas such as

regional arrangements, permitting, enforcement, regulation
and development have been proposed or initiated in the South
Pacific, Eastern Pacific and the United States.

The experi-

ences gained in resource management and allocation in these
regions offer valuable lessons which can be drawn upon
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during the development of potential management options.
These experiences can be studied within their regional context for relevance and transferability to the pelagic longline fishery which is developing in the Eastern Caribbean.

The study is initiated with an investigation of elements and
issues associated with the swordfish fishery.
concentration include:
geography~

Areas of

the Eastern Caribbean Region,

political entities and

traditiona~

its

fisheries;

international and regional organizations involved in management of fisheries resources; the biology of the resource,
including stock assessment, range and life history; issues
such as illegal fishing,

impacts on recreational stocks,

impacts on the local industry, local development and impacts
on swordfish stocks.

The investigation then centers on principles and practices
of fisheries management which have been adopted or proposed
in other regions or EEZs such as the South Pacific, Eastern
Pacific and the United States.
will include:

Major areas of concentration

the international legal framework such as The

Law of the Sea Treaty and customary international law; permitting of foreign fishing vessels; enforcement of national
and regional fisheries law; regional and international
management arrangements; local development of the fishing
industry; and resource conservation,
tion, assessment and regulation.
6

involving data collec-

These experiences and principles are analyzed with respect
to their possible transferability and adaptation to the
Eastern Caribbean Region.

The case of the South Pacific

Fisheries Form Agency (SPFFA) is especially relevant due to
similarities such as the foreign fishing participants
involved, its general makeup of dependent and newly
independent small island states, and the target species
which is a highly migratory pelagic resource.

Management

options will also be considered accordingtb the following
general criteria:

they have been arrived at through the use

of the best available information; can be implemented with
available resources cost effectively; are reasonable to the
concerned user groups; they are flexible enough to be modified and built upon in the future.

From these criteria and

investigations and comparisons of other region's approaches
directed toward highly migratory species management, potential management, options which are directed toward the
resolution of issues surfacing in the Lesser Antilles are
developed.

Resolution of the issues associated with the swordfish
fishery cannot take place overnight.

Many of the answers do

not exist because we have failed or have not had the chance
to ask the right questions.

The management options recom-

mended in this study are a starting point from which new
initiatives and questions must evolve.
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Principal elements

of management such as conditions of foreign vessel entry,
enforcement, conservation and local development will vary in
significance according to particular points in time.

Mana-

gers must recognize the importance of a management process
which allows for flexibility and reevaluation.
Ultimately this depends on the building and utilization of
management institutions for the collection of information,
assessment of data and adoption of new or revision of
measures as the process moves forward.
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CHAPTER I

THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN

The Region Defined
In this study the Eastern Caribbean Region will be defined
as the Islands of the Lesser Antilles stretching from Puerto
Rico to Venezuela.

A "region as defined by L.M. Alexander

is:
"an intellectual concept, created by the selection of
certain features that are relevant to an areal interest
or problem.
It is a geographic generalization whose
distinguishing criteria are chosen by the compiler of
the region in order to serve a stated objective" (cited
in Edeson and Pulvenis 1983).
The Eastern Caribbean Region was chosen because its
geography corresponds to a part of the range "of swordfish
where foreign fishing effort has increased dramatically
within the last five years.

The islands of this area also

possess a number of common features such as geographic
proximity, colonial past and small size.

The majority of

islands in the region perceive foreign fishing and the
issues associated with it as a common problem as they strive
toward management of their Fishing or Exclusive Economic
Zones.

The Eastern Caribbean is sometimes defined as the member
nations of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States
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(OECS) (Palmer 1984, Goodwin 1985).

It consists of inde-

pendent island states which were former British Colonies of
the Windward and Leeward Islands of the Lesser Antilles,
formerly called The West Indies Associated States Council of
Ministers (Edeson and Pulvenis 1983).
complicated by:

Yet the picture is

the remaining British dependencies of the

region; relatively large island states such as Barbados and
Trinidad and Tobago; French posessions or departments; Dutch
possessions or newly independent states; and Venezuela.
additi6n, the

u.s.

In

territories of the U.S. Virgin Islands

and Puerto Rico exert a strong influence on the region.

The

region's ocean geography consists of a puzzle of adjacent
zones involving all of the political entities cited above.
Tables 1 and 2 illustrate the region's diversity in respect
to colonial past and size.

This investigation concentrates on the former British
possessions which include both dependent and independent
states.

Within the Eastern Caribbean these states have the

greatest potential to act as an independent entity within a
regional context while they exhibit the greatest degree of
political and economic integration within the region.
However, the other countries and-possessions noted above are
also important elements due to:

their geographic proximity;

sometimes larger size both in respect to population and
economies; and fishing operations within the region.
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TABLE 1
Political Status of Islands of the Eastern Caribbean
Former or Current

Country

Colonial Influence

Status

Year *

Puerto Rico

United States

Commonwealth

1952

United States
Virgin Islands

United States

u.S. External
Territory

1954

British
Virgin Islands

Great Britain

British Dependent
Territory

1969

Anguilla

Great. Britain

British Dependent
Territory

1980

Holland

Self-governing
Colony

1954

St. Christopher
and Nevis

Great Britain

Independent

1983

Antigua and
Barbuda

Great Bri tain

Independent

1981

Montserrat

Great Britain

British Dependent
Territory

1960

French Overseas
Department

1946

Netherlands
Antilles

Guadeloupe

France

I:xxninica

Great Britain

Independent

1978

Martinique

France

French Overseas
Department

1946

St. Lucia

Great Britain

Independent

1979

St. Vincent and
the Grenadines

Great Britain

Independent

1979

Barbados

Great Britain

Independent

1966

Grenada

Great Britain

Independent

1974

Trinidad and
'Ibbago

Great Britain

Independent

1962

*-year current status was attained,
11

Source (Barry et al, 1984)

TABLE 2
General Characteristics of Eastern caribbean Islands*
Density
per sq kIn

Area
sq kIn

1.5%

370

8,860

103,000

1.3%

291

354

13,000

1.6%

87

150

7,019

0.5%

73

96

228

68

Country

Population

Puerto Rico

3,196,520

United States
Virgin Islands
Bd tish Virgin
Islands
Anguilla

Population
growth rate

Windward Neth.
Antilles

15,479

St. Christopher
and Nevis

45,800

0.7%

175

262

Antigua and
Barbuda

80,300

1.3%

182

442

Montserrat

11,900

0.6%

117

102

216

1,780

104

750

300

1,100

GJadeloupe and
I.J2eward Fr. Is.
I))rninica

385,000
77,900

1.4%

Martinique

330,000

St. Lucia

136,800

2.0%

222

616

St. Vincent and
the Grenadines

111,000

1.4%

285

389

Barbados

253,500

0.2%

590

430

Grenada

92,700

0.8%

269

344

1,199,000

1.5%

234

5,128

Tr inidad and

Tbbag 0

*Figures are as close to 1985 and 1986 as possible
Sources:

The 1986 Caribbean Development Bank Report and
the U.S. Dept. of Commerce International Marketing
Information Series
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European domination began nearly 500 years ago with the
"discovery" by the Spanish.

The Dutch, English and French

entered the region in the 17th century as Spanish power
declined (Lewis 1985).

On most islands the colonial powers

established a sugar plantation economy based on European
capital and imported African slave labor (Palmer 1985).

The

raw product was then exported for refinement and sale in
European markets.

During this period, capitalism in the

Caribbean was totally exploitative since its only goal was
to increase the colonial nations' power and wealth (Palmer
1985).

In social terms colonial powers put into place the

black-white-brown triangle with the white planter on top,
the black slaves on the bottom and the brown mulatto groups
in between (Lewis 1985).

Indigenous peoples such as the

Caribs were forced off the land and driven to near extinction in many cases (Barry et aI, 1984).

Emancipation followed in the mid-nineteenth century during
which economic control was retained by the European planter.
Generally most of the choice land remained in the European
hands.

Many former slaves had little choice but to continue

working for low wages or on their small plots (Lewis 1985).
As the twentieth century approached, agriculture remained
the economic mainstay of the islands.

Although each island

is unique in respect to the historical progression of
events, the preceding summary gives a general view of the
events leading up to the twentieth century.
13

The Contemporary Eastern Caribbean
The character of the contemporary Eastern Caribbean
continues to be dependent on both its history and outside
powers.

Although most of the region's political entities

have gained independence, trade, economic systems, and
political and social institutions are subject to outside
influence.

This is in part due to the character of small

island states and the general continental perception of
them.

The attributes of insularity and small size relate to

the idea that islands are satellite appendages, frontier
outposts or recreational sites (Towle 1985).

The island

states of the Eastern Caribbean also face constraints in
areas such as skilled labor, the natural resource base and
diversification of industrial and agricultural sectors.

The drive for independence gained momentum in the 1960s as
aspirations for sovereignty and economic development spread
among colonies which were also among the least developed
states of the world.

As European influence waned in the

1960s North American influence grew in the Caribbean, especially that of the United States.

Although most colonies

have achieved independence, it can be argued that dependence
on the former colonial powers and the United States have
continued to be a major constraint to self-sufficiency and
development (Barry et aI, 1985).
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Most of the Eastern Caribbean island nations, particularly
the small or micro-states, are still considered the least
developed of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the world
(Palmer 1984).

Per capita GDP for the LDCs of the region

averaged only 1,110 in 1985 (CDB Report 1986) (see Table 3).
Again history has played a role in dictating the current
status of the region's economy.

The early immigrants of the

Caribbean were colonizers, not settlers.
build institutions which promote

Settlers tend to

long~term

development for

the future of their children in areas such as education,
transportation and indigenous industries.

Colonizers build

institutions to exploit the region for profits which could
be returned to the metropolitan power (Palmer 1985).

Today foreign capital seeks cheap labor to produce for export, the function slave labor previously supplied (Palmer
1985).

This takes place through Trans National Corporations

(TNCs) and a world economic order which allows for the
practice termed neocolonialism.

The Caribbean is considered

as one of the most penetrated by TNCs in the world (Barry et
aI, 1984).

It has been argued that foreign capital is

essential because the region's local economies cannot
generate the capital required for public and private
investment (Palmer 1985).

It is also seen as strategy for

technology transfer, diversification and employment (Palmer
1985).

Yet industries which have located factories in the
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TABLE 3

Country

Economic Indicators of the Eastern caribbean Region
GOP
Per cap. Growth
Largest Exports
($rn)
GOP
rate (GOP)
(H, #2, i3)

Puerto Rico

u.s.

Virgin
Islands

British Virgin
Islands
Anguilla
St. Christopher
and Nevis
Antigua and
Barbuda
Montserrat
Guadeloupe

18,671
(802)
84.5
(20)

5,800

1.4%

(7,700)

chem,lpetro
prod/pharrn
petro products

7,101

0.6%

(2,800)

fresh fish/sand &
gravel/fruit & veg
lobster/livestock

67.3

1,469

1.0%

sugar

180.2

2,244

6.7%

manufac goods/
machinery/chern

37.1

3,118

4.6%

poly bags/trop
plant/elec parts

(1,200)

(3,500)

(14%)

bananas/sugar
nnn

Dominica
Martinique

88.2
(1,300)

St. Lucia

170.3

St. Vincent and
the Grendines
Barbados
Grenada
Trinidad and
Tobago

1,132

3.0%

(3,800)

(13% )

bananas/laundry
and toilet soap
petro prod/
bananas/ n.un

1,245

5.8%

bananas/coconut
oil/cocoa

102

933

3.1%

bananas/coconut
arrowroot

1,237

4,894

0.3%

sugar/elect
clothing

96

961

3.7%

cocoa/bananas
nutrreg

7,723

6,538

3.0%

petro prod/crude
petroleum

camp

Caribbean Developnent Bank Report 1986, u.s.
Department of Commerce International Marketing Information
series and Barry et aI, 1984.
() Indicates estimation, all data is taken as close to 1985 as
possible.

Sources:
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Caribbean are subject to the strength of the industrialized
economies, while a large portion of the profits are often
funneled off by their parent TNCs.

The region still suffers

from chronic unemployment and few locally based firms,
resulting in continued dependence on the industrialized
economies.

The agricultural sector of the Caribbean has continued to
be linked to the export of commodities to developed nations
(Barry et aI, 1984).

Meanwhile, world prices for commodi-

ties such as sugar declined relative to essential imports of
manufactured goods (Barry et aI, 1984).

There has been a

decline in the prices of the 15 leading agricultural commodities over the last two decades according to the U.N.
Food and Agriculture Organization (Barry et aI, 1984).
Bananas, of special importance to nations of the Eastern
Caribbean, sold for prices 20 to 40 percent lower in 1980
than in 1960 (Barry et aI, 1984).

Although there has been a

recent surge in banana prices, price volatility is another
characteristic of commodities which frustrates planning and
economic development.

Food production for local consumption is also in decline.
This is in part due to the colonial legacy associated with
it, a historical dependence on imports and better access to
retail and wholesale markets of imported foods than for
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local products (Barry et al, 1984).

The majority of

Caribbean nations import over 50% of their food while
Trinidad, Barbados and Antigua import over 80% (Barry et al,
1984).

In the Commonwealth Caribbean, food per capita

production has dropped in the last 15 years as the region's
population have moved away from farming (Axline 1984).

The

stagnation of agriculture and continued low production has
led to dependence on imports of food to feed the local
population (Barry et al, 1984).

Although it is arguable

whether the Eastern Caribbean can feed itself, the region
can certainly improve its present performance in domestic
food production.

Tourism has become one of the major strategies for decreasing unemployment and trade imbalances.

Yet TNCs have

generally controlled development of the sector and the
industry's profits (Barry et al, 1984).

The tourist

industry is heavily dependent on imports, taxes already
overburdened infrastructure, and produces impacts on the
physical environment while the employment opportunities it
produces are generally for low-pay and unskilled labor
(Barry 1984).

In addition to economic dependence, the industrialized
nations, especially the United States, have a direct political influence within the region.
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This is evidenced by the

remaining territories within the region, foreign aid programs and direct military intervention.

The most explicit

illustrations of this control involve multilateral lending
institutions such as the World Bank, the Caribbean Basin
Initiative and the recent invasion of Grenada.

The treat-

ment of the Bishop regime and the subsequent invasion of
Grenada in 1983 illustrate the willingness of the United
States to project power when it perceives its interests are
at stake.

Unfortunately the declaration of political independence and
actual economic and political independence are not synonymous in the Eastern Caribbean.

The factors which were

previously cited illustrate that the region's current state
is a product of outside influences.

The strength of these

influences is made more acute because of limited natural
resources in the region.

Due to the sudden rise in oil

prices and the economic slow down in industrial nations,
most of the region's nations showed negative growth rates in
real per capita GNP during the 1970s (Palmer 1984).

Table

4 illustrates the growth in percentage distribution imports
of food and fuels during this period.

As economic health

returned to the industrialized nations during 1985, GDP
growth approached 5% in many of the nations in question (CDB
Report 1986).

The region's economic fortunes are not only

tied to the industrial powers, but are subject to much
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TABLE 4
Economic Indicators of Selected Eastern caribbean Nations
GrCMth Rate
of real rnP
per capita
1970-1978

Country

Percentage Distribution
of Imports
Mineral Fuels
Food
74-76
1960-69
1960-69
74-76

Barbados

2.1%

24.3%

21.3%

8.0%

15.0%

St. Lucia

2.3%

23.7%

24.5%

2.6%

7.7%

Grenada

-1.8%

27.6%

*40.6%

4.8%

*8.5%

St. Vincent

-1.8%

27.5%

31.3%

3.2%

6.2%

Dominica

-3.4%

27.5%

32.3%

2.8%

6.5%

Antigua

-3.1%

19.0%

17.7%

17.7%

44.2%

*1974 only
Sources:

Problems of Developnent (Palmer 1984)
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greater variance due to their peripheral status.

Table 5

illustrates that imports have continued to be high relative
to GNP and exports in the 1980s.

'rhe region's external

resource dependence has resulted in a chronic balance of
payments crisis because each of the nations in question
imports more than it exports (Palmer 1985).

The persistent

gap in relative economic wealth between the United States
and the region is in part the result of external dependence
and the peripheral economic status of the Eastern Caribbean
nations (Palmer 1985).

Foreign fishing is a specific example of continued exploitation and dominance by outside influences in the region.

One

of the major reasons for generally unobstructed foreign
fishing and the lack of a local swordfish fishery is the
economic status of the region.

The management skills, in-

frastructure and institutions required for the development
and management of the islands' fishing zones are only now
being developed.

The situation has resulted in a United

St~t~s perspective, rangin~ fro~ negl~ct on th~ part 6~th~
U.S. government to open exploitation by U.S. fishery
participants.
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'fABLE 5

The Eastern Caribbean:

~rts

as a

Percen~age

of Gross

National Product; Exports as a Percentage of Imports

Country

EXfOrts of Goods
of Goods

ImfOrts (CIF')
GOP at Market Prices

~ts

Year

Year

Year

Year

Barbados

1977-79

62%

1986

52%

1977-79

33%

1986

41%

St. Lucia

1975-76

93%

1985

71%

1975-76

37%

1985

43%

Grenada

1974-76

68%

1986

80%

1974-76

51%

1986

34%

St. Vincent

1975-76

87%

1986

92%

1975-76

32%

1986

73%

DOminica

1975-76

69%

1980

135% .

1975-76

56%

1980

20%

Antigua

1975-76

108%

1982

77%

1975-76

39%

1982

19%

Sources:

Problems of Development (Palmer 1984, pp. 50-54),
Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications for
the United States U.S. Department of Commerce,
Fisheries Devel6pmeQtin borniriica (Mitchell and
Gold 1983)
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CHAPTER II
EASTERN CARIBBEAN FISHERIES AND MANAGEMENT
ORGANIZATIONS
Eastern Caribbean Fisheries
Physical and Biological Constraints
The geography of the Eastern Caribbean region is characterized by a large ocean area and the Lesser Antillean
island chain.

The relatively small and primarily volcanic

islands stretch 450 miles from the U.S. Virgin Islands to
Venezuela.

These islands form the semi-enclosed eastern

boundary between the Caribbean Sea to the west and curve out
into the Atlantic Ocean to the east (Figure 1).

These

characteristics might lead one to conclude that the magnitude of the region's fisheries resources is considerable.
Unfortunately this is not true due to a variety of physical
factors.

The physical factors which account for the high productivity
of the world's major fishing
the Eastern Caribbean region.

9roun~s

are largely absent from

Extensive shelf areas where

nutrients may accumulate and where light can penetrate to
the ocean floor to support primary productivity are not a
common feature of tropical island chains (Idyll 1971, Gold
et aI, 1984).

The islands of the region are characterized

by narrow shelf areas that give way to ocean depths greater
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Figure

Source (Appeldoorn 1986)

Hap of the Eastern Caribbean
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than 1,800 meters (Gold et aI, 1984).

Another factor

involves the small degree of temperature fluctuation of the
region's tropical climate.

This enables the thermocline,

which separates warm nutrient poor surface water from lower
nutrient rich layers, to persist throughout the year
1983).

(Idyll

Therefore seasonal mixing which triggers the bloom-

ing of plant life in temperate regions is absent resulting
in relatively unproductive waters (Idyll 1983).

The Eastern

Caribbean also lacks zones of upwelling of deep nutrient
rich waters which is required for plant growth.

Finally, except on its southern perimeter, the region lacks
runoff of major rivers from major land masses which contain
the sediments and nutrients required for higher levels of
productivity (Kenny 1983).

Primary productivity studies

yielded levels of 50 to 100 grams of carbon per meter per
year in the Caribbean Sea as compared to levels of 500 gm/m
in the major fishing grounds of the Atlantic (Kenny 1983).
These levels are comparable to the world's oceans most
barren areas·while it hasbeeri· report~d.byMargalefthat the.
mean off-shore levels in the region may be lower (Kenny
1983).

The United Nations Development Programme, with the

Food Agriculture Organization, undertook a major exploratory
fishing program from 1965 through 1971.

The fisheries

resources of the Eastern Caribbean were reported to be
inadequate .for the development of large scale commercial
operations (Goodwin 1987).
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The physical environment further limits fishing due to the
strong northeast trade winds which affect the activity of
smaller fishing vessels during much of the year (Idyll
1971).

Hurricanes which occur from June to October also

restrict fishing activities (Idyll 1971).

Ciquatera or tropical fish poisoning is yet another constraint of Eastern Caribbean fisheries development.
According to Olsen and Wood, ciquatera has been implicated
in 50% of fish species and 56% of landings by weight in the

u.s.

Virgin Islands (Goodwin 1985).

The problem is particu-

larly acute in the northern part of the region in large reef
fishes caught in areas less than 30 fathoms (Goodwin 1985).
The n.euroto.xin which causes the poisoning is synthesized by
a dinoflagellate which colonizes damaged coral surfaces
(Caddy 1981).

The toxin is then transferred

through the

food chain by herbivorous fish that feed on the reef (Caddy
1981).

The potentially life-threatening symptoms constitute

a major obstacle to marketing of these species due to the
ri~k of poisoriing (G~odwin19$5).: ~urrentiy ther~ is no

field method which can detect the toxin in marine organisms.

The Fishing Industry
Although these factors illustrate the limitations associated
with the resource base, the fisheries resources which are
present can have significant impact on the small island
26

scale (Goodwin 1985).

A general breakdown of the resource

and associated environment include the nearshore demersal
reef fishes, the deepwater demersal fishes, pelagic fishes
and benthic bottom-dwelling invertebrates such as conch and
spiny lobster (Goodwin 1985).

Nearshore demersal fishery
The nearshore demersal fishery targets on bottom-dwelling
species which are concentrated in shallow reef areas.
Species diversity is very high in reef areas.

The habitat

is among the most complex ecosystems in the world with a
rich web of interrelationships among its inhabitants.

Over

300 species are associated with these areas, of which 180
species are utilized in the fishery (Goodwin 1985).

Some of

the most common fishes found in reef and inshore areas
include:

wrasses, triggerfish, snapper, grouper, angelfish,

jacks, mullet, grunts, croakers and many more.

Although

coral reefs are some of the most productive marine areas in
the world, fishery production is limited by the usable
bioma~s present and the li~ited shel£ area~ of the

islands.

The inshore fishery is difficult to assess in respect to
sustainable yields due to its multispecies character and the
lack of landings data from the region.

Yet there is general

agreement that most of the region's inshore stocks are
beyond maximum exploitation levels (Goodwin 1985; Wilson
1987, Caribbean Fishery Management Council 1985).
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The conch fishery is second only to lobster in pound-forpound value and only second to fin fish as a component of
local diets (Goodwin 1985).
depths below 30 meters.

Conch are seldom found in

Its vulnerability to captur.e, high

economic value and the recent introduction of SCUBA as a
fishing method have contributed to its over-exploitation in
most parts of the region (Goodwin 1985).

The highest valued fishery species in the region is spiny
lobster (Goodwin 1985).

It is heavily exploited throughout

the region necessitating management measures such as minimum
carapace size, restriction of berried lobsters and possibly
reductions in effort before over-exploitation becomes more
acute.

R~gional

cooperatioD may become an important factor

in spiny lobster management due to its larval stages which
may last up to six months (Goodwin 1985).

The dispersion of

larvae while they inhabit the water column means that
recruitment of one island may be dependent on adult populations of another locale (Goodwin 1985).

The deepwater demersal fishery
Deepwater demersal species are found at depths of 60 meters
to 27 meters on the edge of shelf areas (Goodwin 1985).

The

distinction between the inshore and deepwater stocks is made
by the fishing gear utilized in this zone and a general
transition in the occurrence of species.
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The inshore

artisanal trap fishery generally changes to handline or
vertical longline techniques in deepwater areas (Goodwin
1985).

The dominant target species in this area are snapper

and grouper.

Although these areas are considered to be

under-exploited at present, they are thought to be sensitive
to fishing pressure and present limited potential (Goodwin
1985).

The pelagic fishery
On most Eastern Caribbean islands pelagic species make up
the largest component of total landings.

The seasonal

flying fish fishery of Barbados and the dolphin associated
with it is the one largest fisheries of the region.

Fish-

ermen also capture small tunas, yellowfin tuna, albacore,
billfish and, to a lesser degree, sharks with handlines and
by trolling lines.

Although greater potential landings are

possible, the lack of more precise estimates of abundance
and sustainable yields are constraints to further development (Goodwin 1985).

One estimate states that in the Lesser

Antilles 6nly 5,000 of a potential 2~,OnO tons of tuna
species are taken (Marcille and Caddy 1985).

Martinique,

Guadeloupe, Barbados, St. Lucia and St. vincent participate
in an artisanal fishery for these species, and are responsible for most of the landings.

Venezuela is the only

regional nation which has developed an industrial tuna
fishery with landings estimated at 5,000 tons of yellowfin
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and skipjack in the Caribbean Sea alone (Marcille and Caddy
1985).

Highly migratory tuna and billfish stocks are also

taken by foreign fishing operations.

However., the wide-

ranging nature of the Asiatic fleets of Japan, Korea, and
Taiwan results in annual variations in effort and landings
within a given area.

Catches of longline tuna and marlin by

Asiatic fleets in the Caribbean and Lesser Antilles Zone
were quite low at approximately 500-1000 tons (Marcille and
Caddy 1985).

These figures are highly speculative in re-

spect to amount and location, but they are illustrative of a
probable range of resource limitations.

Fishing gear
Most fishing operations pf the Eastern Caribbean can be
characterized as artisanal.

Vessels are generally either

traditional canoes, which are shaped and hollowed from logs
ranging in length from 12 to 15 feet, or double-ended
"whalers" with a length of 20 to 30 feet (Goodwin 1985).
Outboard motors are used for propulsion except in southern
.

. '

.

parts of the region whefedinghies may be powet~d by sails
(Goodwin 1985).

In inshore areas Antillean fish traps are

used to target on reef species.

Bottom handlines made up of

monofilament line and baited hooks are also used on shelf
areas (Goodwin 1985).

Trammel nets are nonselective en-

tanglement gear which is set in shallow reef areas.

Since a

wide variety of fish including juveniles and undesirable
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fish are caught, its effects on resource health are potentially serious (Goodwin 1985).

Beach seines are a tradi-

tional gear type used in near shore areas to capture
pelagics passing nearby (Goodwin 1985).

Trolling lines are

used for pelagic species from a running or drifting boat.
Gillnets are also used for pelagic species especially flying
fish (Goodwin 1985).

Vessels generally operate without

haulers for traps or longlines and without depth sounders.
There are very few larger modern vessels which could be
considered industrial operating from GEeS states.
French Islands, U.S.

In the

territories, Trinidad and the Barbados

flying fish fishery, many of the operations have developed
beyond basic artisanal capabilities, yet are not on the
scale of industrial operations in respect to capital and
equipment.

Status and Development of the Industry
The fisheries of the Eastern Caribbean can be generally
classified as labor intensive as opposed to highly capitalized operations.

Therefore

eration for the industry.

employm~ntis

a major consid-

Small-scale fishing activities of

the region tend to be marginal operations resulting in less
disposable income than in other occupations (Goodwin 1985).
For these reasons fishing may not be considered a prestigious job.

The recent development of light manufacturing and

service industries such as tourism have produced employment
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opportunities which might be considered more respectable.
These factors contribute to the large percentage of parttime fishermen working in the industry (Goodwin 1985 [see
Table 7]).

The lack of available capital for greater investment in the
industry and the introduction of new fishing technologies
are often stressed in development efforts.

Yet the basic

artisanal methods, combined with some modern adaptations
such as outboard motors, have been ample to over-exploit
most inshore stocks (Goodwin 1985).

It also should be noted

that traditional fishing methods are well adapted to local
conditions, constraints and culture.
currently under-exploited

resource~,

In the case of
care should be taken in

the increase of fishing effort and the transfer of technology foreign to the region.

First the resource base may

be limited and easily over-exploited, resulting in the same
problem currently being faced with most inshore resources.
Second, the technology or methods may not be appropriate in
resp~ctto

the local

econo~y,

6ulture and conditions.

Many

fishermen currently operating maiginal enterprises cannot
afford to risk limited resources on technology which is
unproven within their range of experiences (Goodwin 1985).

Many of the fishery resources of the Eastern Caribbean are
limited and at or beyond maximum levels of exploitation.
Although the accuracy of the fishery statistics in Table 6
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TABLE 6

Country
Puerto
Rico

Nominal Catch by Country in the Eastern Caribbean
(All landings given in metric tons)
Years
1984
1985
1983
1981
1982
1978
1979
1980
1496
2354
1784
2202
2655
2537
3197
3597
2802a

USVI

557

547

BVI

318R
607b

318R

669
1667a
318R
680c

1986

1327

634

883

611

680

600

640F

318R

318R
667b

318R

318R

318R

318R

Anguilla
1700
St
Kits & Nevis

1700

1850

1880

1880
1500e

1100
973f

Antg
Barbuda

2469

2444
2000f

2439
1700f

2004
1400f

2246
1100f

111

111R

Montserant

3313

740d
1300F

1500

1500F

2246R
800f

2246R

2246R

l11R

11lR

l1lR

8390F

8500F

100
55f

102

109

104

Guad

9000F

8500F

8000F

8300F

8240

8826

Domnica

1070
1070h

642

1445

1514

1545

lOOOF
950i·

500P
625f

446

450F

Martn

4375

4664

4891F

4700F

5500F

5107F

5147F

4604F

5000F

st Lucia

2600
2700k

1024

969

891

921

910
1772f
2600j

946

1052

840

547R

547R

547R

547R
1600m

547R
1700f

St Vincent

8940

698

547

Barbados

3884

4516

3808

3528

3579

6648 .
66001

5913

3915

4223

Grenada

2063
2908f

1464
4085f

1387

718

960

1473

1501
1500n

1584

2328

Trind
Tobag

4823

3840

4461

3804

4574

4240

3593

2862

3000

Total

37698

Sources:

33162

33264

34096

547R

547R

31030

FAD, Yearbook of Fishery Statistics, 1986, FAa Rome, (All first
line entries adjacent to country name), R-Repetition of data
previously reported by country or area. F-FAO estimate from
available sources of information. Other references given after
Table 7.
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are questionable, it illustrates that total landings may
have peaked and may actually be dropping.

Nearly half of

the fish consumed in the Lesser Antilles is imported (Idyll
1981) as shown in Table 7.

The region must now examine

methods of better management of its resources through the
identification of priorities and goals and the building of
management institutions to carry them out.

Improvements are

also required in areas such as infrastructure and marketing,
field staff and training, regulation, monitoring programs
and enforcement (Goodwin 1985).

The development of under-

utilized resources should be undertaken with caution in
respect to technology and potential impacts on stocks.
Although the resource base of the Eastern Caribbean region
is limited, its fishery resources have the potential to make
a greater contribution to local development in respect to
balance of payments, employment and nutrition (Goodwin
1985).

Industry constraints and potential benefits must be

considered as the region's island nations attempt to manage
adjacent pelagic resources.

Regional Organizations
There are several regional and subregional organizations
which are active in the economy and fisheries of the Eastern
Caribbean.

The island states of the region have character-

istics such as small size, dependence on
and a limited resource base.

e~ternal

influences

These factors may encourage a
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TABLE 7

Count.ry
P.R. fa

Fisheries Statistics for Eastern

C~ribbean

Nations

No.
Fishermen
1872

Imports
(mt)
24454

Exports
(mt)

Vessels
1449

Landings
(mt)
2802

USVI

la

578

237

1667

2590

BVI

Ib

9lft75pt

123

667

416

lSOftlOOpt

122

980

St Kitts Nevis
267ft283pt
If

283

974

850

Antigua Barbuda
1100
If.g

350

800

500

20ftl80pt

80

55

221

1300

640

625

600

Per Cap.
kgjyr
9
26

520

32

740

24

Anguilla

Id,e

39
350

31.5

260

0

15.1

1772

500

0

26.4

618

6600

3600

30

40.4

2750ft2750ot

537

1700

200

550

11

560ft840pt

700

1500

920

750

14.9

Montserrat

If
Dominica
If,i
St. Lucia
If,j

1000ftlOOOpt

Barbados

II

1600

St Vincent

If,m
Grenada
ff,n

ft-full-time fishermen, pt-part-time fishermen, - no data
a CFMC, 1985
b Gold et al., 1985
c Caddy, 1981
d Olsen and Ogden, 1984
e Gold et al., 1984
f Goodwin, 1985
g FAO. Antigua Country Profile 1986
h Mitchell, 1983
i FAO, Dominica Country Profile 1984
j FAO, St Lucia Country Profile 1985
k Mitchell et al., 1982
1 FAO, Barbado? Oountry Profile 1984
m FAO, St Vincent Country Profile 1986
n FAO, Grenada Country Profile 1987
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regional unified approach toward common problems involving
trade and management.

Although common characteristics,

especially geography, promote such action, the states of the
Caribbean as a whole and those of the Eastern Caribbean in
particular are not homogenous.

Factors related to history,

current trading partners, individual island state sitespecific conditions and goals underscore the diversity
present in the region.

The French islands of Guadeloupe and

Martinique provide an example of the limitations of regional
action based on geography.

Although they are located in the

middle of the region, due to strong ties with France, they
have remained outside the regional institutions formed by
the former British colonies of the Caribbean.

Regional

groupings and action are often cited as one of the few
alternatives of small developing states although the results
of such programs are mixed at best.

The following is a

review of the regional organizations which are especially
relevant to the fishing industry of the Eastern Caribbean.
Table 8 indicates participation of political entities in the
region.

CARICOM
For the wider Caribbean, The Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
is the main economic regional organization.

CARICOM evolved

from The Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) which
eliminated most tariff barriers between most nations and
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TABLE 8
Partici~tion

country

of Eastern Caribbean States in Regional
Organi za tions
OECS

Puerto Rico
United States
Virgin Island
British Virgin
Islands

associate
member

Anguilla
St Kitts and
Nevis

x

Netherlands
Antilles
Antigua and
Barbuda

x

t1:>ntserrat

x

Guadeloupe
[):)minica

x

Martinique
St Lucia

x

Barbados
St Vincent

x

Grenada

x

Trindad and
Tobago

X

CFMC - Caribbean Fisheries Management COuncil
X

- Member
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territories of the Commonwealth Caribbean (Payne 1984).

To

advance regional integration, the Treaty of Chaguaramas was
signed in July of 1973 (Payne 1984).

According to Payne the

goals of CARICOM involve three basic areas:
"The first is the furtherance of regional economic
integration by the establishment of a common market;
the second is the expansion of functional co-operation
in such fields as health, education transport and
meteorology; and the third is the co-ordination of
foreign policy among the fully independent states of
the Community" (Payne 1984, 128).
The international economic crisis of the 1970s deeply
affected the economies of the region.

This led to tension

within the association caused by bilateral economic arrangements between relatively wealthy Latin American countries
and impoverished member states, and import restrictions even
among member states (Payne 1984).

Integration has continued

to be plagued by political forces such as the balance of
power between member states, the ideological question concerned with the meaning of economic development, and
rivalries and conflicts between heads of government in the
region (Payne 1984).

Intra-CARICOM trade is low relative to both the total
trade of Member States and intra-regional trade among other
regional groupings of developing nations.

In 1980 intra-

regional trade accounted for 8% of the total trade of
CARICOM members (McIntyre 1984).
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The weak production

structure, limited resource base, and the resulting lack of
complementary production contribute to the low levels of
intra-regional trade (McIntyre 1984).

However, the region

has potential to utilize CARICOM as a mechanism to reduce
imports, especially in the case of food and consumer goods
through the coordination and integration of commodity
production (Payne 1984).

In the case of fisheries CARICOM members can trade in fish
free of customs duties (Edeson and Pulvenis 1983).

The role

of CARICOM in regional fisheries development was highlighted
by its third Technical Fisheries Conference in March of
1985.

Topics of intended involvement which were discussed

included:

insurance; training, aquaculture

~esearch

center;

research, development and promotion of fishery products;
safety measures; resource assessment; intra-regional
cooperation; inter-agency coordination; and protection and
development of Exclusive Economic Zones (Goodwin 1985).
CARICOM intends to collaborate with OECS and FAO in the
areas cited above.

The organization's role in the region's

fisheries has been questioned due to the differing goals,
needs and potentials of CARICO, member states, especially
between the smaller Eastern Caribbean states and other
members (Goodwin 1985).
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WECAFC and FAa
In 1973 the Western Central Fisheries Commission (WECAFC)
was established as a regional commission of the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (Edeson and
Pulvenis 1983).

The Statutes of WECAFC state that its

objectives include the following:
"promoting and assisting in the collection of national
statistics relating to fisheries, and the compilation
and dissemination of statistical data on a regional
basis; facilitating the co-ordination of national
research programmes and standardization of research
methods; promoting the exchange of information relating
to fisheries in the region; promoting and co-ordinating
studies on environment protection and fisheries;
promoting and assisting the development of aquaculture
and stock improvement; encouraging education and
training; assisting member countries in establishing
national policies for the development and utilization
of fishery resources and promoting and co-ordinating
international aid to achieve these objectives.
(Cited
in Goldet aI, 1984, 82.)
.
The region includes the Caribbean, Northern South America to
five degrees north, Central America north of the Panama
Canal Entry, the coast of North America including the Gulf
of Mexico and southeastern United States to 35 degrees north
(Edeson and Pulvenis 1983).

WECAFC and The United Nations

Food Agriculture Organization (FAa) have been involved in a
wide variety of fisheries development projects in the
Caribbean focused in areas such as development of underexploited stocks, training, utilization of existing catches,
management of heavily exploited stocks and promoting
harmonization of fisheries legislation in the region (Gold
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1984).

The large size of the WF.CAFC region necessitates

action in conjunction with UNDP/FAO and other United Nations
agencies on a sub-regional level.

Other United Nations

agencies involved in Caribbean ocean management include the
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization/International Oceanographic Commission
(UNESCO/lOC) and The United Nations Environmental Program
(UNEP) with its Regional Seas Program (Goodwin 1985).

lCCAT
During the period following the second world war there was
rapid expansion of tuna fisheries throughout the world.
Concern over potential production and continued viability of
. tUha stocks prompted hations and related

industrie~'

to

establish international organizations for research and
management of highly migratory species (Joseph 1983).

The

International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic
Tuna (lCCAT) entered into force in 1969 under the International Convention of the same name (Edeson and Pulvenis
1983).

According to Article IV,

"The principal objective of the Convention is to study
populations of tuna and tuna-like fishes (including
billfish), and such other fishes exploited in tuna
fishing in the Convention area not under investigation
by another international fishery organization" (Edeson
and Pulvenis 1983, 7).

The main aim of the convention is conservation of these
species throughout the Atlantic Ocean and adjacent seas
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(Edeson and Pulvenis 1983).

ICCAT is constrained by the

lack of funding for a permanent staff, data acquisition and
the timely formulation of management advice (Joseph and
Greenough 1979).

It does not conduct its own research, but

depends on member nations to analyze data.

The Caribbean is

included within this area although none of the nations of or
bordering the Eastern Caribbean, other than the united
States and Venezuela, have signed or deposited instruments
of ratification or adherence (Edeson and Pulvenis 1983).

OECS
The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) was
established by formal treaty in 1981.

The OECS evolved from

the West Indies Associated States Council as most members
achieved independence and perceived a need for a new
mechanism to promote cooperation (Edeson and Pulvenis 1983).
The main goal of OECS is political and economic integration
of the region's member states.

A regional strategy for the

Eastern Caribbean is a rational answer to constraints such
as the small size of its island nations, limited resource
base and external dependence on capital, trade and security
(Palmer 1984).

Therefore member states have made an effort

aimed toward the pooling of resources through the harmonization and coordination of economic and foreign policies where
their interests converge (Palmer 1984).
of proposed cooperation are:

The general areas

international, economic and
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political relations; domestic economic and financial relations, including matters relating to the sea and its
resources; the judiciary; mutual defense and security; and
education, training and cultural relations (Emmanuel 1984).
To date, the areas of greatest integration are the jUdiciary
and currency systems while there has been little progress in
the areas of diplomatic representation and defense and
security (Emmanuel 1984).

The GECS countries suffer from

many of the same problems which plague CARICGM such as the
lack of trained managers, a limited resource base, dependence on imports and the lack of indigenous capital.

In November of 1988, the Windward Islands of GECS, including
Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia and St. Vincent, agreed to move
forward on plans for a political union (The Daily News
1988).

The Leeward Islands of the GECS - St. Kitts,

Montserrat and Antigua - have not joined in the initiative
although they may join in the future if they wish (The Daily
News 1988).

The four windward islands are closely grouped

geographically and have been the most active of the GECS in
formulation of the political union.

Further integration of

this type has the potential to be a positive development in
coordination of fisheries policies.

GECS is active in development of the Eastern Caribbean's
fisheries resources.

GECS plans to work closely with
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CARl COM in the development of its programs (Goodwin 1985).
OECS has also been a participant in FAO workshops involving
the harmonization of fisheries legislation and fisheries
development in the Lesser Antilles (Goodwin 1985).

An OECS

fisheries desk has also been established in St. Vincent for
the provision of technical services to member states and the
collection of fisheries statistics in the Eastern Caribbean.
The OECS fisheries desk is currently working on a regional
approach to foreign fishing within member states' zones of
national jurisdiction (Blok per. com. 1988).

Other Organizations
In the field of oceanography, The International Oceanographic Commission promotes cooperative international marine
research.

Its projects include the support of research for

projects involving snappers and groupers, lobster migration
and turtle stocks (Idyll 1981).

The Caribbean Fisheries Management Council (CFMA) based in
Puerto Rico is the principal agency involved with United
States fisheries management in the U.S. territories of
Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

Their work has

involved management of reef fisheries, lobster and input
concerning U.s. swordfish management.
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Finally the Gulf and Caribbean Fisheries Institute has met
for 40 years, bringing together U.S. and Caribbean scientists, administrators and industrialists (Idyll 1981).
Papers and sessions include a wide range of topics concerned
with fisheries of the region.

The special topic at last

year's meeting involved the swordfish fishery which has been
recently developed in the region.

Although the OECS is the principal institution involved in
the management of the swordfish fishery of the region, all
of the organizations mentioned are required for management
both within and outside the region.

Stock management and

benefit distribution are dependent on the coordination of
these agencies in data collection, evaluation, information
dissemination and regulation.

These organizations must be

utilized to match the wide biological range of highly
migratory pelagics to the political range of fishery
participants and resource adjacent states involved in the
fishery.
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CHAPTER III

SWORDFISH FISHERY BACKGROUND

During the early 1980s, the swordfish fishery of the Northwest Atlantic was undergoing rapid expansion due to the
relaxing of U.S. mercury regulations in 1978 and growing
consumer demand for the product.

These factors encouraged

the expansion of effort and range of U.S. swordfish operations.

A perceived trend toward declining stocks and issues

associated with fishing outside traditionally fished areas
have made the swordfish fishery one of the most controversial fisheries in the Northwest Atlantic.

This chapter will examine the characteristics which make the
management of the swordfish fishery inherently difficult as
the geographic range of U.S. operations has expanded.

Swordfish Biology
Swordfish, Xiphias gladius, range throughout most of the
temperate and tropical waters of the world between roughly
45 degrees north to 45 degrees south latitude (Conser et
aI, 1985b).

In the Atlantic, swordfish generally occur

throughout this zone with concentrations in the Northwest
Atlantic along the east coast of the United States and
Canada, in the South Atlantic along the South American
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coast, and in the Eastern Atlantic off the west coast of
Spain and in the Mediterranean Sea (Beardsley 1979).
Although their distribution is considered to be continuous
with no clear-cut dividing line between these areas of
concentration, no movement among the areas in question has
been documented with the limited number of tag recaptures
which have been recorded up to 1985.

This suggests the

possibility of separate stocks in the three areas although
it is more likely that at least limited interchange occurs
between these groups (Conser et aI, 1985b).

In the Northwest Atlantic, swordfish inhabit waters from
Newfoundland to Northern South America.

Seasonal shifts of

different age groups have shown central movements which are
dominantly south-north (Hoey and Casey 1983b).

Larger size

groups generally move further north and east than those fish
of smaller age groups.

All groups show a tendency toward

northern movement in the summer and southern movement in the
winter (SAFMC 1985).

Swordfish can be highly migratory in

nature as indicated by tag and recapture of individuals
which have travelled several thousand miles.

This does not

mean that the entire population migrates long distances.
Some elements of the population occur year-round in specific
areas, and different age groups may migrate to different
degrees as mentioned above (SAFMC 1985).

Distribution and

seasonal migration are dependent on temperature, feed
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availability and spawning (SAFMC 1985).

Swordfish are

opportunistic feeders which favor cephalopods (squids) and a
variety of fish species including juvenile swordfish.
Swordfish are often found in greater concentrations where
favorable conditions exist although they are generally
classified as a solitary fish.

Areas which sustain the

greatest fishing effort are the edge of continental shelves
and along ocean frontal zones where swordfish forage is most
abundant, such as the edge of the Gulf Stream off the eastern United States.

This is probably a reflection of the

swordfish's somewhat narrow horizontal distribution (SAFMC
1985).

Larval studies have shown concentrations of occurrences in
the east-central Gulf of Mexico, Straits of Florida and the
Eastern Caribbean.

Swordfish larvae have been collected

throughout the year in the Northwest Atlantic with the
greatest concentrations during the fall and winter (Grall et
aI, 1981).

In the Caribbean Sea the greatest number of

larval swordfish have been collected from November to
February (Berkeley and Houde 1980).

Swordfish are continu-

ous pulse spawners with most spawning activity occurring
during March and April.
fish ranges from lxlO

6

The estimated fecundity of swordto 2.6xlO

7

eggs which are released

into the water column (SAFMC 1985).
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Swordfish exhibit growth differentiation according to sex.
Females grow faster than males after age two and attain a
larger size.

In Florida the largest aged female weighed

over 300 kg compared to the largest males which weighed less
than 140 kg (Berkeley and Houde 1985).

Males reach repro-

ductive maturity at approximately three years of age with a
lower jaw fork length (LJFL) equal to 126 em and a dressed
weight of 17 kg, while females reach reproductive maturity
at five years of age with a LJFL of 151 em and a dressed
weight near 28.8 kg (SAFMC 1985).

History of

th~

Fishery

In 1962 the dominant gear strategy utilized in the Northwest
Atlantic swordfish fishery changed from harpoon to longline
gear.

This change was associated with a dramatic increase

in swordfish landings from 2,500 MT to a high of over 8,000
MT round weight in 1963 (SAFMC 1985).

This figure droped

off and stabilized around 5,000 MT on an annual basis until
1970 (Caddy 1976).

During this period, the fishery was

dominated by Canadian participants who accounted for 80-95%
of landings in the Northwest Atlantic.

The size composition

of the catch was marked by a trend toward smaller fish from
an average dressed weight of 90.7 kg in 1963 to 45.4 kg in
1971 (Beckett 1971).

This decline has been attributed to

the change in gear strategy from harpoons, which take larger
fish.to

longline~.

which are less selective, and the
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expansion of fishing grounds to southern areas where smaller
fish make up a greater percentage of the population (Caddy
1976).

Harpoon effort generally decreased during this

period, while longlining effort increased from under six
million hooks when landings were at their peak to six to
seven million in 1970 (Caddy 1976).

Landings which were

maintained around 5,000 MT in the later 1960's depended on
increased fishing effort and expansion into new fishing
grounds.

The fishery subsequently collapsed after the

imposition of mercury regulations in 1971 (Beckett 1971).

Since 1956, the Japanese have carried out a pelagic longline
fishery in the Atlantic targeting on tuna (Fox 1971).
Swordfish landings from this fishery were incigental because
sets were usually made during the daytime when swordfish are
least likely to feed.

According to ICCAT, annual landings

of incidental by-catch were around 1,800 MT during the late
1960s.

In 1971, the FDA issued guidelines which limited the concentrations of mercury in swordfish to 0.5 ppm.

A positive

correlation between mercury concentration and swordfish body
weight was found to exist; generally the larger the fish,
the larger the concentration of mercury.
could meet

~he

clandestin~

Since few fish

standards, the 1970s were characterized by

fishing operations.
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Fishermen were afraid of

losses to impoundment if the FDA sampled their fish (SAFMC
1985).

Therefore, little is known about the fishery during

this time period although average size and CPUE were
reported to increase as expected after 1970 (Caddy 1976).
In 1978 the FDA restr.ictions were challenged and raised to
1.0 ppm.

This action encouraged a dramatic growth in

fishing effort and expansion to new areas in the fishery.
In 1982 Canadian landings were calculated to be approximately 2,500 MT while

u.s.

landings had reached approxi-

mately 4,100 MT (SAFMC 1985).

Figure 2 illustrates the

areas of longline effort concentration during this period.

Fishin~

Methods

Swordfish are taken by harpoon, entanglement gear, handlines, rod and reel, and longline.
majority of the

u.s.

Longlines take the

commercial catch and are the primary

gear strategy which is employed in the Eastern Caribbean.
Swordfish exploitation began as a commercial longline
fishery in the U.S. in the early 1960s off the Northeast
coast, although it has been practiced by both the Cubans and
Japanese since the 1950s.

The three principal types of longline strategies are the New
England, Florida and Cuban methods although the artisanal
Cuban method is rarely used today (Berkeley et aI, 1981).
The general fishing method can be characterized by the
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following description.

Longlines of up to 40 miles are set

in the evening and retrieved the next morning by vessels
which usually range from 50-85 feet in length (Berkeley et
aI, 1981).

The preferred area for sets are ocean frontal

areas which are the border areas between zones of different
physical characteristics such as the edge of the Gulf
Stream.

In the Caribbean, sets are commonly made in areas

adjacent to shelf areas where the depth may be 1,000 feet or
more.

Swordfish longlining takes

plac~

nocturnal feeding habits of the species.

at night due to the
Hooks are baited

with squid or mackerel and spaced along the main line every
200 to 300 feet (Berkeley et al, 1981).

The main line is

suspended below the surface with floats which may be made up
of inflatable olyethylene balls at a predetermined depth
.

'.

which vaiies around 10 to 20 meters (Campos et al, 1985),
although adjustments are frequently made according to conditions.

The gang ions which are suspended from the mainline

vary in length from 10 to 40 meters also depending on conditions.

Strobe lights and radar reflectors or high flyers

are attached to the main line everyone to one-and one-half
miles (See Figure 3).

The gangions, floats, and high flyers

are all attached to the mainline with stainless steel "snapon" connectors (Berkeley et aI, 1981).

The mainline is made

up of 700-pound test monofilament while the gangion line has
400-pound test monofilament line (McLain per. com. August
1986).

Cyalume chemical lights are suspended 10 to 15 feet
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Figure 3

Longline gear types for swordfish
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lS00

above the bait with elastic or rubber bands for swordfish
attraction (Berkeley et aI, 1981).
to resemble glowing squid.

These lights are thought

The hooks are big game fish

hooks ranging in size from 8/0 to 12/0 (Campos et aI, 1985).

Haulback is usually accomplished hydraulically with a
longline hauler or reel on which the main line is wound
(Berkeley et aI, 1981).

Gear clipped to the mainline is

then detached and fish are taken aboard as the mainline is
retrieved.

Swordfish are dressed immediately and stored on

ice which is made from salt water.

Dressing is accomplished

by removal of the head, fins, entrails and tail.

This

routine is repeated daily until the boat has the catch
required to fill the hold or to make the venture economically viable.

This means that

a

trip may last up to three

weeks with catches ranging from 10,000 to 30,000 pounds per
trip.

There are variations to the preceding description in

gangion spacing, depths, bait, floats and catches which
depend primarily on vessel size and local conditions, but
most methods and gear are similar to what has been described
above.

Most of the operations in the Caribbean are characterized by
a hybrid of New England and Florida methods.

New England

boats, especially those fishing in the Caribbean, are larger
allowing them to travel greater distances, make longer sets
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and spend greater periods of time away from port.

Many of

the Florida vessels are smaller in size because they usually
fish areas where the Gulf Stream comes within 15 miles of
shore, or in the Gulf, and make shorter trips of two to
three days.

The utilization of longer sets and larger

vessels characteristic of New England and of Florida gear
sets which utilize monofilament line, deeper fishing depths
and greater spacing of gangions have been the predominate
gear strategy operating in the Eastern Caribbean.

The Cuban method is rarely used today although it may be
useful for adaptation by Eastern Caribbean artisanal
fishermen, especially in areas where the shelf edge is near
shore.

Unlike the former methods, the sets were approxi-

mately four miles, which is relatively short, and done from
smaller vessels of around 30 feet.

These vessels were not

equipped with the electronic instrumentation which is common
to most longline vessels currently operating.

Lanterns were

utilized instead of cyalume lights for swordfish attraction
and for indication of when a fish is hooked.

The set was

checked for fish throughout the night so that fish were
taken soon after becoming hooked, resulting in less loss due
to sharks.

Retrieval was accomplished by hand instead of

hydraulically.

Fish were then preserved on ice or by

covering with a wet tarp.

Trips were usually limited to one
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night, thereby limiting the effective range of the operation
in comparison to the other two methods (Berkeley 1982).

The utilization of larger New England boats and Florida
methods and gear has been a successful combination in the
Eastern Caribbean, as evidenced by the growing number of
vessels which visit the area each year.

The fishery can be

described as lucrative for the longliner in supplying
swordfish dockside for prices approaching four to five
dollars per pound (Rolon per. com. August 1986) while sold
in the

U.s. for prices approaching $12.00 per pound

depending on location and season.

Commercially viable

concentrations are present in the Eastern Caribbean from
November through May although swordfish are present in the
region throughout the year.

Status of the Swordfish Resource and Fishery
Perhaps the subject which is researched and discussed the
most, but the least understood or agreed on, is that of
swordfish stock health and management.

The swordfish

fishery has been subject to virtually no regulation
throughout its range.
by:

Management measures are complicated

the wide distribution of the species; limited under-

standing of swordfish stock differentiation, biology and
population dynamics; and the number of countries which
participate in the fishery, either directly or indirectly.
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Since over one-half of U.S. landings originate outside the
U.S. EEZ, regulation is further complicated by jurisdictional questions (Pollack 1988).

In 1983 swordfish landings in the Northwest Atlantic peaked
at over 9.3 million pounds (SAFMC 1985).
number of small fish (dressed

weight~40

Recently the
pounds) taken has

risen significantly, and average size has dropped in most
U.s. management regions indicating growth overfishing (SAFMC
1985).

Mean dressed weight has dropped from 83 pounds in

1980 to 60 pounds in 1986 (Pollack 1988).

According to

analytical assessment of Northwest Atlantic stocks, fishing
mortality has increased since 1978 resulting in a 40% drop
in spawning stock biomass of swordfish aged five years or
greater by 1984,.then increased to within 75% of 1978 levels
by 1986 (Southeast Fisheries Center

1986)~

Meanwhile the

number of juveniles of ages 0-2 years remained stable until
1982, then increased thereafter (SEFC 1986).

A 30% reduc-

tion in total stock biomass took place from 1978 through
1982, then stock biomass increased to the 1978 level by
1985.

Catches exceeded stock growth from 1979 through 1980,

became approximately equal to growth in 1981, and increased
from 1982 to 1985 (SEFC 1986).

Total landings have

generally remained stable during the period.

In 1980

u.s.

landings were 8.0 million pounds, while in 1986 landings
were 7.6 million pounds (Pollack 1988).
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Although studies indicate that growth overfishing has taken
place resulting in a smaller averge size, recruitment
overfishing has not occurred (ICCAT report 1985).

Steve

Berkeley of the South Atlantic Fishery Management Council
states that "longliners are working longer and harder and
with more sophisticated gear to catch about the same number
of fish" (Pollack 1988).

The fishery has experienced

substantial increases in the fishing mortality rate since
1978 and has approached the fully exploited level
aI, 1985b).

(C~nser

et

It should be noted that there are inherent

uncertainties associated with the analysis of fish populations due to the effects of natural fluctuations in the
environment, imperfect or incomplete data and models which
cannot fully explain the complexity for fish stocks (Pollack
1988).

United States Swordfish Management
The actual health of swordfish stocks is debatable, but most
studies agree that exploitation is at or near peak production levels, while total effort within their probable range
in the Northwest Atlantic is steadily increasing.

This

guestion has prompted the five U.S. Fishery Councils (New
England, Mid-Atlantic, South Atlantic, Gulf and Caribbean),
whose regions lie within the range of swordfish stocks, to
initiate a cooperative effort to control the resource
through the establishment of a Fisheries Management Plan
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(FMP).

Although this action was initiated over six years

ago, the effort has resulted in very little in the form of
regulation to date.

The last FMP was rejected by the

Secretary of Commerce in 1985.

Management was further

complicated by disagreement among participants, scientists
and managers involved in the Northwest Atlantic longline
fishery whose arguments were as politically motivated as
economic or biological.

The major goal of the FMP currently under consideration is
to reverse the current trend of growth overfishing by the
increase of average weight.

According to Brad Brown of the

Southeast Center, it can be argued that the increase in
fishing mortality due to longline effort has resulted in a
more intensive fishery on the entire resouice ~nd that the
fishery appears to be functioning at or near an optimum
level (Pollack 1988).

However, since price is positively

correlated with swordfish carcass size, pound for pound,
lar.ger fish are more desirable.

The increase in average

size exploited will also raise the time of first capture
which will prevent the future possibility of recruitment
overfishing.

The principal components of the FMP that were under consideration include Variable Season Closures (VSC), mandatory
log requirements, restriction of entanglement gear and on-
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board observers.

Log requirements went into effect in May

of 1986 while the possibility of on-board observers has been
dropped.

VSCs were passed by the Councils, but never en-

acted by the National Marine Fisheries Service.

According

to the South Atlantic Council, "the VSC was designed to
reduce the catch of small swordfish by selectively closing
the fishing grounds during periods when small swordfish are
most concentrated there" (Pollack 1988E, 4).

It was ques-

tioned whether the measure would produce the desired goal
due to the possibility of increased effort during openings
and the difficulty in making the VSC coincide with the
presence of small fish.

According to Craig O'Conner (NMFS acting Southeast Regional
Director),

becaus~

a large proportion of U.S.

originates outside the U.S. EEZ,

l~hdings

"the VSC would deny

American fishermen access to U.S. ports thereby impairing
their ability to compete with foreign vessels fishing the
same waters" (Pollack 1988, 72).

The proposed ban on

imports during closures could help to alleviate the problem,
but it has been blocked by controversy (Pollack 1988).
Meanwhile, adverse effects on

U.S~

tuna longliners due to

the prohibition of nighttime longlining during closures was
another negative factor associated with the VSC measure
(Pollack 1988).

Finally, the Japanese fishing industry

filed suit against the Department of Commerce because the
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proposed measure would limit their longline operations in
the U.S. EEZ (Pollack 1988).

The Japanese contend that VSCs

would "deprive them of a significant part of their tuna
catch" in the U.S. EEZ in which the U.S. has not declared
jurisdiction over tunas (Pollack 1988, 72).

These factors

have combined in killing the proposed VSC regulation.

Size

limits have been proposed for fish under 25 pounds dressed
weight.

This proposal. was rejected by the South Atlantic

Council because lon91ine gear is nonselective, and small
fish will be hooked and killed anyway (Pollack 1988).

Although no regulatory actions have been taken other than
reporting requirements, the U.S. Atlantic Fisheries
Management Councils are planning to amend the swordfish
.

.

management plan in theco~ing jear (Stevens 1988).

~here is

no definitive plan of action at present; however, there is
general agreement among the' councils that management measures are required.

According to Gail Johnson, swordfish

committee chairperson, "fishing mortality is too high across
all age groups and something needs to be done" (Stevens
1988, 20).

The one certainty which remains is that sword-

fish management will remain controversial and the enactment
of a regulatory regime is uncertain in the near future.
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CHAPTER IV

THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN SWORDFISH FISHERY

During the 1983 season, two u.S. mainland longline vessels
initiated the first attempts at the commercial exploitation
of swordfish stocks in the Eastern Caribbean.

In 1986 the

number of vessels operating in the region increased to at
least 50 with some reports that the total may range as high
as 70 (Rolon per. com. 1987).

In 1985 u.S. landings in the

Caribbean Region reached 652,635 pounds.

Landings increased

by nearly 300% to 1,902,750 in 1986, accounting for over a
quarter of the U.S. Atlantic catch of 7,607,909 pounds
(SAFMC 1987a)

(See Tables 9 and 10).

target species,

th~

incidental

In addition to the

by-~a~ch

of marlin, tuna,

wahoo, dolphin fish and a number of shark species has been
reported.

The majority of the commercial fishing vessels which exploit
large pelagics such as swordfish or tuna in the Eastern
Caribbean are of foreign origin.

Most swordfish vessels

originate in the continental United States while the
majority of far-ranging tuna vessels come from Asiatic
nations such as Japan, Taiwan and Korea.

The Japanese have

carried out pelagic longlining in the Atlantic since mid1956 (Fox 1971).

From 1956 through the 1960s they targeted
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TABLE 9

Caribbean
1985 Swordfish Landings and Size Composition

r-bnth

Landings
Dressed Wt.

Mean
Wt.

Total
No.

% (50
lb.

No.

<50
lb.

January

138,170

107.0

1,291

15.1

195

February

143,546

105.5

1,361

10.9

148

March

172,138

101.3

1,699

18.4

313

April

59,971·

91.8

653

24.8

162

May

24,474

101.0

242

21.7

·53

June

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

July

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

August

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

september

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

OCtober

7,901

76.2

104

27.9

29

November

18,630

71.0

262

33.8

89

December

87,805

78.7

1,116

22.0

246

652,635

97.0

6,728

18.4

1,235

Total

Source (SAFMC 1987)
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TABLE 10

Caribbean
1986 Swordfish Landings and Size Composition

funth

landings
Dressed Wt.

Mean
Wt.

'Total
No.

lb.

No.< 50
lb.

%<50

January

275,250

80.6

3,192

32.0

1,021

February

369,000

83.1

4,440

31.6

1,403

March

297,750

83.7

3,557

32.0

1,138

April

270,750

79.9

3,389

31.6

1,071

May

121,500

71.3

1,704

34.5

588

June

57,750

64.7

893

38.1

340

July

28,500

54.8

520

49.9

259

August

15,750

60.5

260

37.1

96

105,750

79.0

1,339

25.7

344

October

90,750

72.8

1,247

31.0

387

November

122,250

74.0

1,652

32.0

52~

December

165,750

81.5

2,034

25.2

513

1,902,750

78.6

september

'Total

24,227
7,689
31. 7
Source (SAFMC 1987)
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on yellowfin tuna in areas adjacent to the Eastern Caribbean
(Fox 1971).

Taiwanese and Korean operations are currently

more active in the region and transship landings through St.
Martin, Curaco and Trinidad and Tobago (Rolon, per. com.
1986).

United States operators who formerly fished in areas adjacent to the mainland originally expanded to U.S. waters
adjacent to Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

The

only requirement for U.S. fishermen who fish in U.S. waters
is a federal swordfish permit which is free of charge.
Although swordfish were known to inhabit Caribbean waters,
stock concentrations and commercial viability were unknown
until these initial attempts were made.
Virgin Island Pelagic Fisheries

In 1984 the U.S.

Developmen~

Project, funded

through the Saltonstall-Kennedy Act, illustrated the potential viability of the fishery as the number of U.S. vessels
visiting the area increased annually (Wood 1986).

The sudden influx of nonindigenous participants and the
introduction of gear technology uncommon in the Lesser
Antilles have resulted in a variety of user conflicts and
policy issues.

Problems began to surface in Puerto Rico and

the U.S. Virgin Islands in 1985.

The landing of longliner

by-catch, including recreational billfish species, put
longliners in conflict with local commercial and
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recreational fishermen.

Meanwhile it became apparent that a

substantial proportion of swordfish landed in Puerto Rico
originated outside U.S. waters.

Issues involving access of

foreign fishing vessels became a pressing policy consideration for island states of the Lesser Antilles because longliners have operated in their fishing zones without permission, or in a manner which was inconsistent with prior
agreements.

Embedded within these policy issues is the

realization that development of a local longline fishery is
impeded by the lack of expertise, experience and capital.
These issues appear before a background riddled with controversy concerning stock health, management and regulation
of the far.-ranging species.

Issues in the U.S. Virgin Islands
and Puerto Rico
The effect of longliner by-catch sales on local markets is
the major source of conflict between local fishermen and
stateside longliners.

Recreational fishermen fear that the

health of several billfish species which they target on is
threatened due to longliner landing.

Foreign tuna vessels

from the Far East have carried out longline operations in
the region for nearly three decades with little or no problem.

The lack of associated conflicts is due to their lack

67

of visibility to local fishermen.

Tuna vessels fish farther

from shore and over greater ranges than U.S. swordfish
vessels, while local markets are not utilized for their
operations' by-catch.

Local Marketing of Incidental By-catch
The question of incidental by-catch and its impact on local
markets and billfish stock health are related to the actual
volume resulting from swordfish operations.

Swordfish

longline gear is only as selective in the capture of other
pelagic species (which also inhabit Eastern Caribbean
waters) as the strategy with which it is fished and deployed.

This means that the depth and time of deployment

are instrumental in the determination of catch composition.
Japanese longline statistics, NMFS exploratory fishing and
New England Swordfish operations illustrated temporal segregation between tuna and billfish which are more vulnerable
to daytime sets, while swordfish are more vulnerable to
nighttime effort (SAFMC 1985) (see Figure 4).

The strategy

of nocturnal gear deployment is selective for swordfish with
a predominate incidental by-catch of sharks (Hoey and Casey
1983a).

Longline operations which target on tuna are

generally set during the day and yield a by-catch of sharks
and a greater percentage of billfish species and other
teleosts than nocturnal sets (Casey et aI, 1983).
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In 1986 the Caribbean Region reported landings of 110,077
pounds of billfish and 287,863 pounds of tuna (SAFMC 1987a)
(see Table 11).

The incidental catch of fish actually

hooked is lacking except for 78 sets made by the U.S. Virgin
Islands Pelagic Fisheries Development Project.

This is a

relatively small sample size from which to draw conclusions,
but it reported the expected predominance of swordfish at
nearly 50% and sharks at 32%.

Other telosts including tuna,

marlin, dolphin and others totalled approximately 16% of
total landings (Wood 1984) (see Table 12).

Although these

figures should be treated cautiously, ln association with
the studies cited earlier, they indicate that by-catch rate
of sharks is substantial, probably as high as 50%, while the
by-catch of teleosts such as tuna, wahoo and dolphin are
likely to be between 10% and 20%.

It seems reasonable to expect that a great deal of variation
in amount and composition of landed by-catch exists, depending on each vessel's objectives and fishing strategy.
Although swordfish longline retrieval is usually started
before first light, it may take over six hours, thereby
extending into daylight hours due to the length of sets
which may approach 40 miles (Rolon per. com. 1986).

The

result is the capture of a greater percentage of species
that are commonly caught during daylight hours such as tuna,
marlin, sailfish, dolphin, and wahoo (McLain per. com.
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TABLE 11
Swordfish
Dressed Wt.
Value

Whole Wt.

NE & MA

3,720,750

$ 9,332,214

1,818,370

$ 5,358,043

14,000

South Atlantic

1,385,909

3,869,183

672,913

1,061,819

36,218

20,685

Gulf Of Mexico

598,500

1,617,855

6,734,981

9,637,893

141,400

89,082

caribbean

1,902,750

5,258,335

287,863

541,811

110,077

16,394

Total

7,607,909

20,077,587

9,514,127

16,599,566

301,277

134,282

54.54%

54.61%

45.09%

1. 73%

0.37%

Area
-

% of Total

43.67%

Tuna
-

Value

Billfish
Whole Wt.
Value

"0
1986 u.S. long1ine landings and value of swordfish, tuna and
billfish acording to u.S. management region.
Source (South Atlantic Fisheries Management Council 1987)

$

8,400

Species
swordfish
(xiphias gladius)

TABLE 12
Longline catch Composition
Number caught
133

Relative Abundance
.496

blue shark
(Prionace glauca)

20

.074

blacktip shark
(carcharhinus limbatus)

13

.048

whitetip sharks
(Eularnia longimanus)

10

.037

hammerhead shark
(Sphyrna rnokarran)

6

.022

bull shark
(Eularnina leucas)

4

.015

tiger shark
(Galeocerdo cavieri)

4

.015

unidentified sharks

29

.107

blackfin tuna
(Thunnus atlanticus)

12

.044

3

.Oll

escolar
(Lepidocybium flavorbrunneum)

12

.044

blue marlin
(Makaira nigricans)

14

.051

3

.011

dolphin fish
(Coryphaena hippurus)

2

.007

sailfish

2

.007

white marlin
(Tetrapturus albidus)

1

.004

snake mackeral
(Gempylus serpens)

1

.004

Totals
Source (Wood 1986)

272

.997

yellowf in tuna
(Thunnus albacarus)

Wahoo

(Acanthocybium solandr i)

(Istiophor~5

platypterus)
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1986).

Recent increases in the price of fresh tuna are

making them a valuable component of landings.

Sharks have

been reported as a nuisance due to the damage they cause to
hooked swordfish.

Most shark species have a low dockside

value and are prone to spoilage without special treatment.
Therefore, they are usually cut from the mainline to save
time and money.

It has been reported that marlin may also

be cut away or released due to their low dockside value.

The press reports a difference between the major companies'
vessels which seem to have a set of ethical rules and renegade vessels which have little regard for the preservation
of gamefish or local conditions (Martin and Woods 1986d).
Hypothetically, the behavior of fishermen will be dictated
by their self-interest, in this case most likely being
financial returns due to the transitory nature of their
operations.

If there are low marginal costs associated with

the use of available space and the extra effort involved
with incidental catch retention, or daytime effort, then
by-catch will be retained.

Combine low costs of retention

with ready dockside markets, and incidental by-catch becomes
an attractive commercial proposition for the longliner.

If

it is not cost effective to send these species to the U.S.
by airfreight from Puerto Rico, then it will be sold locally.

Mainland longliners who wish to sell fish locally must

obtain a Virgin Islands commercial fishing license for five
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dollars (Christian per. com. 1986).

Sales may be carried

out by the company which is involved in the enterprise or as
"shack" (the sale of incidental catch), the profits of which
are immediately split by the crew (Rolon per. com. 1986).
A major factor contributing to disruption of local markets
is the relatively low price of by-catch in relation to the
prices normally obtained by local fishermen for the same
pelagic species such as dolphin fish.

Local fishermen cite

examples where they have been undersold for species such as
dolphin fish for prices of $2 or less per pound (Hildebrant

1986).

Swordfish vessels are not constrained by the same

costs and conditions which affect local fishermen.

The

outcome appears to result in the dumping of fish which
creates temporary market gluts and prices which may be below
the local cost of local production (CFMC 1986).

In both the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico the lack of
infrastructural facilities for product storage and marketing
may leave the fisherman without an alternative on a given
day.

An example reported in Puerto Rico involves middlemen

who normally deal with local fishermen.

They cite greater

profits, regular supply and a high guality product as factors which attract them to longliner by-catch marketing
(Rolon per. com. 1986).

Tourist hotels find large pelagics

such as fresh dolphin fish or tuna desirable for their menus
for the reasons cited above (CFMC 1986).
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Local catches

which are generally composed of pot fish are also in
competition with longliner by-catch.

dir~ct

The actual or per-

ceived threat of ciguatera in reef fish is not present in
the pelagics landed by longliners, presenting another possible reason for preference of the latter.

Total imports of fish and fish products amounted to 2.2
million pounds in the U.S. Virgin Islands and 53.8 million
pounds for Puerto Rico in 19.80, as compared to 1.5 and 7.2
million pounds which were landed in the same year (CFMC
1985).

Although salt cod and luxury tourist products are

included in these import statistics, the figures illustrate
a large short fall

in the supply of fishery products.

From

the consumer's side, locally produced fishery products are
considered somewhat scarce and expensive at prices approaching or surpassing $3 per pound for mixed reef fish.

It

seems reasonable to expect that the general population and
restaurants of the USVI and Puerto Rico stand to benefit
from an increase in fish supplies in the form of lower
prices, better quality and greater choice.

In the long term, or on an annual basis, it is apparent that
short falls of supply in relation to demand occur in most of
the Eastern Caribbean.

The problem occurs in particular

markets at certain times of year in an area which has a
poorly developed fisheries marketing infrastructure.
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The

established marketing system, although imperfect, has
evolved over a long period of time and has more or less met
the fishermen's needs until the advent of longlining bycatch.

When a new element was introduced to an already

somewhat stressed and delicate system, it caused disruption
to fishermen who were already operating what is in many
cases a marginal enterprise.

Most fishermen believe that

the local fishing industry has stagnated or is in decline
while most inshore stocks are at or beyond maximum levels of
exploitation (Taylor 1986).

The income of fishermen aver-

ages below $300 per month in this region (CFMC 1985).
Swordfish fishing is not a traditional activity among local
fishermen.

They do not "seem particularly worried about the

impact of the longliners on stocks of swordfish" (CFMC
1986-8).

However, local fisherm~n believe that the long-

liners are in part responsible for a perceived decline in
pelagics which they also target such as dolphin fish, wahoo
and occasional tuna and marlin (CFMC 1986).

Recreational Concerns
Another area of concern is the possible detrimental effect
of swordfish longlining on recreational species such as
marlin and sailfish.

Recreational fishermen perceive long-

lining as a threat to populations of the large highly migratory pelagic species which they target (CFMC 1986).
1986, longline landings of billfish in the Caribbean
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In

Management Region totalled 110,077 pounds as compared to
1,902,750 pounds of swordfish (SAFMC 1987a) (see Table 11).
This figure may have been low relative to the number of fish
actually hooked because marlin were sometimes cut off dead
or alive due to their relatively low dockside value (Rolon
per. com. 1986).

Also a portion of the billfish landed may

not have been included in these figures because it was
reported that fish were landed illegally without a local
commercial fishing license.

Dockside prices were reported

to be $.60 to $1.20 per pound, although during the last two
years the price has been rising (Rolon per com. 1986).
Recreational and small commercial fishermen also reported
11,000 pounds landed in 1985 for an ex-vessel value of $1.50
per pound (SAFMC 1987b).

As noted previously, incidence of billfish by-catch is
greater for daytime as opposed to nocturnal longline sets.
In the USVI Pelagic Fisheries Development Project, sailfish
and marlin constituted approximately 6% of the total catch
(Wood 1986).

NMFS exploratory fishing and commercial sword-

fish data off the east coast of the united States resulted
in a composition of less than 1% billfish for night sets
(SAFMC 1985).

The tuna longliners operating throughout much

of their range utilize daytime sets which may account for
higher rates of hooked fish per. unit effort.
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Species

composition data indicates percentage catch of 4% billfish
as the result of Japanese tuna effort (Casey and Hoey 1983)
(see Figure 4).

An accurate mortality rate for marlin

released from longlines may vary markedly although 47% for
blue marlin and 71% for white marlin have been cited in
observer reports from Japanese longline operations (SAFMC
1987b).

Stock assessment analysis is plagued by deficiencies in
basic data and biological parameters (ICCAT report 1985).
Sailfish appear to be only moderately exploited, but a
better picture could be achieved if data concerning sailfish
and spearfish species were separated and with better overall
data collection (ICCAT Report 1985).

Stock condition of

white and blue marlin is also unclear although "a declining
trend in CPUE for both species is seen as a cause for concern" (SAFMC 1987b, 10).

Bill Vissner, an organizer of

Caribbean billfish tournaments, feels that "the billfish
population has declined dramatically over the past few years
and that longliners are responsible for an 85% reduction in
billfish landings" (Stimpson 1988, 50).

It should be empha-

sized that, although this is a common view among recreational fishermen, scientific analysis cannot support this
assertion.
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Fisheries in the Western North Atlantic
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sport fishing brings to~rist dollars into the local economy
for charter boats, equipment and indirect revenues to various service sectors of the economy (Campos et aI, 1986).
Expenditures by participants in the U.S. recreational billfish fishery were estimated at approximately $100 million in
1977-78 (SAFMC 1987b).

The actual figure may be larger due

"to inflation, growth in the activity and indirect expenditures which were not accounted for in the study"
1987b,27).

(SAFMC

Fishing tournaments are annual attractions in

both Puerto Rico and USVI.

A National Marine Fisheries

study done by the Clapp and Mayne Consulting Firm stated
that the marine recreational fleet of Puerto Rico was composed of 8,200 vessels with an investment of $85.3 million
in 1979 (Puerto Rico Sea Grant, per. com. 1987).

Caution

should be exercised with these figur~s because they do not
represent the actual economic value of the resource.

They

are also crude estimates if projected to 1988, yet these
figures illustrate that the recreational billfish fishery is
an important component of the region's economy.

Conclusion
The investigation of by-catch landing composition and volume
is essential to gain a better understanding of the problem.
In addition, the voluntary stationing of on board observers
could supply valuable data on the composition of fish actually hooked and fishing operations.
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Since longliner

landings are seasonal and have localized effects, a better
understanding of local marketing infrastructure could assist
in the formulation of policies which could minimize effects
on the local industry.

CODREMAR, the agency in Puerto Rico which classifies and
inventories catches of small boat fishermen,

is doing

surveys on landings of longliners in Puerto Rich (Kimmel
per. com. 1987).

In 1986, a contract was awarded to the

University of Puerto Rico to begin the Caribbean Observer
Project (NMFS 1987).

ICCAT is also intensifying efforts in

the research of Atlantic billfish.

The fisheries councils

of the Atlantic U.S. recently proposed a Billfish Management
Plan which will prohibit the commercial sale of billfish and
require size limits 6~ fish retained by r~creation~l operations (SAFMC 1987b).

This plan illustrates current concerns

regarding recreational billfish stock health.

Local market interactions and impacts on recreational stocks
are issues which have no easy answers, but they illustrate
valuable lessons in dealing with the swordfish fishery.
These issues have the potential to be instructive and to
contribute to future policies of Eastern Caribbean states
throughout the region as the U.S. longline presence expands.
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Illegal Swordfish Longlining in Eastern
Caribbean States' Waters
The illegal operation of U.S. longline vessels in Lesser
Antillean nations' waters, either due to unauthorized entry
or by operating in a manner inconsistent with prior agreements, has become a major issue in the Eastern Caribbean
region.

A significant percentage of the 1,902,750 pounds of

swordfish reported for the U.S. Caribbean Region originates
beyond the U.S. zone.

During the Caribbean Pelagic Re-

sources session of the 40th Annual Gulf and Caribbean
Fisheries Institute, U.S. industry participants openly
admitted to fishing in other island nations' waters (Merritt
1987).

Al Merritt also stated that, "And I can't say we

never poached.

We're not lily white"

(Stimpson 1988, 51).

Bob McAuliffe, a representative on the Caribbean Management
Council illustrates the attitude which may be common among a
large segment of longliners when he stated that, "the major
problem this year is that the smaller independent Caribbean
states view the ocean as their private property" (Stimpson
1988, 51).

The question remains as to the frequency of

longliner intrusions and the amount of fish caught in the
fishing zones of the Eastern Caribbean island states.

The Case of the British Virgin Islands
The most immediate problem and best documented case involves
the British Virgin Islands.

The "Reciprocal Fisheries
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Agreement Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland" states that commercial fishing
by vessels of the United States may continue in the territorial waters of the British Virgin Islands (BVI) in
accordance with existing patterns and at existing levels.
In 1977, when this agreement was drafted, there was no
swordfish fishery with only a small number of USVI pot
fishermen utilizing stocks in BVI waters.

Longlining initi-

ated by U.S. vessels in 1983 prompted the British Virgin
Islands to draft new requirements for entry of U.S. longline
vessels.

The 1985 amendment r.equired a higher fee,

from

$150 to a $7000 permit for each vessel, required reporting
of swordfish catch and the landing of all by-catch at the
British Virgin Islands fisheries terminal (Walters per com.
1986).

In the 1985-86 season, 13 of the 14 vessels permitted to
fish reported the taking of 400,000 pounds of swordfish and
10,615 pounds of by-catch which was landed in the BVI
(Walters per com. 1986).

In addition to late reporting of

swordfish catch, only eight of the 13 vessels operating in
BVI waters complied with by-catch landing requirements
(Walters per. com. 1986, CFMC 1986).

The price offered in

the BVI by the government cooperative handling by-catch
landings was only $.30-$.50 per pound although according to
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Mr. Blok, the acting BVI Fisheries Officer, this was never
actually paid (Blok per. com. 1987, Walters per. com. 1986).
It was suspected that a large percentage of the by-catch
actually went to the USVI or Puerto Rico where $2 to $3 per
pound could be obtained (Rolon per. com. 1986).

These

factors dismayed BVI officials who issued permits for four
vessels during the 1986-87 season with a reported catch of
71,278 pounds of swordfish and 5,350 pounds of by-catch
(Blok per. com. 1987).

In the 1987-88 season the number of

vessels permitted to work in the British Virgin Islands Zone
dropped to two with a swordfish catch of approximately
100,000 pounds and landed by-catch of nearly 5,000 pounds
(Blok per. com. 1988).

By-catch was made up of predomi-

nately tuna and marlin species (Blok per. com. 1988).

The

reasoris given for intreased sw~rdfish landings iri 1987-88
were better reporting at the Puerto Rico terminal and better
all-round fishing than during the previous season (Blok per.
com. 1988).

The reason for limiting entry of vessels re-

lated to poor cooperation in previous years, but the two
vessels currently permitted have been very cooperative (Blok
per. com. 1988).

In respect to enforcement, the BVI has a police boat which
is frequently unavailable for fisheries work or inoperative
(Walters per. com. 1986).

It is responsible for the entire

200-mile zone of 84,000 square miles which is under BVI
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jurisdiction (Gold et aI, 1985).

It is suspected that other

U.S. swordfish vessels operate illegally within the BVI
Fisheries Zone.

The BVI also requires that foreign vessels

take domestic observers for compliance monitoring, data
collection and familiarization with the fishery.

Illegal Fishing in Other Parts of the Region
Another activity which is unconfirmed in many cases, but
likely in light of the longline fishermen's attitudes previously cited, is the operation of U.s.
Eastern Caribbean nations' waters.

longliners in other

A confirmed report

involved three Florida-based fishing vessels which were
detained by St. Vincent officials (San Juan Star 1986).

One

vessel allegedly had engine trouble, and when the two other
vessels entered within 12 miles of St. Vincent waters all
three were seized (San Juan Star 1986).

The boat which had

been fishing had a sizable quantity of swordfish on board,
$75,000 worth according to the captain (San Juan Star 1986).
The captain of the "Miller Time" claimed the $200,000 fine
demanded for release of the vessel was "extortion, ransom whatever"

(San Juan Star 1986).

Sightings of U.S. long-

liners have been reported by an Anguillan fisherman in 1986
(Carty per. corn. 1986).

Meanwhile, amid controversy Merritt

boats attempted operations in Venezuelan waters (Stimpson
1988).

Al Merritt, owner of Merritt's Seafood, stated that

he has approached several island nations for fishing permits
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(Merritt per. corn. 1987).

These reports indicate that U.S.

longline activity extends beyond the U.S. zone along the
entire Lesser Antillean island chain.

Therefore, a substan-

tial proportion of the reported BVI and USVI catch may
actually come from areas beyond their respective fisheries
zones.

Without exception, the neighboring island nations of the
region lack the enforcement capabilities required to deal
with foreign fishing vessels.

In addition, although ex-

tended jurisdiction had become a widely recognized component
of international law, Eastern Caribbean states are only now
in the process of developing necessary legal and technical
institutions to deal with the problem.

The U.S. Department of Commerce could be of some assistance
by the enforcement of the Lacey Act.

This law gives the

U.S. government the right to prosecute U.S. nationals who
are importing fishery or wildlife products which were obtained in violation of foreign law recognized by the United
States (Christian per. com. 1986).

For U.S. enforcement

followup, the country in question must report the vessel's
description, location and whether fishing gear was deployed
at the time of the sighting (Christian per. com. 1986).
Therefore, a U.S. vessel which is fishing illegally in other
nations' waters is subject to U.S. prosecution although this
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has not happened during the short history of the swordfish
fishery in the Eastern Caribbean.

It might be suspected

that fisheries enforcement of this type is not a priority in
the region given

u.s.

preoccupation with drug enforcement.

Local Development of a Pelagic Longline Fishery
Another issue relates to the revenues which are not kept in
the local economy because most longliners are based in the
mainland United States..

It might be concluded that the

local fishermen and population of both the

u.s.

territories

and Eastern Caribbean states could derive greater benefits
from direct participation in the swordfish fishery.

The

potential feasibility of a local fishery was one of the main
objectives of the

u.s.

Virgin Islands Pelagic Fisheries

Development Project(~ood 1986).

The inshore reef fish~ries

of most of the region's islands are already at or beyond
maximum sustainable levels of exploitation.

Local exploita-

tion of pelagic resources on islands such as Barbados,
Grenada, Dominica and St. Lucia is substantial for flying
fish, dolphin fish,
(Goodwin 1985).

kingfish and tunas in some cases

Yet, the local development of a pelagic

longline fishery is practically nonexistent.

One reason might be the capital requirements for what might
be considered a risky venture.

There is little room for

error if operating and finance costs are to be covered
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during the initial year of operation.

In 1979 an investment

of $80,000 was required for a 36-foot vessel and gear, with
variable and fixed costs for the first year totalling nearly
$85,000 (Cato and Lawlor 1981).

In Florida, gross revenues

of nearly $150,000 were expected assuming a catch of 70,000
pounds (Cato and Lawlor 1981).

During the past seven years,

these costs have surely increased, pushing initial investment requirements beyond the capabilities of the majority of
local fishermen.

The U.S. Virgin Islands Development

Project utilized a vessel of similar size and indicated that
sets longer than the six miles they used were required for a
profitable operation (Wood 1986).

Most vessels currently

operating in the region are of larger size allowing them to
utilize longer 40-mile sets and to spend longer periods at
sea.

It is questionable whether smaller vessels could be

competitive given the current structure of the fishery.

Local fisherman may also have problems in adapting to new
fishing methods and strategies.

Most fishermen have worked

in a less capital intensive pot fishery.

A local pelagic

longline fishery will require a jump in vessel size, required equipment, fishing skills and record keeping and
accounting skills to compete with the boats arriving from
the mainland.

A coordinated extension program oriented

toward the adaptation of islands technology to the swordfish
fishery, a long-term monitoring system and provision of
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startup costs are required if the activity is to have a
chance at becoming a viable alternative for local fishermen.
Even if the required skills and capital can be transferred,
cultural and social factors may prohibit development.

Local

fishermen are not accustomed to spending long periods at sea
which they may find unacceptable.

They may also be risk

adverse when presented with new methods with which they are
not personally familiar.

Two vessels were operated by British Virgin Islands fishermen during the 1987-88 season.

One of them failed because

they simply could not find fish (Blok per. com. 1988).
least one vessel is now being operated out of the
Virgin Islands although the owner is from the
(Stimpson1988).

u.s.

At

u.s.
mainland

In Grenada local longlining for Atlantic

sailfish was recently reported (Bryant 1988).

Generally

longlining remains an activity undertaken by foreign participants.

Local development may be possible, but it will

require consideration of many of the factors cited above,
including time.

Other Considerations
The stock management problems of the Eastern Caribbean are
magnified by the newness of the fishery and the lack of
associated data.

Evidence related to local swordfish popu-

lation origin and migratory patterns are less certain than
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those of other regions to the north.

Preliminary landing

statistics show a greater average size than landings of the
Southeast and Gulf regions of the United States (SAFMC
1987a).

There is evidence that a segment of the swordfish

population remains in the eastern Caribbean throughout the
year.

Therefore, various segments of population may have

different migration patterns dependent on age.

It has also

been speculated that swordfish landed in the region may
originate from southern areas adjacent to South America
(Rolon per. com. 1986).

The Caribbean is also probably a

major spawning area for swordfish as evidenced by larval
studies.

All these possibilities illustrate the underlying

uncertainties related to the dynamics of the Caribbean
region's swordfish stock dynamics.

Another factor relates to the growing demand for fishery
products in the continental United States, especially for
highly valued species such as swordfish.

Consumption of

swordfish reached record levels in 1986 at approximately 21
million pounds including imports (Lipton 1986).

Assuming no

changes in real prices due to the dollar exchange rate with
exporting countries and consumer preferences, consumption
would exceed 30 million pounds in 1995 (Lipton 1986).

Meanwhile, recent increases in tuna prices, due to U.S.
fresh and sushi markets and a growing Japanese export
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market, have increased the value of species such as bigeye
beyond prices for swordfish in some cases.

In the Gulf,

yellowfin tuna landings increased from 148 thousand pounds
in 1983 to 3 million pounds in 1985 (Pollack 1987).

It was

reported during the 1987 Caribbean season that tuna became
an important segment of longliner landings for many fishermen due to rising prices (Rolon per. com. 1987).

It was

also indicated that some daytime sets were made to target
exclusively on tuna.

Sharks are an under-utilized species which are currently
considered a nuisance to swordfish operations due to the
damage they cause to hooked swordfish and the time and
effort wasted when they are hooked (McLain per. com. 1986).
Although they make up a high percentage of total fish
hooked, only certain species are taken due to their relatively low value.

Unlike other large pelagics, fecundity is

low for shark spcies, making their populations more susceptible to fishing pressure.

In the future, under-utilized

shark species could become a valuable resource while impacts
on those species of present commercial value could become
serious.

Increases in longline effort of U.S. vessels seem probable
due to the factors cited above.

90

In addition, longline

efforts of other nations such as Korea, Spain and Venezuela
are reported in areas within or adjacent to the region
(Campos and Munoz-Roure 1986).

The central problem in the Eastern Caribbean region relates
the sharing of benefits accruing from the exploitation of
highly migratory species among resource adjacent island
states and the nations which possess the capital and expertise to exploit the resource.

Yet side issues

exi~t

con-

cerning the best possible use of pelagic resources affected
by the swordfish fishery such as recreational species.
Meanwhile, all fishery participants are intricately related
to the complex issues associated with the goal of stock
conservation due to the wide ranges of large pelagic
species.

Only through international cooperation will it

become possible to implement sound management measures.
Fisheries management principles, international ocean law and
regional management strategies are currently evolving as
responses are formulated to many of these issues.

The next

two chapters will examine these factors for their potential
application to the Eastern Caribbean.
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CHAPTER V

MANAGEMENT OF HIGHLY MIGRATORY SPECIES

The objective of this chapter is to present a general
overview of HMS management.

This is initiated through an

examination of management objectives, basic principles of
fisheries management and international legal aspects of
highly migratory species management.

These factors are the

basis from which management regimes can
and evolved.

b~

organized, built

However, the application of these principles

must also be modified due to constraints such as site
specific factors, imperfect information and the differences
between simplified models and complex real world situations.

General Principles of HMS Management
Management Objectives
Highly migratory species are among the most complex and
controversial stocks to manage.

They are the most extreme

example of transboundary stocks because their wide-ranging
oceanic migrations repeatedly cross boundaries between zones
of national jurisdiction and the high seas.

Tuna and bill-

fish species are the two major groupings of highly migratory
fish which are treated in this chapter.

These species have

exceptionally wide ranges, and their conservation is dependent on international cooperation (Joseph and Greenough
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1979).

According to the Law of the Sea Treaty, Dolphin

fish, Cetaceans, oceanic sharks and sauries also fit within
the highly migratory category, but are not dealt with in
this report (United Nations 1983).

Tunas and billfish are

among the highest valued fishes, due to their demand as food
fish and the recreational excitement they provide at the end
of a fishing line.

Due to their high demand, fishing effort

has increased dramatically within the last three decades.
Some commercial stocks, such as Atlantic swordfish, southern
and northern bluefin tuna and Eastern Pacific yellowfin
tuna, are now considered to be at or beyond maximum levels
of exploitation (Saila and Norton 1974, Hilborn and Sibert
1988).

The identification of management objectives is the first
step in devising potential HMS management arrangements.

A

1971 FAD publication cited the following tuna management
objectives which were identified in a joint meeting of the
Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council and the Indian Ocean Fishery
Commission (Saila and Norton 1974).

These objectives are

still appropriate 15 years later and apply to most HMS.
five main objectives include:
"(I)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Maintenance of tuna (HMS) stocks at levels that
provide high sustained yields;
Improved economic efficiency;
Appropriate distribution of benefits;
Measures which afford the opportunity for
countries not yet participating in tuna (HMS)
fishing to build up their fishing industries;
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The

(5)

Conservation measures that do not interfere with
development of unexploited stocks"
(Saila and Norton 1974, 37).

Objective 5 may also be stated as:

Conservation measures

which can protect stocks caught incidentally while creating
as little disruption as possible to the primary fishing
operation.

It should be recognized that the strong interrelationships
which exist between objectives mean that achievement of one
objective may conflict with another (Saila and Norton 1974).
The following section examines these objectives in terms of
basic fisheries management principles.

These principles are

initially presented under ideal conditions; then they are
related to realities of HMS management.

Stock management
Objective (I), the maintenance of high sustained yields, is
of interest to all concerned parties.

From a biological

perspective, "conservation of a stock depends on the balance
between losses due to natural and fishing mortality and
gains in stock growth"

(Copes 1987, 5).

of individual fish of fishable size.

A stock is made up

The stock increases in

biomass through recruitment, juvenile fish which reach
fishable size, or by the growth of fish which are already
part of the stock (Copes 1987).
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The relationship between

stock gains and losses due to fishing effort is explained by
an analysis of "effects of fishing effort on fish catches
over time" (Copes 1987, 5).

The relationship between yield

and effort shows "the yields that can be sustained at
various levels of long-term effect" (Copes 1987, 7).

This

is called a surplus yield model because it represents the
surplus which can be harvested on a sustained basis at a
given level of effort (Copes 1987).

Maximum Sustainable

Yield (MSY) is the level of effort which will result in the
largest possible sustained yield.

Figure 5 illustrates that

increases in effort beyond MSY will in the long run decrease
landings due to the decline in the standing stock of fish.

Surplus yield models are utilized for most of the world's
tuna stocks because:

they are relatively simple; they

require catch and effort statistics which are available and
they are "reasonably well suited for long-lived species such
as tuna" (Copes 1987, 8).

Therefore, to satisfy objective

(1), Total Allowable Catch (TAC) could be set at MSY.

This

would provide the highest possible sustained yields without
the risk of over-exploitation while producing the greatest
amount of protein possible for the world population (Copes
1987) (See Figure 5).

Unfortunately, maximum sustained yield is an ambiguous term
due to an incomplete scientific understanding of stock
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Figure 5

Surplus Yield Model

MSY

//\
I

;

I
I
I
I
I
I
I

,

o

,

,

\

\

\

x

K
Effort (amount of fishing)

This curve illustrates a yield-effort relationship.
The
curve represents the yields that can be sustained at various
levels of long-run effort. Long-run means that equilibrium
will be reached among the stock and catch levels at a given
level of effort over a period of time depending on stock
dynamics.
MSY is the maximum yield of fish which can be
harvested from a stock on a sustained basis.
Source (Copes 1987)

96

populations and imperfect information.

The importance of

the preceding explanation is that, like most renewable resources, a biological limit to prduction on a sustainable
basis exists for HMS (Saila and Norton 1974).

Economic efficiency
The presence of strong interrelationships between objectives
means that an action in one area such as objective (1), high
sustained yields if set at MSY, will affect another such as
objective (2), economic efficiency (Saila and Norton 1974).
Economists would argue that MSY is only a measure of gross
benefits without accounting for the cost of production
(Copes 1987).

From a standpoint of economic efficiency,

benefits should be measured by the difference between "the
value of the catch over the costs of production" (Copes
1987, 9).

Figure 6 illustrates the maximum economic yield

(MEY), the point at which "the maximum net benefit or
resource rent can be generated" (Copes 1987, 9).

MEY will

be lower than MSY in respect to effort and total landings,
but it will yield the greatest resource rent without
threatening over-exploitation.

Like MSY, MEY is difficult

to attain due to modeling and information constraints while
the political goals of user groups make agreement on a set
level of effort difficult to attain.
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The common property character of most fisheries resources is
usually a major factor which contributes to their economic
and biologic waste.

Under open access, all fishermen have

access to a given stock, but they neither control nor own
the stock.

An individual fisherman has no incentive to

limit harvests for the maintenance of productivity because
other fishermen fishing the same stock will capture these
benefits (Copes 1987).

Fishermen will continue to enter the

fishery with corresponding increases in effort until economic benefits are equal to economic costs (See Figure 6).
At this point, the economic rent has been dissipated and
overcapitalization has occurred.

Therefore, the high

opportunity cost of labor and capital utilized in the
fishery indicates that resources could be better utilized in
another economic sector.

The use of overall catch quotas to satisfy objective (1)
will lead to overcapitalization.

Individual fishing nations

will generate over capacity in the race to catch as much as
possible before the quota is reached (Saila and Norton
1974).

The limitation of effort through limited entry is

one strategy which could satisfy objective (2).

Improved

economic efficiency will also result if those nations with a
comparative advantage are allowed to operate.

For highly

migratory species, this could be accomplished through the
establishment of transferable national quotas.
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Figure 6 Bioeconomic Model
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In this diagram the yield curve is transformed into a
revenue curve by multiplying the yield at different effort
levels by a constant price.
Total costs are proportional to
the level of effort, and they are represented by a linear
cost curve.
The maximum net benefit or resource rent that
can be generated is MN which occurs at an effort level of OL.
This is the maximum economic yield (MEY).
At MSY the resource
rent is smaller while at effort level OP, which corresponds
to an open access situation, there are no net ben~fits in the
fishery.
Therefore at the effort level OL the government of
the coastal state in question can collect the greatest amount
of revenue illustrated by MN while at effort level OP the
economic rent has been dissipated and there is no room to
generate revenues through access fees.
Source (Copes 1987)
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rights are transferable or marketable among nations, then
shifts to those operations with lower labor and capital
costs could take place (Saila and Norton 1974).

Unfor-

tunately, a system of this type would require a large degree
of political compromise for the distribution of the resource
among concerned parties.

This is not presently realistic on

an international level in most cases.

Distribution of benefits
The question of benefit distribution involves the coastal
state or resource adjacent nations (RANs) and the distant
water fishing nations (DWFNs).

The increased mobility of

foreign fishing fleets during the 1960s, the development of
excess harvesting capacity and high resource demand have
resulted in the expansion of DWFNs to new fishing grounds
and increased effort worldwide (Saila and Norton 1974).
Since the near universal acceptance of exclusive economic or
fishing zones, governments have claimed ownership or
management authority over stocks within their respective
zones of jurisdiction.

Ideally, objective (3), the distribution of benefits, could
be satisfied through the charging of entry or license fees
from those DWFNs which wish to operate within RAN fishing
zones (Copes 1987).

The greater the rent (the amount above

normal levels of return for labor and capital, or economic
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costs), the greater the license fees which can be charged
without discouraging the vessels from operating in the given
nation's fishing zones (Copes 1987).

If an open access

situation exists, then boats will enter the fishery until
they break even.

In the case of open access or if excess

effort is allowed to enter a RAN's zone, the rent is
dissipated to the point where license fees will make the
boats leave the fishery.

This will leave no room for

revenue generation by the government of the coastal state in
question (Copes 1987).

Joint venture arrangements can

involve cooperation beyond the charging of license fees.
Assistance in the development of domestic fishing and
processing sectors are other ways in which benefits can be
realized by the RAN.

In the case of HMS, their wide-ranging nature makes management difficult on a national basis because the highly migratory resource retains its common property character on the
high seas.

In addition, stocks also move from one zone of

national jurisdiction to another.

Stock management can then

be complicated by different management approaches depending
on individual national policies.

Entry can be limited on

the national level, but usually not on the international
level.

Therefore in most cases no one RAN has control over

objectives (1), maintenance of stocks at high levels, and
(2), increasing economic efficiency, because of neighboring
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nations' policies and high seas fishing by DWFNs.

An addi-

tional complicating factor involves enforcement.

Many RANs

which have excess stocks adjacent to their shores are
developing nations which lack the enforcement capabilities
required to effectively police their zones.

Therefore, in

reality, open access still exists within many zones of
national jurisdiction as well as the high seas.

Resource adjacent nation fishery development
Objective (4), the building of RAN fishing industries, is
related to objective (3), the appropriate distribution of
benefits.

The generation of employment, export earnings and

a domestic supply of protein are potential benefits which
could be obtained by the RAN.

However, these benefits must

be weighed against the required foreign exchange, fishing
skills and infrastructure of more capital intensive fishing
operations.

In addition, competition with existing fleets

and overcapacity in many HMS fisheries will make the
achievement of this objective difficult.

If the country in

question decides to develop a local fishery,

then objective

(2), increased ec6nomicefficiency, might be relaxed in
favor of the social benefits produced within the RAN.

Another problem involves the relationship between domestic
and foreign fishing operations fishing within a national
fishing zone.

The fishery resource might be envisioned as a
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pie which represents the total allowable catch.

The pie is

then divided among the coastal state according to the
domestic harvesting capacity and the foreign participants
which are granted the surplus (Garcia et aI, 1986).

Unfor-

tunately, the picture is complicated by the nature of the
resource because the total pie is "not fixed in size,

its

size is not easy to determine and its components, domestic
harvesting and the surplus are not independent of each
other" (Garcia et aI, 1986, 192).

The sustainable yield

from a given stock of fish is illustrated by a plot of
effort against catch.
foreign fishing,

As more fishing effort, in this case

is introduced to the fishery, catch per

unit effort will drop.

Therefore, the domestic fishery will

have to increase fishing effort to maintain catch levels.
This will result in greater costs incurred per unit of catch
due to the decrease in CPUE.

Therefore, the concept of

surplus has little meaning for the coastal state which has
the objective of catching the most fish with the least
amount of effort.

The coastal state which is allowing the entry of foreign
vessels while attempting to develop a domestic fishery must
recognize that this relationship exists.

In reality,

the

loss of domestic fishery revenues attributable to foreign
fishing must be weighed against gains associated with the
entry of foreign vessels.

Under cooperative agreements, the
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domestic fishery could obtain benefits such as technology
and skill transfers, and fees which could mitigate the
effects of lower CPUE levels attributable to the foreign
fishery.

The nature of highly migratory resources further

complicates the situation because fishing in adjacent
fishing zones and the high seas could affect stock abundance
within the given national zone.

Therefore, objectives (1)

through (4) are all interdependent.

Management decisions

depend on resource makeup, the makeup of the fishing fleet
which targets on the resource, both foreign and domestic,
and interaction between user groups.

The relationships

cited in the biological and economic principles given above
are important; however,

in the case of highly migratory

species, already inherent uncertainties are increased by the
international management requirements of the resource.

Incidental impacts on stocks
Objective (5) involves the effects of the fishery on other
stocks besides the principal target species.

Longlining,

one of the major gear strategies utilized ·in HMS exploitation,

is usually a multispecies fishery.

Therefore, fishing

operations could produce negative effects on species caught
as incidental by-catch.

Although some pelagics may have

relatively low commercial values, their value for
tional fisheries may be quite high.

recrea-

Ideally, a balance

should be sought between commercial and recreational
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fisheries through an examination of whether or not impacts
on stocks caught incidentally in the commercial fishery are
significant and the benefits attributable to each fishery.
In reality, there is a great amount of uncertainty associated with economic values for competing user groups and
fishery stock populations, especially highly migratory
recreational stocks.

The preceding objectives and discussion of related management principles are the foundation from which management
objectives can be evaluated, reality can be injected and
interrelationships between objectives can be examined.

It

becomes clear that tradeoffs and compromise among objectives
and participants are required for management on the international level.

The next section involves the foundation of

international cooperation, international ocean law and The
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.

The Legal Regime for Highly Migratory Species
Highly migratory species are treated with a special article
in the Convention on the Law of the Sea, but their management is also subject to other articles concerned with the
management of the living resources within the EEZ and
beyond.

This section explores the international legal

background of fisheries management with emphasis on highly
migratory species and realities concerning state practices.
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The negotiation of The Third United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) guided the evolution of the
international ocean law during the 1970s.

These negotia-

tions produced a codified set of standards for national
conduct, especially for the utilization of the world's ocean
resources.

Actual state practice is dictated by interna-

tional norms which are defined by the concurrent evolution
of accepted state practices or customary law, and codified
treaties such as the Law of the Sea Treaty (Belsky 1985).
Although UNCLOS III has not

b~en

ratified by the 60 nations

required for it to go into force, many of its components
reflect existing practice in the international community.
Distant water fishing fleets grew at a tremendous rate
during the 1960s into the 1970s.

Rapid progress in

fisheries technology and the world's growing demand for
protein contributed to the expansion of fishing fleet ranges
and capacities.

During this period, it became apparent that

fishing fleets had the potential to over-exploit many of the
world's major fishing grounds.

This prompted coastal state

concern with exploitation of stocks occurring adjacent to
their shores by foreign fishing fleets.

The benefits

resulting from stock exploitation were being obtained by
foreign operations.

Meanwhile, the common property nature

of the resource, coupled with a general lack of international cooperation, resulted in declining stocks and
over-exploitation.

The question became:
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What rights do

coastal states have over fishery resources by virtue of
their geographic proximity to these resources?

The question of coastal state rights in the determination of
fishery management and utilization is one of the major
factors which contributed to the extension of coastal state
jurisdiction.

During negotiations at the Conference of the

Law of the Sea, nine coastal states presented a working
paper concerned with the EEZ stressing the following point.
"The coastal [nation] should have the right to utilize
and preserve resources adjacent to its coasts, since
the survival or development of its people depends on
those resources and because it [is] in the best
position to regulate their rational exploitation"
(Cited in Bowen and Hennessy 1984, 42).

Unilateral jurisdictional claims have become a common
feature of state practice, while in most cases it has been
acquiesced to by the world community (Ross and Landry 1987).
The Law of the Sea Conference set down a comprehensive set
of guidelines to add conformity to nation states' zones as
jurisdictional claims spread during the 1970s (Ross and
Landry 1987).

The main component of extended jurisdiction is the Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ).

According to Article 56 of the UNCLOS

III text:
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"In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal state has:
sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and
exploiting, conserving and managing the natural
resources, whether living or non-living, of the water
superjacent to the sea-bed ... " (United Nations 1983,
258) .

Article 56 indicates that the coastal state has complete
control of fisheries within its EEZ.

The EEZ is comprised

of a 200-nautical-mile zone extending seaward from the
coastal state's baselines (United Nations 1983).

Under the

convention, the coastal state also has jurisdiction over
fisheries resources within its:

territorial sea, an area

not greater than the width of 12 nm measured from the
baselines; internal waters, waters on the landward side of
the baseline; and archipelagic waters, water enclosed by
archipelagic baselines in the case of countries comprised of
closely grouped islands (Slatyer 1987).

Article 64 of the UNCLOS III text refers explicitly to
highly migratory species and states the following:
"The coastal state and other States whose nationals
fish in the region for the highly migratory species
listed in Annex I shall co-operate directly or through
appropriate international organizations with a view of
ensuring conservation and promoting the objective of
optimum utilization of such species throughout the
region, both within and beyond the exclusive economic
zone.
In regions for which no appropriate international organization exists, the coastal State and
other States whose nationals harvest these species in
the region shall co-operate to establish such an
organization and participate in its work" (United
Nations 1983, 261).
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Annex I identifies highly migratory species as tunas,
frigate mackerel, pomfrets, marlins, sail-fishes, swordfish,
sauries, dolphin, oceanic sharks and Cetaceans (United
Nations 1983).

Viewed by itself, Article 64(1) would appear to indicate
that HMS are an exception to coastal state competence over
the living resources of the EEZ referred to in Article 56.
Article 64(1)

indicates that it is the joint responsibility

of the coastal state and other participating nations to
ensure conservation and optimal utilization, both within and
outside the EEZ.

Cooperation and the formation or strength-

ening of international management institutions are stressed
in this paragraph.

Article 64(2) clarifies the context of

Article 64(1) by stating:

"The provisions of paragraph 1

apply in addition to the other provisions of this part"
(United Nations 1983).

Therefore, the term "sovereign

rights" referred to in Article 56 indicates that HMS are
subject to coastal state authority within the EEZ just as
all other living resources (Burke 1984).

In the case of high seas fishing, Article 116 states that:
"All States have the right for their nationals to
engage in fishing on the high seas subject to:
(a)
their treaty obligations;
(b)
the rights and duties as well as the interests
of coastal States provided for,
inter alia,
in article 63, paragraph 2, and articles 64 and
67; and
(c)
the provisions of this section" (United Nations
1983, 273).
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Article 116 indicates that fishing states must cooperate
with the coastal state regarding questions of conservation
and allocation of HMS stocks occurring both on the high seas
and within the coastal state EEZ (Burke 1984).

It appears

to give "priority to the coastal states' rights and
interests affecting high seas fishing states" (Burke 1984,
276).

In both the case of coastal state rights over HMS in the EEZ
and fishing nation's high seas fishing rights, the convention indicates that both parties should seek cooperation.
In reality, if cooperation does not exist, it is doubtful
whether the coastal state will limit effort in its EEZ or
that coastal state regulations will be followed by fishing
nations on the high seas.

In most real world situations,

·except in the cases of international agreement, coastal
states have taken full control over HMS management within
their EEZs while fishing nations continue to fish the high
seas without coastal state input.

HMS are found both within

adjacent EEZs and high seas areas with varying stock abundances in each area due to their great mobility (Burke
1984).
many

Although cooperation has been poor or nonexistent in

i~stances,

Articles 64 and 116 are constructive

approaches which are essential for the control of fishing
effort and stock conservation.
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HMS are also subject to UNCLOS provisions dealing with
conservation and utilization of fisheries resources in the
EEZ.

Although the coastal state has sovereign rights over

the fisheries resources within its EEZ as specified in
Article 56, Articles 61, 62 and 63 are meant to imply that
it also has certain duties.

In reality, the language of the

text and the characteristics of fish stocks have contributed
to ambiguities in this area and generally left the balance
of control in favor of the coastal state within its EEZ.

Article 61 states that the coastal state "shall determine
the allowable catch," and the coastal state "shall ensure
through proper conservation and management measures that the
maintenance of the living resources in the exclusive Economic Zone is not endangered by over exploitation"
Nations 1983, 260).

(United

Article 61(3) refers to MSY as the

level to which stocks should be restored or maintained, but
it goes on to state "as qualified by relevant environmental
and economic factors including the economic needs of coastal
fishing communities and the special requirements of developing states"

(United Nations 1983, 260).

Therefore, the

coastal state is authorized to set levels above or below
MSY, a concept which is theoretical and difficult, if not
impossible, to equate with a value (Burke 1984).

In

reality, the coastal state has total control in setting
total allowable catch at any level it considers appropriate
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with respect to specific circumstances.

Again, due to the

mobility of HMS, it is impossible to set total allowable
catch for a given EEZ.

Article 61(4) refers to effects on other species associated
with harvested species.

It states that the coastal state

should take into account, "Maintaining or restoring populations of such associated or dependent species above levels
at which their reproduction may become seriously threatened"
(United Nations 1983, 260).

This paragraph does not indi-

cate that the coastal state is required to take action or
give a definition of "seriously threatened."

Although this

paragraph is important in relation to multispecies
fisheries,

it is unclear whether constructive measures will

evolve in this management area.

Article 61(5) refers to the free flow of information among
all participating states and competent international organizations (United Nations 1983).

Although most of the world's

nation states exchange such information, it should be recognized that individual states will act in their own selfinterest if this information will reflect negatively on
their operations or sacrifice competitive advantages.

Article 62 refers to coastal state duty in promotion of "the
objective of optimum utilization of the living resources in
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the exclusive economic zone" (United Nations 1983).

If the

coastal state lacks the capacity to harvest the allowable
catch, then access to the surplus should be given to other
states (United Nations 1983, 260).

The terms "optimum

utilization," "allowable catch" and "surplus" are all
ambiguous and left to the discretion of the coastal state.
Optimum utilization does not require "full utilization"
while allowable catch can be set at any level considered
appropriate to the coastal state (Burke

1984)~

The concept

of surplus is also difficult to define when referring to
fisheries stocks, especially HMS.

HMS require management

throughout their range, negating the importance of concepts
such as "surplus" and "total allowable catch" within an
individual EEZ.

As indicated in the previous section, levels of additional
effort will affect levels of catch per unit effort.

Al-

though a biological surplus may exist, a surplus may not
exist in respect to the optimization of coastal state
operations within its EEZ.

In reality, many coastal states

allow the entry of foreign fishing nations' to their EEZs,
but entry is given due to factors involving coastal state
self-interest, not due to international obligation cited in
UNCLOS III.

If international cooperation fails, the coastal

state is in the position to allow entry of vessels at
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whatever effort level it considers appropriate.

This

defeats the purpose of Article 64(1) and the special
management requirement of HMS.

Article 63 refers to cooperation between coastal states in
the cases of shared stocks, which is frequently the case
with HMS.

It indicates that coastal states should seek to

cooperate through appropriate subregional and regional
organizations for the objective of stock conservation and
development (United Nations 1983).

This has happened in

many parts of the world where information is exchanged and
attempts at quota allocations have been made.

However, it

has been difficult to impose effort or quota limitations
within individual coastal state EEZs through regional
arrangements.

The UNCLOS III text is both ambiguous and incomplete for two
main reasons.

First, it enabled the negotiating nations to

reach a consensus in areas where disagreement was acute.

It

also gave room for individual states, subregions and regions
to address site specific problems.

Although many of the

Convention's provisions are not spelled out in detail or
enforceable, it does present a set of norms, standards and a
spirit for members of the world community.

Ratification of

UNCLOS III will not solve the problems of HMS management,
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but it will provide a foundation from which the international legal regime can continue to evolve.

International law is made up of compromises between individual state self-interest and the need for order in the
international community.

Rules are established by state

practice or custom and through multilateral treaties instead
of legislatures or political executives as in the case with
domestic law (Belsky 1985).

Although each state might

benefit through international agreement, compromises may
entail, or be perceived by individual states as entailing, a
loss of potential benefits.

Because cooperation and en-

forcement is the responsibility of each individual state or
group of states, individual states can disregard the system
or remain outside it (Belsky 1985).

Only when the costs of

remaining outside the system outweigh the benefits will
individual states cooperate.

The case of HMS highlights these perceptions.
coastal states'

It is in

interest to claim HMS within their EEZ, and

take as much as possible before stocks move on to an adjacent EEZ, in the short run.

It is in the fishing nations'

interest to take as much of the resource as possible both
within EEZs and on the high seas, also in the short run.

It

is in everyone's interest to conserve and utilize the species through international cooperation in the long run, but
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this means that certain states may sacrifice a proportion of
their harvest through compromise.

Unlike less migratory

stocks, highly migratory species are common property at an
international level throughout much of their range.

Ini-

tially there is no motivation to sacrifice individual goals
in the interest of the majority.

On the high seas, and in

many zones of jurisdiction, this is the case where a firstcome, first-served mentality generally applies.

The interdependence between coastal states and fishing
nations for the conservation and maintenance of stocks at
high levels, and the benefits both sides can gain through
mutual cooperation, are the basis from which international
cooperation can originate.

The next chapter examines

management of HMS in the South Pacific region where compromise has resulted in greater benefits to island states
while allowing continued access to foreign fishing fleets.
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CHAPTER VI

HIGHLY MIGRATORY SPECIES MANAGEMENT EFFORTS

The declaration of sovereign rights over the living resources occurring within national zones of jurisdiction has
become accepted practice in the international community.

In

most cases, highly migratory species have also been claimed
within 200 nm EEZs or Fishing Zones.

However, no one nation

can manage this resource unilaterally due to the unique
characteristics of HMS (King 1979).

International coopera-

tion is hampered by differing resource endowments and
national priorities.

The need for common action has en-

couraged national and regional entities to formulate a
variety of management proposals and regimes where their
interests converge.

This

secti~n

will explore evolving

responses to HMS management, especially in the South
Pacific.

Management Alternatives
Coastal state extended jurisdiction and the regional approach to HMS management in the South Pacific should be put
in the proper international context as it evolves as a
management institution.

The Eastern Pacific is an example

of regional management where attempts were made at limiting
catch while allowing for a greater distribution of benefits
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among developing resource adjacent states (RANs).

The

Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) was established by treaty in 1949 and began operating actively in
the Eastern Pacific in 1951 (Saila and Norton 1974).

It was

a regional body whose purpose involved the development of
programs for the management of tuna stocks (Saila and Norton
1974).

The IATTC set annual catch quotas for yellowfin tuna

in the eastern

tropi~al

Pacific as a conservation measure

aimed at the maintenance of yields of the resource (Saila
and Norton 1974).

This measure did not fully address the

objectives of economic efficiency and benefit distribution
among participants.

From 1966 to 1973, the fleet operating

in the region increased by nearly three times, the open
season for yellowfin fishing decreased from 10 months to
three months, and competition among participants increased
(Joseph and Greenough 1979).

This suggests that overcap-

italization and economic waste resulted (Saila and Norton
1974).

It also did not solve the problem of benefit

distribution among participants.

As zones of extended jurisdiction gained acceptance in the
world community, resource adjacent nations demanded a
greater proportion of the benefits accrued through resource
exploitation.

Meanwhile, U.S. tuna interests remained

intransigent to coastal state demands.

In 1979, the IATTC

management system broke down, partly due to disagreements
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over allocations and fees between the foreign participants,
especially the United States, and the resource adjacent
Latin American nations (Joseph 1983).

Since 1979, there has

been no set quota on landings, and yellowfin stocks have
been overfished (Copes 1987).

Overall catch quotas may be effective in the short term to
prevent over-exploitation, but, as indicated above, they
contribute to overcapitalization as participarits compete for
as much as possible before the quota is reached (Saila and
Norton 1974).

National quotas have been recommended as an

alternative which would divide the permissible yield among
concerned nations (Saila and Norton 1974).

National quotas

would allow each nation to harvest its quota where ever and
in whatever way it chooses.

National quotas should be mar-

ketable so that nations without the capacity to harvest
their share of the resource would be able to market it to
obtain benefits from the resource.

This would make the

resource available to the lowest cost or the most efficient
harvesters and contribute to greater economic efficiency
(Saila and Norton 1974).

Although this would prevent over-

capitalization due to competition between states,

it would

not prevent competition within the state and overcapitalization (Saila and Norton 1974).

Under this system,

benefits could be distributed, yet criteria in determining
quotas must be acceptable to all participants if the system
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is to survive.

Criteria may include historical catch and

proximity to the resource among other political aspects
considered appropriate to participating nations.

Effort

limitation and license fees and taxation are other management tools which can be utilized in serving the objectives
of conservation and economic efficiency.

The main question

remains as to how effort and benefits can be divided among
concerned nations (Saila and Norton 1974).

Unfortunately, HMS management has not attained the level of
cooperation on the international level which is required for
the effective implementation of many of these proposals.
The next section will concentrate on the management regime
which is evolving in the South Pacific.

Management in the Pacific Islands Region
The island nations of the Central and South Pacific are
currently struggling with the issues of benefit distribution
with foreign fleets.

Some of the largest tuna stocks in the

world range throughout the vast expanses of ocean waters
which separate the generally small, newly independent
nations of the region.

Extended jurisdiction has given the

region's island nations new hope for greater control over
their destinies.

It also offers the tremendous challenge of

formulating a management regime that is based on the cooperation required to obtain benefits from the resource.
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The Region
The Pacific Islands Region stretches from the Republic of
Palau in the west to the Pitcairn Islands in the east
(Doulman 1987a).

A wide definition of the region includes

the more developed and larger nations of the region such as
Australia and New Zealand, but for the purposes of this
report, concentration will focus on the small, lesser developed island states of-the region (see Figure 7).

Except for

Tonga, all of these states were colonies of metropolitan
powers; 14 are now independent and eight remain territories
of the United States, France, United Kingdom and New Zealand
(Doulman 1987a).

Therefore, the region as a whole is di-

verse, widely spread and huge (approximately 30 million
square kilometers).

It stretches across over half of the

tropical and temperate southern Pacific as indicated by
Figure 7.

The small, newly independent island nations of the region
are subject to political influence and economic dominance of
outside developed nations.

According to Doulman, two of the

major factors which may cause the situation to worsen are
the islands' "narrow economic bases and limited agricultural resources and land-based activities" (Doulman
1987a).

As with many developing countries, the region's

island nations face low per capita incomes, rising imports
relative to exports, high unemployment, high rates of
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emigration by youth, and high reliance on external aid (Kent
1980).

Table 13 illustrates the generally low per capita

GNP of the region's island nations and their relatively
small land area, as compared to the large ocean area which
has come under island nation jurisdiction.

Due to these

factors, marine resources are central to economic development, self-reliance and the general well-being of the people
of the region (Kent 1980, Doulman 1987a).

Fisheries of the Region
Tuna is the most abundant and valuable fishery resource of
the region (Doulman 1987a).

In 1984, landings harvested by

both domestic and foreign vessels were estimated at 650,000
tons, with an ex-vessel value of $700 million (Doulman
1987a).

This accounts for approximately 30% of the world

catch of tuna (Copes 1987).

The tuna landings of the region

are comprised mainly of yellowfin and skipjack tuna with
several other minor tuna species (Copes 1987).

The three principal gear types utilized in their capture are
longline, purse seine and pole and line (Sibert 1987).

Yel-

lowfin are generally caught with longlines, although they
are taken by all three methods (Sibert 1987).

Skipjack are

caught with purse seines and pole and line (Sibert 1987).
Longlines and pole and line fisheries took most of the catch
until 1980.

In the 1980s, the introduction of the purse
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Nation or
Territory

TABLE 13
Basic Data of the South Pacific Region
Population
1974 GNP/
Land
(1977)
capita
Area

American
samoa

30,500

Cook Islands

18,500

1,100

EEZ Area
(000 sq kIn)

197

410

240

2,200

Fiji

592,000

840

18,200

1,370

French Polynesia

137,000

2,530

4,000

5,380

53,500

730

684

4,430

102,000

.4,420

7,300

6,500

30

290

134,000

4,170

19,100

1,540

99,500

480

11,880

670

Gilbert
Islands
Q.larn

Nauru
New Caledonia
New Hebr ides
Niue

3,800

260

350

Norfolk Island

1,900

35

570

461,693

2,300

4

970

Papua New
Guinea

2,908,000

Pitcairn Island

65

Solanon
Islands

206,000

Tokelau

1,600

Tonga
Trust Terr.

470

310

28,500

1,520

10

330
720

90,000

300

697

120,000

500

1,800

7,460*

Tuvalu

7,500

25

760

Wallis and
Futuna

9,700

16

280

2,934

160

western Samoa

152,000

300

*-includes the EEZ of Guam
Source (Kent 1980)
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seine led to a decline in the pole and line fishery.

In

1982, purse seining surpassed the other two major gear types
(Sibert 1987).

Purse seining is the most capital intensive

and efficient method of catching tuna (Doulman 1987b).

It

accounts for over half of total landings in the Pacific
Islands Region, but ranks behind longlining in value
(Doulman 1987b).

Purse seines target on surface-dwelling

species such as skipjack and small yellowfin.

These species

are of lower value than those species occurring deeper in
the water column such as larger yellowfin, bigeye and
albacore which are vulnerable to longline sets (Doulman
1987b).

Foreign fishing nations take the vast majority of the tuna
commercially harvested in the region.

Locally-based or

registered fleets take 140,000 to 160,000 tons of the
650,000 tons landed (Doulman 1987a).

The Japanese entered

the region in the early 1950s and steadily expanded longline
and pole and line fisheries in subsequent years (Fujinami
(1987).

Korea and Taiwan expanded into the region during

the 1960s with longline and pole and line operations which
have continued to grow up to the present.

United States

purse seiners began fishing in the region during the early
1970s (Felando 1987).

Fleet overcapacity leading to shorter

seasons in the Eastern Pacific encouraged a shift in effort
to new tuna fishing grounds (Felando 1987).
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Currently,

Japan and the United States take the majority of landings in
the region (Copes 1987).

Many countries or companies

operating in the region are vertically integrated.

Shore-

side processing and transshipment locations are an important
component of the industry for the region's economy.

The condition of yellowfin and skipjack stocks is not
certain due to inadequate statistical data (Van Dyke and
Heftel 1981, Sibert 1987).

However, it is generally agreed

that skipjack stocks are well below maximum levels of exploitation.

Kearney predicts that "a several-fold increase

in harvest levels above the present one of 300,000 mt may be
possible without depleting the resource"
Ridings 1985, 53).

(Bardach and

Moderate increases above current yellow-

fin landings of approximately 250,000 mt may also be possible without serious effects by utilizing longline gear
(Bardach and Ridings 1985).

However, yellowfin stocks

present greater concern to managers because they are more
heavily targeted due to their greater value (Copes 1987).
There are concerns with the recent growth in the surface
purse seine fishery,

because of potential effects on the

mixed stocks of yellowfin and skipjack which it targets, and
possible effects on the economics of the tuna fishery
(Sibert 1987).

There is general agreement that further ex-

pansion is possible, although better reporting of statistics
and further analysis are essential (Sibert 1987).
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Tuna Management in the Region
Subsistance fisheries of the Pacific Island Nations are estimated at approximately 10,000 mt compared to the 650,000
mt commercial harvest landed annually (Doulman 1987a).
Therefore, virtually all of the tuna harvested is consumed
outside the region.

DWFNs provide an important source of

revenue totalling between $15 to $20 million annually for
access fees.

As indicated above, commercial operations are

dominated by outside interests in both the harvesting and
processing sector, but they also contribute to the region's
economy.

Fisheries Forum Agency
In the mid-1970s, UNCLOS III negotiations and coastal state
practice established the concept of extended jurisdiction as
an accepted norm in the international community.

During the

South Pacific Forum meeting of 1976 in Nauru, the idea of
establishing a South Pacific fisheries agency was presented
(Gubon 1987).

The meeting culminated in the Nauru Declara-

tion which emphasized creation of 200-mile zones, conser vation, regional cooperation and coordination of policies
related to marine resources (Gubon 1987).

Later in 1976 in

Suva, governments of the region:
"(1)
(2)

declared their intention to establish 200-mile
Exclusive Economic Zones after consulting with
each other;
decided to harmonize fisheries policies in the
region and to adopt a coordinated approach to
their negotiations with distant-water fishing
nations;
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(3)

decided in principle to establish a South
Pacific fisheries agency to promote conservation and the rational use of tuna stocks in the
region" (Kearney 1978, 250).

The scope of cooperation was questioned because regional
states indicated that:

the sovereignty of the coastal

states should remain inviolable" (South Pacific Forum 1977
cited in Gubon 1987, 246).

During subsequent meetings,

disagreement centered in two main areas:

eligibility of

membership in the agency, and whether or not tuna should be
declared within the EEZ.

Actually, the two areas are interrelated.
organization were proposed:

Two types of

"one aiming primarily at

ensuring conservation and promoting optimum use of living
resources in the region, the other at ensuring maximum
benefits for the people of the coastal states of the region"
(Gubon 1987, 247).

The former proposal followed a more

broad-based conservation approach as taken in Article 64 of
UNCLOS III (Gubon 1987).

The united States promoted this

approach during meetings because this would allow participation of distant water fishing nations.

The u.S. was one

of the few nations in the world which had exempted tuna from
jurisdiction within its fishing zone due to claims that tuna
should be managed throughout their range.
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In reality, west

coast tuna interests, such as the American Tunaboat Association, were responsible for this policy in order to claim
reciprocal rights to access in other nations' fishing zones
(Wade 1984).

This put U.S. policy in conflict with the

Pacific island nations' goals.

The Pacific island nations

argued for coastal state jurisdiction over HMS because they
are the only significant fisheries resources within their
zones of jurisdiction .(Van Dyke and Heftel 1981).

The

Pacific island nations wanted an organization which would
unite them in negotiations with DWFNs (Gubon 1987).

The South Pacific Fisheries Forum Agency (SPFFA) agreement
was signed in 1979.

It recognizes that the coastal state

has sovereign rights over the living resources within the
EEZ including highly migratory species (Van Dyke and Heftel
1981).

It also limited membership to Forum nations of the

region, thereby excluding distant water fishing nations and
nations with regional island dependencies (Van Dyke and
Heftel 1981).

The objectives of the SPFFA as stated in its preamble are
expressed by the following:
n (

1)

their common interest in the conservation and
optimum use of the living marine resources in the
region, particularly highly migratory species;
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(2)

their desire to promote regional cooperation and
coordination in fisheries policies;
their concern for securing maximum benefits from
the region's living resources for the national
well being of SPF countries;
their desire to facilitate the collection, analysis, evaluation, and dissemination of information about the region's fisheries resources,
especially highly migratory species" (Guben 1987,
248).

(3)
(4)

The SPFFA convention does not satisfy Article 64 requirements due to membership restrictions (Van Dyke and Heftel
1981).

It reflects the common concerns of the region's

nations which center on maximizing benefits to the region.
The South Pacific nations realized that regional cooperation
is required in areas such as enforcement, expertise, information collection and dissemination, and negotiation (Gubon
1987).

As a group they stood a better chance at obtaining

essential information such as:
"(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

the quantity and quality of the fisheries
resources;
how much fishing could be permitted while
sustaining stocks;
who had traditionally fished their resources;
where their fish were sold, processed, and
consumed;
and the market value of their fish" (Gubon 1987,
249).

conventional wisdom concerning highly migratory species
management expresses the proposition "that international
cooperation is required for the effective utilization of the
tuna resources of the world" (Hilborn and Sibert 1988, 31).
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However, the term highly migratory species has been misused
to the point where its biological meaning may have become
irrelevant (Hilborn and Sibert 1988).

The assumption that

all tuna species have huge ranges encompassing entire ocean
basins has been exaggerated in some cases.

There are indi-

cations that the ranges of yellowfin and skipjack of the
South Pacific region are smaller than previously believed
(Hilborn and Sibert 1988).

DWFN claims that widely-based

international organizations necessary for HMS management are
sometimes more self-serving than based on biological fact.
Therefore, international cooperation may not have to satisfy
Article 64 to be effective.

It also indicates that inter-

national catch quotas may not be necessary if high seas
fishing does not threaten species conservation.

The degree

of international cooperation should depend on actual species
distribution and geographic considerations such as EEZ
configurations and relative sizes (Hilborn and Sibert
(1988).

A high degree of regional cooperation may still be

required, especially in the case of adjacent relatively
small EEZs.

This lends legitimacy to the South Pacific

approach toward regional tuna management which excludes
DWFNs from membership.

However, cooperation in data

collection and interpretation is still required of all
participating nations.
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The SPFFA was not generally concerned with dictating management in areas such as quotas, setting of license fees or
limitation of fishing effort.

The decisions pertaining to

the EEZ were left to the respective coastal state (Gubon
1987).

The SPFFA functions as a forum for the exchange of

ideas, information, technical advice, and communication of
current state activities (Gubon 1987).

Under the SPFFA

system, individual states were left to negotiate individually with foreign fishing nations.

This left the danger of

encouraging competitive undercutting of fees required of
foreign fishing nations because of competition between
individual nations to sell fishing rights (Van Dyke and
Heftel 1981).

As a united group, the Forum nations would be

in a better position to negotiate better terms (Van Dyke and
Heftel1981).

Uniform entry would also be beneficial to

foreign fishing nations because this would enable them to
follow changing concentrations of fish without regard for
EEZ boundaries and national licenses (Van Dyke and Heftel
1981).

Surveillance and enforcement is another common

problem of the region's coastal states due to the vast area
of the region.

conventional methods of policing, such as

surface patrols and air patrols, are inadequate in this
situation (Van Dyke and Heftel 1981).

A satellite system

has been proposed although costs would be very high (Van
Dyke and Heftel 1981).

Enforcement activities can be
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enhanced by regional cooperation in order to avoid duplication of efforts and to share costs among concerned coastal
states (Van Dyke and Heftel 1981).

These factors encourage

greater cooperation in issues involving foreign vessel entry
and management.

The Nauru Group
In 1982, the Nauru Agreement was signed by several countries
of the region.

The basis of the regional grouping was

primarily economic (Doulman 1987c).

The distribution of

tuna within the Pacific Islands Region determines individual
coastal state responses and distribution of domestic and
foreign fishing

(Doulman 1987c).

Those countries with the

greatest at stake in the region's tuna fisheries had the
common concern of deriving the greatest possible benefits
from their tuna resources (Doulman 1987c).

The harmonizing

of policies within the region for the maximization of financial returns is the major goal of the Nauru Agreement.
Nauru grouping is logical for the following reasons:

The
most

of the group's EEZs are contiguous as indicated in Figure 8;
scientific research indicates that tuna stocks are shared
among members; more than 75% of the tuna taken by DWFNs in
EEZs of Pacific island nations is harvested in waters of the
Nauru nations; over 70% of access fees paid by DWFNs go to
Nauru nations (Doulman 1987c)

(See Table 14 for organization
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Figure 8
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TABLE 14

FFA and Nauru Group Membership in the South Pacific
Country

FAA Membership

Australia

x

Cook Island

x

Federated States
of Micronesia

x

Fiji

x

Kiribati

x

Marshall Islands

observer

Nauru

x

New Zealand

x

Niue

x

Palau

observer

Nauru Group Member

x

x
x
x

x

Papua New Guinea

x

x

Solomon Islands

x

x

Tonga

x

Tuvalu

x

Vanuatu

x

Western Samoa

x

X indicates rnerrbership
Note - Nauru membership is not exclusive while members may join or leave.
However, due to the contiguous nature of their zones and resource
endowments, the two most likely additions would be Tuvalu and
Vanuatu.
Source (Doulrnan 1987a)
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membership).

These factors all have significance to en-

forcement and access agreements with DWFNs.

"The Nauru Agreement is an international treaty that
obligates members to adopt common courses of action with
respect to their shared fisheries resources so long as the
cooperation benefits them without derogating their sovereign
rights" (Doulman 1987c, 261).

The two areas of greatest

importance involve a regional registry of foreign fishing
vessels and minimum terms of fisheries access that member
countries adopt in licensing foreign vessels (Doulman
1987c).

All foreign fishing vessels must be listed on the

FFA's register before being granted a license by the Nauru
group nations (Doulman 1987c).

If a vessel violates terms

of entry in a given nation's EEZ, it may be removed from the
register and eligibility to participate in the region's tuna
fishery.

The registry has aided enforcement in the region

and in the collection of fines to prevent the deregistration
of vessels for violations (Doulman 1987c).

The adoption of

minimum terms of fisheries access has allowed the Nauru
group to stop DWFNs from playing one nation against another
during the negotiations.

It simplifies negotiation by

leaving fewer variables to be determined while allowing the
coastal state to concentrate on obtaining better financial
terms (Doulman 1987c).
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Two other areas which the Nauru group will likely address in
the future are "preferential access for fishing vessels from
Nauru group countries and the standardization of methods for
determining access fee payments for DWFN fleets"
1987c, 263).

(Doulman

Preferential access is already taking place on

an informal basis and will probably become more common as
Nauru group members develop their own fleets (Doulman
1987c).

The method of fee determination in using a per-trip

formula is also nearly universally accepted within the Nauru
group (Doulman 1987c).

In the future, standardization in

setting access fees according to the scope of the DWFN
operation is expected (Doulman 1987c).

Foreign fishing nations were uneasy with the establishment
of the SPFFA and Nauru Agreement.

They expected that un-

reasonable access terms' might be demanded, especially by the
Nauru Group (Doulman 1987c).

However, DWFNs encouraged

cooperation among Nauru group members because of DWFNs'
willingness to play one country off against another.

The

members of the Nauru Group realized the importance of the
financial returns they receive from access fees.

They

understood that there was room for improvement in terms of
access without making terms destructive to the operations of
fleets they depend on for revenues.
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Cooperation between the Nauru Group and the FFA have continued to be good although there was some initial apprehension on the part of the FFA.

The Nauru Group has been a

progressive influence on the FFA.

This is illustrated by

its adoption of Nauru Group cooperative policies jn areas
such as a vessel registry (Doulman 1987c).

Historically, there has been little cooperation between the
Micronesian and Melanesian nations of the
(Doulman 1987c).

Na~ru

organization

However, common resources and economic

concerns made a compelling case for regional cooperation,
because the benefits of cooperation outweighed the national
concerns involving independence (Doulman 1987c).

This

regional grouping offers advantages in administration, enforcement, revenue

~aximization

and data collection .(Doulman

1987c).

Indivi~~al

Coastal State Approaches

In the South Pacific, regional institutions such as the
SPFFA and the Nauru Group are continuing to evolve especially in the areas of cooperation and coordination of
policies.

However, a balance under which rights have been

retained within respective island state EEZs has been one of
the bases from which the current system works.

License fees

are collected and used by each island state for its own
development.

In the case of the South Pacific, resource
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distribution and beliefs in state sovereignty are two
factors which are barriers to complete integration.

In the South Pacific, individual states have more
flexibility because tuna resources are generally below
maximum levels of exploitation.

This is the case in Papua

New Guinea where the results of stock assessment programs
indicate that "the potential annual yield from its Declared
Fisheries Zone (DFZ) significantly exceeds the quantity of
tuna currently being harvested" (Doulman 1987e, 16).

Papua

New Guinea has the third largest EEZ in the Pacific Islands
region covering 2.3 million square kilometers (Doulman
1987e).

It also contains rich tuna resources with an annual

harvest of 100,000 tons (Doulman 1987e).

The domestic

harvest averages approximately 28,000 tons, with the rest
taken by foreign fishing operations (Doulman 1987e).

The

case of Papua New Guinea is a good example of the access
arrangements which have been evolving in South Pacific
states of the region.

The policy of granting foreign fleet access to the Papua New
Guinea DFZ is encouraged because domestic harvesting capacity cannot fully exploit the tuna resources occurring in its
zone, and because the payment of access fees generates
government revenue (Doulman 1987a).

The government will

license any foreign fishing vessel as long as it is listed
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on the Fisheries Forum Agency register; and it has not
previously infringed on licensing conditions in Papua New
Guinea (Doulman 1987e).

All access agreements are based on

the Papua New Guinea/Japan Fishing Agreement.

The general

conditions are "the payment of a prescribed fee and the
observance of terms and conditions of access specified in
the Papua New Guinea/Japan Fisheries Agreement"
1987e, 18).

Access fees are:

(Doulman

"designed .to extract the

resource rent of the resource; foster· operatiorial efficiency
in the use of the resource; and provide an instrument for
the government to regulate, develop and conserve and
generally manage the resource"

(Doulman 1987e, 19).

The Papua New Guinea Fisheries Act specifies that fees
consist of a Fisherman's licensing fee and a Boat Licensing
Fee, which are nominal, and an Operation~ee ~hich is meant
to extract

~

financial return for fisheries resources which

are exploited (Doulman 1987e).

In the Papua New Guinea

case, foreign aid is not accepted as part of the payment for
access, but must be fully independent of the provision of
fisheries access.

Papua New Guinea has taken the position

that access must rely strictly on commercial terms (Doulman
1987e).

Fees are related to a somewhat complicated formula

which is dependent on the type and size of the vessel,
duration of time of fishing trips and the type and market
price of species targeted (Doulman 1987c).
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In addition to the payment of access fees, foreign vessels
have certain obligations "to minimize administrative costs,
provide a basis for scientific monitoring and management and
to promote the orderly exploitation of the fishery"
1987e, 22).

(Doulman

This is accomplished through the establishment

of conditions of entry.

Prohibited areas were established

within the Papua New Guinea territorial sea to protect
domestic pole and line fishing operations.

Vessel owners

. must report entry and exit from the Papua New Guinea DFZ
with the exact location, time and

quan~ity

of

fi~h

on board.

Catch records must be maintained and forwarded to the
director of fisheries after each trip.

The radio call sign

of the vessel must be displayed on the top of the vessel and
recognizable from the air.

Foreign fishing vessels are

obligated to take on government-nominated observers who must
have access to all facilities and equipment.

Foreign

fishing vessel owners must base an agent in the country to
handle licensing and arrangements to reduce administrative
costs.

These conditions assist Papua New Guinea in en-

forcing and administering the program.

These conditions are

also terms which the Nauru group has adopted for the
harmonization of terms of access throughout the region
(Doulman 1987e).

Papua New Guinea received $4.5 million in revenue from
foreign fishing in 1985 (Doulman 1987e).
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In 1984, revenues

obtained by licensing foreign fleets exceeded the Fisheries
Division's budget by 20% (Doulman 1987e).

It might be

inferred that these revenues have a significant impact on
available funding for domestic development and management of
the nation's fisheLies

(~oulman

1987e).

However, this must

be gauged against administrative, enforcement and surveillance costs to administer the program.

In 1982, administra-

tion and enforcement costs incurred by the Fisheries
Division were $0.6 million (Doulman 1981e) .
~t~d

Costs associ-

with befense Department surveillance and the Department

of Primary Industry would result in a significantly higher
figure (Doulman 1987e).

Costs of administration and en-

forcement illustrate that actual benefits accrued by the
country in question are related to the behavior of foreign
fishing operations within their zone.

Compliance with the

Japanese fleet has been good although patchy in the case of
other flag states (Doulman 1987e).

As voluntary compliance

drops, the cost of surveillance and enforcement increases
(Doulman 1987e).

This will put upward pressure on access

fees and selective limitation on entry (Doulman 1987e).
This is an example where a mutual relationship with voluntary compliance is in the interest of both foreign and
domestic parties.

Most of the Pacific Island states have made similar arrangements in respect to conditions and access fees required for

142

the entry of foreign fishing vessels.

In addition, joint

venture agreements and foreign aid are other benefits
provided to island states to satisfy entry requirements.

For relatively small island states, access fees can be of
considerable size relative to their domestic economies.

In

1986, license receipts from foreign fishing operations
accounted for 25% of Kiribati government revenue (Doulman
1987a).

In the case of Kiribati,

Japanes~

access fees were

usually a combination of cash payments and goods and services for domestic fisheries development (Teiwaki 1987).
The Kiribati government had reservations with this method of
payment because it felt that access arrangements should be a
purely commercial transaction (Teiwaki 1987).

The Kiribati

government felt that Dthe.value of fish harvested should be
measured and

~ompensated

for in cash and not confused with

the aid inclinations of the foreign state" (Teiwaki 1987).

Development aid as a method of payment, especially in the
case of a small island nation, is questionable in respect to
the benefits it produces.

Foreign aid, some in the form of

subsidies, is a major segment of many of the economies of
the region's island nations.

The injection of excess aid

can have negative effects in cases where the local economy
does not have the capacity to absorb and utilize it (Teiwaki
1987).

Nations such as Kiribati need development which they
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can control at

a

pace with terms that are in their own

interests (Teiwaki 1987).

Members of the South Pacific

Forum are in agreement that access should be based on commercial considerations and that aid and access should be
delinked (Doulman 1987c).

There have been instances where

aid has benefited countries and others in which inappropriate and inadequate assistance were provided (Doulman 1987d).
Development aid is no.t inherently evil, but the motivations
behind it are ofteh

mo~eself-serving

on the part of the

donor than helpful to the recipient.

Domestic development of tuna fisheries is the goal of most
of the nations of the Pacific Region.

However, most of the

Pacific Island states also lack the capital, expertise,
information, skills and" infrastructute to develop fishery
operations.

Tuna prices have also stagnated in the 1980s

resulting in stiffer competition among participants (King
1987).

The region's tuna fisheries are capital intensive

operations, especially purse seiners (King 1987).

The

industry is also vertically integrated so that processing
and access to markets may be a necessary component depending
on national development goals.

The answer in some cases is joint ventures, where foreign
capital and expertise can be combined with domestic resource
endowments and local labor.

The Solomon Islands have
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participated in this type of arrangement with Japanese
businesses since 1972 (Hughes 1987).

Problems involving

skilled manpower needs, meeting time tables, depressed
market prices for tuna and the United States embargo were
setbacks encountered during this period (Hughes 1987).
However, localization of the industry has continued while
the Solomon Islands have benefited in the form of taxes,
commissions and fees, and employment while building industry
infrastructure (Hughes 1987).

The Solomon Islands have also

benefited from Japanese "industrial know-how, access to
capital and to markets" (Hughes 1987, 221).

The Japanese

company, Taiyo, benefited from access to the Solomon
Islands' Zone and a good working relationship with the
government.

The following statement made by Anthony Hughes

expresses the positive side in the following:

"It is un-

likely that the industry could have been established so
fast, on such a scale, and in such a permanent form by any
method but a joint venture"

(Hughes 1987, 220).

Joint ven-

tures can generate employment, foreign exchange and technology transfer, but they must be based on mutual benefits and
careful planning by the participants.

It must be recognized

that the motives of the foreign partner and island government are often very different (Doulman 1987d).

Another area which may benefit the island nations involves
trans-shipment of tuna from island nation ports (Doulman
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1987d).

Trans-shipment could benefit the concerned island

state through development of infrastructure and greater
integration with tuna operations.

The tuna industry is very competitive in all sectors such as
harvesting, processing, distribution and marketing.

The

island nations must identify those areas where they possess
the greatest comparative advantage and where value is added
in the production system (King 1987).
the following:

Dennis King stated

"This end is best achieved by collecting

access fees or some other form of rent from foreign tuna
producers and using the proceeds to develop local industries
consistent with national goals" (King 1987, 295).

The United States Case
The presence of the United States tuna fleet in the South
Pacific Region became one of the major sources of conflict
and the impetus for greater cooperation and coordination of
fisheries policy among the South Pacific States.

The U.S. position, from the inception of extended jurisdiction, was to exclude tuna from coastal state control.

The

Magnuson Fishery Conservation Act expresses the U.S. legal
position in sections involving highly migratory species,
international fishery agreements and import prohibitions
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(Van Dyke and Nocol 1987).

The United States does not

recognize coastal state jurisdiction over tunas and requires
coastal nations to join with DWFNs to manage HMS (tuna)
through international fishery agreements (Van Dyke and Nocol
1987).

If a coastal state seizes a U.S. tuna vessel "as a

consequence of a claim of jurisdiction which is not recognized by the United States", then that nation's fishery
products may be embargoed (MFCMA 1976, Van Dyke and Nicol
1987, 109).

These policies are a reflection of U.S. West

Coast tuna interests, the American Tunaboat Association
(ATA) and the United States Tuna Foundation (USTF (Van dyke
and Nicol 1987).

The tuna industry wanted continued access

to other nations'

fisheries zones on their own terms.

As

extended jurisdiction with the inclusion of HMS became the
international norm, the United States found itself out of
step with the rest of the world.

Increased conflict in the

Eastern Pacific encouraged migration of U.S. operations to
the South Pacific.

However, they did not escape conflicts

and the inevitable need for compromise with resource
adjacent nations.

In 1985, the United States had 60 purse seiners registered
with the South Pacific Forum member nations.

This is more

than any other country, and a significant portion of the
total of 147 which were operating in the region (Doulman
1987b).

In some cases the ATA gained access with Pacific
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Nations under terms similar .to those negotiated by the
Japanese.

This was the case in Papua New Guinea where

u.s.

purse seiners were licensed under the Papua New Guinea/Japan
Fisheries Agreement (Doulman 1987e).

The U.S. fishing presence in the South Pacific was unpopular
from its beginning in the mid-1970's.

During negotiations

leading to the formation of the Fisheries Forum agency, the
u.S. promoted its national

inter~sts

and those of the ATA

instead of interests of the territories it represented
(Gubon 1987).

In respect to compliance, U.S. vessels had

one of the worst records in the region.

In Papua New Guinea

a u.s. registered purse seiner, the "Danica" was arrested in
1982 for fishing without a license (Tsamenyi 1986).

In

1984, another u.s. registered purse seiner, the·"Jeannette
Diana" was arrested for illegal fishing in the Solomon
Islands (Tsamenya 1986).

In both cases, the U.S. government

invoked Magnuson Act provisions and embargoed fish products
from the two nations (Tsamenyi 1986).

The embargos were

lifted in both cases after sanctions imposed by the concerned island nations were modified.

The illegal fishing

problem continued in 1985 and 1986 with the fishing vessels
"Ocean Pearl" and "Priscilla M" in the EEZ of the Federated
States of Micronesia (Van Dyke and Nicol 1987).

In both

cases, negotiated sanctions were paid by owners of the
offending vessel and the U.s. did not proceed with an
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embargo, possibly due to ongoing treaty negotiations (Van
Dyke and Nicol 19876).

These cases undermined the normally

strong relationships between the South Pacific nations and
the United States (Tsamenyi 1986).

As early as 1982, Congressman Paul McCloskey, Jr. advocated
negotiation with the South Pacific states (Tsamenyi 1986).
He stated that the U.S. needs to show the concerned South
Pacific states that it is willing to deal justly with
matters of stock management and conservation (Tsamenyi
1986).

This could thwart Soviet penetration within a region

which is of strategic value to the security interests of the
United States (Tsamenyi 1986).

The South Pacific nations

also had both economic and political motivations for agreement ort fi~heries issues related to tuna (Tsamenyi 198~).
The U.S.

is both the largest consumer of tuna in the world

and the largest market for tuna products of most South
pacific states {Tsarnenyi 1986}.

U.S. policy, as stated in

the Maguson Act, had negative effects on the region's economy in the form of embargos and difficulties in granting
access (Tsamenyi 1986).

The South Pacific states also have

strong ties with the capitalist world and its financial
institutions (Tsamenyi 1986).

These reasons encouraged

negotiation because agreement could be potentially beneficial to both sides.
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Although both sides recognized the need for compromise,
negotiations did not progress smoothly or at a fast pace.
In initial talks, according to one Pacific commentator, the
U.S. delegation displayed a good deal of "ignorance, illsensitivity and more than a touch of arrogance concerning Forum
Fisheries aspirations" (Islands Business 1985, 27;
Van dyke and Nicol 1987, 118).

Cited in

The one factor which changed

the U.S. willingness to compromise and accelerated the pace
of negotiations was the Kiiibati-Soviet fisheries agreement.
In August of 1985, 16 Soviet fishing vessels were allowed
access to fish for 12 months in the Kiribati EEZ for access
fees totaling $1.5 million (Teiwaki 1987).

The strategic

considerations which arose prompted greater u.S. concern as
illustrated by participation of the State Department and
moderation of the u.S. negotiating position.

After 10

rounds of negotiation, in October of 1986, the United States
and Pacific Islands nations reached agreement on a regional
fisheries treaty (Van Dyke and Nicol 1987).

The treaty gave the U.S. access to 10 million square miles
of fishing grounds.

Perhaps of greater importance, it

served U.S. strategic interests by promoting a positive U.S.
presence in the region.

The Pacific Islands made economic

gains of about $60 million over a five-year period (Van Dyke
and Nicol 1987).
manner:

Payments are broken down in the following

$9 million in cash annually to the FFA.paid by the
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u.s.

government; $1 million per year in development aid in

addition to current programs for projects formulated by the
FFA and administered by USAID; $50,000 per vessel paid by
the ATA with a minimum of 35 vessels totaling $1.75 million
per year; and $250,000 per year paid by the USTF to provide
in-kind technical assistance (Van Dyke and Nicol 1987).

The

FFA cash payments will be divided among the 16 concerned
South Pacific nations.

It will consist of a minimum guar-

anteed payment for each nation, with the other 85% paid
according to fishing vessel catch locations (Van Dyke and
Nicol 1987).

In addition to license fees, there are other terms of entry
which generally reflect existing conditions that individual
states require of all foreign vessels.

In order to be

eligible, a vessel must be in good standing on the Regional
Register (Van Dyke and Nicol 1987).

The island nations also

wanted independent control over closed and limited areas
within individual EEZs (Van Dyke and Nicol 1987).

In the

cases of Australia, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon
Islands, closed areas within their EEZs were left to bilateral negotiations (Van Dyke and Nicol 1987).

U.S.

vessels are required to report catches under the South
Pacific Commission standard reporting procedures (Van Dyke
and Nicol 1987).

This includes the completion of a catch

report form and weekly reporting.
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In addition, vessels must

report at the time of entry or departure from waters under
jurisdiction and at least 24 hours before entry into any
port.

Foreign vessel operators must also allow observers on

board for scientific and compliance monitoring functions.
The observer has the right to inspect any part of the vessel
and ships'

logs, and the right to gather information related

to fisheries within the Licensing Area (U.S. State Dept.
1987).

One of the most important parts of the Treaty involves the
responsibility of the U.S. government to enforce the provisions of the Treaty.

The treaty states that the United

States government will cooperate in the investigation of
alleged violations, report to the concerned Pacific Island
States and take steps in the sanctioning of offenders (U.S.
State Dept. 1987).

Government-to-government agreements are

to the Island Nations' advantage because "diplomatic
measures can be used to help ensure compliance"
1987d, 302).

(Doulman

This treaty spreads responsibility for vessel

operators' actions directly to the United States government.

The Pacific Island States-United States Fisheries Treaty
recognized coastal state jurisdiction over highly migratory
species and the terms under which the entry of U.S. vessels
is allowed.

The departure from the former U.S. policy,

reflected· in U.S. law under the MFCMA, was in large part due
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to the importance of political concerns outside the sphere
of fisheries policy.

In reality: the United States govern-

ment paid for the strategic value of the region in addition
to the value of fishing access.

To accomplish this feat,

the U.S. tuna industry was subsidized in part through U.S.
government payments, and U.S. law under the MFCMA was
ignored.

It is questionable whether fee payments actually

reflect the commercial value of fishing access, whether
higher tir lower, due to these factors.

The treaty is also an important step for cooperation and the
coordination of fisheries policies among the region's island
nations.

The island nations gained economic benefits while

retaining good relations with the United States.

Therefore,

the Treaty appears to be mutually beneficial in meeting the
goal of benefit distribution among participants.

Regional Comparisons
There are many similarities and differences between the
Eastern Caribbean and South Pacific situations.

Perhaps the

most important factor is the illustration that regional
cooperation for the advancement of common goals is possible.
However, there are many site specific factors which must be
recognized before direct application to the swordfish
management in the Eastern Caribbean.
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The Eastern Caribbean and the South Pacific Islands regions
are generally made up of small island states.

However,

differences in size and configuration of projected zones of
jurisdiction are huge.

The Pacific Islands Region is vast

in respect to total area and the size of individual Fishing
or Exclusive Economic Zones.

Although many of the EEZs in

the Pacific Islands Region are contiguous, they are widely
spread and therefore huge relative to land area.

The entire

South Pacific Islands Region is approximately 30 million
square kilometers in size.

All of the states in the region

have EEZs greater than 100,000 square kilometers in area
with a range between 160,000 sq km for Western Samoa to
746,000 sq km for the U.S. trust territories (see Table

The islands of the Eastern Caribbean Region are also surrounded by relatively large zones of extended jurisdiction,
but these zones are characterized by the structure of the
450-mile arc of islands which extend out into the Atlantic.
The islands occurring along this arc are much more closely
packed, resulting in an interlocking puzzle of adjacent
zones.

All of the GECS countries except Antigua are cut off

by adjacent states' potential zones well before the 200-mile
limit (see Figure 9).

The Greater Caribbean has an area of

1.5 million square kilometers while the area of the Eastern
Caribbean is approximately one-third of this figure.

Poten-

tial national zones of extended jurisdiction range between
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approximately 10,000 to 110,000 square kilometers in area.
These geographic differences between zones

hav~

implications

for fishing operations which target on wide-ranging pelagics
such as swordfish.

Forty-mile sets could easily span two

national zones while movement during a given season could
mean that operations will span several zones.

The resource endowments of the two regions are quite different both in respect to magnitude and composition.

The

tuna resources of the South Pacific Islands Region are among
the richest in the world.

An estimated 650,000 tons, with

an ex-vessel value of $700 million, was harvested in the
region in 1984 (Doulman 1987a).

This consisted primarily of

skipjack and yellowfin tuna, the bulk of which is taken by
purse seine.

About 1,000 tons of swordfish with an ex-

vessel value of approximately $6 million was landed by U.S.
vessels operating in the proximity of the Eastern Caribbean
region during the 1987 season (SAFMC 1987).

An additional

1,000 tons of tuna species may have also been taken in the
prox~ity

of the Lesser Antilles region by other foreign

longline vessels (Marcille and Caddy 1985).
figure is highly speculative.

However, this

The swordfish longline

operations of the Caribbean produce a high-valued product
which is sold fresh in u.S. markets.

Purse seined tuna is

of lower value and is usually used for a canned product.
The United States is the largest single consumer of both
Pacific tuna and Caribbean swordfish.
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Politically, the regions share a history of foreign influence and dominance.

Both the Eastern Caribbean and the

South Pacific Island nations are generally made up of newly
independent states.

The South Pacific generally escaped the

legacy of slavery, possibly due to 'its distance from metropolitan powers and small land areas.

The states of both

regions are generally made up of developing nations with
characteristics such as:
limit~d

relatively low per capita income;

resource and industrial bases;

r~liance

on imports;

foreign aid recipients; and close economic and political
ties with the western capitalist world.

The nations of both

regions view economic development and self-reliance as two
of their major goals as independent states.

The United

States has major interests in both regions including economic and strategic concerns.

Although there are major differences between the two
regions, experiences in the South Pacific tuna fishery have
the capacity to be instructive as the Caribbean attempts to
manage the highly migratory species occurring within their
zones of extended jurisdiction.

Issues concerning regional

groupings, access negotiations, conditions of entry and
political concerns have relevance to the Eastern Caribbean.
The next chapter attempts to outline the management alternatives which might be applied to the Eastern Caribbean
swordfish fishery.
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CHAPTER VII

SWORDFISH MANAGEMENT ALTERNATIVES IN THE
CARIBBEAN

The extension of coastal state jurisdiction in the form of
200 nm Fishing or Exclusive Economic Zones has become an
accepted practice of international ocean law.
regime, the coastal state has gained

under this

"sover~ign

rights" over

the living resources occurring adjacent to it by virtue of
its location.

International practice has also dictated that

highly migratory species are not exempt from coastal state
jurisdiction.

Therefore, accor.ding to international cus-

tomary law and UNCLOS III, the island nations of the Eastern
Caribbean have the right to claim jurisdiction over the
highly migratory species, including swor.dfish, within their
200 nm jurisdictional zones.

However, the right to declare

jurisdiction over the resource, and the realization of resource management goals such as a more favorable distribution of benefits to the coastal state, are not synonymous.

Practic€s in the South Pacific and fisheries management
principles are drawn upon in this chapter to formulate
management alternatives for the Eastern Caribbean.

The five

basic management objectives examined in Chapter V are used
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to organize principal areas of concern.

It should be

recognized that all of the objectives are interrelated.
These objectives in order of presentation include:
(1)

Maintenance of swordfish stocks at levels that provide
high sustained yields;

(2)

Appropriate distribution of benefits;

(3)

Measures which afford the opportunity for countries not
yet participating in HMS fishing to build up their
fishing industries;

(4)

Improved economic efficiency;

(5)

Conservation measures which can protect stocks ta~ght
incidentally (recreational stocks) while creating as
little disruption as possible to the primary fishing
operation (swordfish longlining).

Benefit distribution is treated in the greatest depth
because this is curiently the area of greatest concern to
the

Easter~Caribbean,

although other areas deserve

attention because of their potential future impact.

Maintenance of Swordfish Stocks
All participants would agree with the objective of maintaining swordfish stocks at high levels.

However,

the

definition of what level is best, how this level can be
maintained and the current status of stocks are all disputed.

With the information currently available and our

present understanding of swordfish stocks, it is nearly
impossible to answer these questions.

It is possible to

examine what we do know and how management might be
improved.
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The question of stock conservation is more complicated in
the Eastern Caribbean than in the South Pacific Islands
Region.

It is generally agreed that stocks in the South

Pacific are below maximum sustainable levels of exploitation.

Although South Pacific tuna stocks are highly mobile,

their range generally encompasses the South Pacific Islands
Region.

In the case of swordfish in the Western Atlantic,

the only real agreement is that stock status is uncertain.
The range of swordfish extends far beyond the Eastern
Caribbean to the Grand Banks and perhaps beyond.

Therefore,

it is probable that the principles concerned with maintenance of stock abundance must be applied well beyond the
Eastern Caribbean Region.

As noted in Chapter III, the current status of stocks is a
very controversial subject.

It is known that fishing

pressure has resulted in growth overfishing, or smaller
average carcass size, in the Atlantic management areas of
the United States.

It has been argued that this has not

affected productivity of the Northern or Western Atlantic
swordfish population.

There is general agreement that the

current rate of exploitation is near maximum sustainable
yields.

Given that the range of swordfish includes most of the
Atlantic Ocean, the question of interest to the Eastern
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Caribbean becomes:

Will effort levels and exploitation

patterns in other regions of the Atlantic, especially the
Northwest Atlantic, affect production in the Eastern
Caribbean?

If swordfish are as highly migratory as

reported, the answer is affirmative.

However, swordfish

migration is not a simple matter of fish leaving for
northern areas in the summer and returning in the winter.
There appears to be a residential population, or at least a
year-round presence, of the species in the Eastern Caribbean.

The Caribbean may also be a spawning area for sword-

fish.

Ray Hilborn and John Sibert indicate that the highly

migratory label has been overused and poorly defined in many
instances (Hilborn and Sibert 1988).

Questions concerning

the relationship of South Atlantic stocks to Caribbean
stocks and the actual range of swordfish appearing in the
Caribbean remain to be answered.

As seen in cases such as Atlantic Bluefin tuna, the Eastern
Pacific and Southern Bluefin Tuna, it is likely that swordfish management is dependent on cooperation and coordination
of policies throughout the stock's range.

The argument that

HMS are not always as migratory as they seem may be more
true than previously thought, but current

evidenc~

points

toward wide movement and ranges for swordfish.
Effort levels in the Western Atlantic are increasing while
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the condition of the resource is in doubt.

All biologically

driven systems have limits in respect to potential yields.
Although the available information is far from perfect,
there are basic principles concerning effort and catch and
population age structure which indicate that, regardless of
the present status of the resource, exploitation limits
exist.

Although fishery systems are biologically driven,

our only control over 'potential yields is dependent on the
management of human activities.

Therefore, the starting

point is not necessarily biological, but a better understanding of human activity associated with it.

Without

cooperation among the concerned participants, it is
extremely difficult to collect the data required to understand the biological system involved.
becomes:

The question then

What management process can be initiated to gain

the required data, trust of participants, and understanding
of the fishery which will result in a strategy aimed at the
protection of the resource from a potential decline in
yields?

This question is difficult to answer on a national, much
less international, level.

For over six years, the United

States Atlantic Fisheries Councils and Regional Centers have
struggled with this problem.

They have succeeded in col-

lecting valuable information but, like most fishery investigations, definitive answers have not been agreed upon.
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During the intervening years, u.s. fishing operations have
spread beyond traditional fishing grounds to the Grand Banks
and the Caribbean.

The fishery has become more interna-

tional in nature as

u.s.

States EEZ.

boats ranged beyond the united

It has been reported that 50% of current East

Coast U.S. landings originate outside the u.s. EEZ (Pollack
1988).

Spanish vessels are now ranging further west while

their presence is anticipated in the Caribbean.

Therefore,

management requirements such as information collection,
scientific research and regulation are becoming more
important on the international level (see Figures 10 and
11).

The relevant international organization for HMS, as referred
to in Article 64, is the International Commission for the
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT).

The u.s. supports

the ICCAT Convention through the reporting of u.s. fishery
statistics and research carried out at the Southeast Fisheries Center.

The recommendations of the ICCAT biennial

report for 1986-87 expressed the need for statistics and
research, but no management recommendations were presented.
Statistics recommendations included:

national reporting of

catch and effort; adequate levels of size and sex sampling;
and standardization of statistics (ICCAT 1987).
recommendations included:

Research

intensification of tagging

efforts; standardization of CPUE; identification of stocks;
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Figure 10

Swordfish Exploitation in the Caribbean and Adjacent Areas

Resource Adjacent
Nations

FAa Reporting

United States (1562 mt)*
canada (585 mt)

Area 21
(Northwest Atlantic)

Japan (245 mt)

Area 31
(West Central Atlantic)

States (1922 mt)*
Japan (86 mt)
Korea (84 mt)

(148 mt)
United States (1922 mt)*
Venezuela (51 mt)
OECS nations
CA.~ICCt1 nations
Others Central America
fuxico

l<.rea

Foreign Fishing
Nations

Cuba

I-'

0'\
~

Barbados and Trinidad
OEeS nations
Venezuela
French Islands
Territories, Br. Neth.
U.S. territories

WECAFC

Eastern Caribbean
Swordfish Stocks

Unit~i

United States (900 mt)*
Korea
. Taiwan

Argentina (404 mt)
Brazil (375 mt)
Uruguay (1685 mt)

Area 41
(Southwest Atlantic)

Japan (695 mt)
Korea (134 rot)

Spain (7440 mt)*
Portugal (15 mt)
France (4 mt)

Area 27
(Northeast Atlantic)

Spai.n
Japan (33 mt)

*-

Indicates t~at it is likely that a large percentage of reported landings were taken outside
the given nation's fishing zone.
Source (FAa 1986 Yearbook) (landings given for 1985)
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better growth estimates and analysis of fishing effort
effectiveness to improve indices of abundance (ICCAT 198?).

The effectiveness of ICCAT has been questioned because each
member state conducts research, interprets recommendations
and enforces management on its own (Devnew 1981).
fore,

There-

there are wide differences in opinion concerning the

need for management, ,difficulties in standardizing information and differing levels of compliance in accordance with
management recommendations.

The self-regulating character

of the convention is not sufficient for the difficult management and conservation issues which must be dealt with in
the future.

The utilization of ICCAT as a scientific

institution concerned with research and data collection may
be the feasible limit of its role in the management process.
The separation of ICCAT scientific functions from the political realities of nation state self-interests is a possible
alternative.

Management in the areas of regulation and

enforcement might be carried out by negotiation of multilateral treaties.

This might help to minimize the impact of

political bias on scientific investigations.

It is not

realistic to expect a timely and effective international
regulatory strategy for swordfish management under the
current ICCAT convention.

The U.S. experience in swordfish

management highlights the proposition that, until the situation worsens, there is little political will to move
forward.
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The examination of principles in Chapter V concerning stock
abundances are important, yet their actualization will
require cooperation which does not exist.

However, the

following management tools may be utilized in the future.
The use of national quotas is a possible alternative,
although management within the
alternative seem unlikely.

u.s.

context alone makes this

In addition, the international

compromises required for allotment of national quotas are
beyond the level of cooperation which can be reasonably
expected at the present time.

Variable season closures,

size limits, effort restrictions, or a tax on small fish to
cut profitability in their targeting are other management
measures which could be helpful.

Presently, there is no

swordfish regulation for the Atlantic on the international
level.

On the national level, only Canada has limitations

of effort and landings.

The states of the Eastern Caribbean can do very little if
stocks begin to decline due to fishing outside their waters.
Articles 63 and 64 of UNCLOS III indicate that international
cooper.ation is required among participants under these
circumstances, but this seems unlikely when confronted with
the current state of cooperation of participants within the
swordfish range.

However, the Eastern Caribbean states

should be aware of ICCAT proceedings and participate through
OECS to the greatest degree possible.
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The information

obtained from vessels operating in the Eastern Caribbean
waters could be valuable in gaining a better understanding
of the resource, while the Eastern Caribbean Nations could
benefit from current research taking place outside their
immediate region.

Previous discussion of this objective illustrates the
inherent uncertainty which is implicit in the investigation
of fisheries population dynamics.

The goals in this area

must include cooperation in information collection and
coordination of regulatory policies on an international
scale.

Although these goals may not be met in the forsee-

able future it is important for the Eastern Caribbean
Nations to be recognized as concerned parties which have a
stake in the conservation of the resource.

This includes

their inclusion in the management process which has the
potential to be in everyone's interest.

Without progress in

international cooperation and coordination of policies, the
eventual decline in swordfish production of the Western
Atlantic is likely within the next decade.

Benefit Distribution
The appropriate distribution of benefits is the most
important economic and political issue related to the
Eastern Caribbean swordfish fishery.

168

The recent emergence

of a longline swordfish fishery has proven that commercialJ.y
viable concentrations of swordfish are present in the
region.

However, the fishery is dominated by foreign opera-

tions, and the economic value of the resource does not
benefit the region.

This section explores some alternatives

directed toward a distribution of benefits which are potentially acceptable and mutually beneficial to both

u.s.

fishing interests and the Eastern Caribbean Nations.

International Legal Aspects
Under Article 56 of UNCLOS III and customary international
law, the Island Nations of the Eastern Caribbean have the
right to claim "sovereign rights" over the living resources
within their EEZ.

Swordfish is considered a highly migra-

tory species by definition in the UNCLOS III text; therefore, Article 64 applies.

In the Atlantic, the relevant

international organization referred to in Article 64 is
ICCAT.

Since ICCAT has not proposed any management recom-

mendations for swordfish, coastal states within its range
are free to adopt any management measures they consider
appropriate under the "sovereign rights" granted in Article
56.

Even if management recommendations are adopted by

ICCAT, none of the independent Eastern Caribbean States are
party to the convention.

It is also reasonable to believe

that without the region's input there would be little incentive to abide by recommendations concluded in part by the
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United States, the largest participant in the Eastern
Caribbean swordfish fishery.

Article 62 of UNCLOS III is concerned with access to coastal
state waters for the harvest of underutilized stocks.
Swordfish occurring in the EEZs of the Eastern Caribbean
would fit this description because they are presently underutilized by the region's fishermen.
coastal state to:

Article 62 allows the

license foreign vesselsi establish fees

and other forms of remunerationi and determine conditions of
entry.

Article 62 also states that coastal state must

promote "optimum utilization" by determining its harvesting
capacity and granting the surplus of the total allowable
catch to other nations (United Nations 1983).

Since the

local harvest of swordfish is near zero, it is the duty of
Eastern Caribbean states to grant access to foreign harvesters.

The Caribbean nations have the right to control

access of foreign fishing operations within their zones of
jurisdiction under both customary international law and the
provisions of UNCLOS III.

However, it is also the duty of

the Eastern Caribbean states to grant access under the
objective of "optimum utilization" as stated in the UNCLOS
III treaty.

The Role of the OECS
The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (GECS) is
presently taking action on the issue of illegal fishing
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within the waters of the OEes nations.

All of the OEeS

nations have declared 200 nm zones of jurisdiction in which
they declare rights over the management of living resources,
including swordfish (see Table 15).

They have also initiat-

ed attempts at the harmonization of the legal regime governing foreign fishing access in the region.

The relative size

and resources of each nation make such a step imperative for
management of transboundary stocks such as swordfish.

A

unified political voice may also have greater impact on
negotiations with foreign fishery participants, especially
the United States.

Negotiation of fishing access terms may

also be enhanced because island nations will not be played
off against each other.

Harmonization of regional fishery

law will set a standard which could also work to the
advantage of the foreign fishing operation.

In this way,

laws will be consistent as operations move from zone to
zone.

There are definite advantages to a regional approach, but
also many questions concerning the degree of management
integration and membership in the organization.

The OECS

membership has geographic limits in relation to the probable
range of the swordfish resource in the Eastern Caribbean.
The configuration of potential 20D-mile jurisdictional zones
leads to potential limitations in effectiveness of management.

The OECS zones are not contiguous while all zones
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'l'ABLE 15

Eastern Caribbean Juri.sdictional Claims
Country

Territorial
Sea

200 nm zone and
~r declared

Maritime
Boundaries

Anguilla

3 mile

Antigua

12 mile

Fishing and EEZ
(1982)

undetermined

Barbardos

12 mile

EEZ (1978)

undetermined

British Virgin
Islands

3 mile

Fishing (1981)

Fishing (1977)

Dominica

12 mile

Fishing and EEZ
(1981)

French Islands

12 mile

EEZ (1977)

Grenada

12 mile

EEZ (1978)

undetermined

undetermined

Montserrat

3 mile

St. Kitts

12 mile

EEZ

undetermined

St. Lucia

3 mile

EEZ

wjMartinique

St. Vincent

3 mile

EEZ

undetermined

12 mile

EEZ

wjVenezuela

3 mile

EEZ (1976)

wjVenezuela

12 mile

EEZ (1978)

w/U.S./Trin.

Trinidad and
'Ibbago

U.S.A. terr.
Venezuela

- indicates tmknown, undetermined maritime boundaries
indicates that delimitation of EEZs has not taken place
Sources (Edeson and Pulvenis 1983, Ross and Landry 1987)
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except Antigua are cut off by other nations' zones before
they extend 200 miles in any direction (see Figure

lO)~

The

subregional Nauru group of the South Pacific was formed due
to common fisheries concerns such as contiguous geographic
factors and resource endowments.

The origins of the OECS

are rooted in economic and political factors related to
common characteristics such as to geographic location,
colonial past, relatively small size and similar political
and development goals.

OECS, unlike the Nauru group, was

already in existence when the common concern with the
swordfish issue surfaced.

For this reason, geography and

resource endowment played a smaller role, in relation to the
current formulation of responses to the problem, than in the
case of the Nauru g(oup.

Although there are geographic disadvantages to Caribbean
swordfish management carried out through only the OECS
states, it must be seen as a positive development.

The

Nauru group has had a progressive influence on the FFA.
Measures such as a regional registry were quickly adopted by
the FFA after the Nauru group initiated the practice
(Doulman 1987c).

Consensus at the subregional level is more

easily reached and could be spread on a wider scale as other
nations recognize the benefits of such an association.

A

wider association would give the region greater political
leverage with the distant water fishing nations and simplify
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management through the standardization of policy over a
greater and more contiguous geographic area.

However, it

would also require a willingness to compromise in areas
involving individual state sovereignty, the degree of
management integration and the makeup of the management
organization.

Beyond the OECS, the remaining British

territories (the British Virgin Islands and Anguilla) are
the most immediate possibilities for expansion.

They have

common concerns because illegal swordfish 10ng1ining is
currently suspected in their waters, and permitting of U.S.
vessels has been carried out in the BVI fishing zone for the
last three seasons.

Their fishing zones are relatively

large due to their projection into the Atlantic Ocean and
contiguous with other OECS states.

Their common colonial

past and the BVI association with the OEes associate member
make this a practical possibility.

Cooperation and coordination of politics with CARICOM could
add bargaining power to regional swordfish management.
Barbados and Trinidad have contiguous and relatively large
zones in the Southern part of the region.

Their inclusion

would be a significant addition to the potential management
area.

The French Islands lie in the middle of the region, separating the Northern OECS nations from those in the south and
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isolating Dominica in the middle.

Although there are inher-

ent difficulties with their integration due to their association with France, some degree of cooperation would be
beneficial due to their location.

Their participation

during the 1985 WECAFC meeting was positive in relation to
views expressed concerning enforcement and regional data
collection (WECAFC 1985).

Venezuela is another important

factor in a regional response due to both the EEZ it projects into the Caribbean Sea, and its developing longline
fishery.

Venezuelan Aves Island claims cut off the exten-

sion of several GECS states' EEZs within the Caribbean Sea.
Therefore, negotiation concerning boundary delimitation and
fishing rights with. Venezuela is an important consideration
for the region.

A regional association has the potential of providing
greater benefits at less cost than the development of
independent institutions.

Duplication in the areas of

administration, surveillance and enforcement and data
collection could be avoided through the development 6f one
regional agency.

This would be ~ great advantage to the

Eastern Caribbean states which lack resources and skilled
personnel.

However, the management organization will rely

on the sharing of costs and benefits of resource management
in a manner which is acceptable to all parties.

Initial

problems might involve the strengthening of the organization

175

as the vehicle through which political compromise can be
accomplished for the division of tasks as the region
attempts to maximize benefits.

The OECS is fortunate because a regional fisheries unit was
recently established on St. Vincent.

This OECS institution

is acting as an administrative and support center for
information collection and dissemination, and a focal point
from which policy can be formulated.

Subsequent steps in

the areas of enforcement, training, and development are
either in the planning stage or near implementation.

The

Canadian government has provided $250,000 in the first year
for the establishment of an enforcement unit (Joseph per.
com. 1988). The program will consist of a regional information unit to facilitate communication between member states
concerning foreign fishing.

Funding will also be utilized

,

for renting light aircraft and vessels from the coast guards
of member states for air and sea patrols (Joseph per. com.
1988).

The OECS has several alternatives in respect to:

the entry

of foreign vessels; the expansion of programs beyond the
immediate OECS nations; and the direction of possible local
development.

The degree of integration, expansion of

regional cooperation and eventual success will depend on the
mutual gains in benefits among those nations or territories
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included.

If these gains outweigh the benefits of initiat-

ing individual management strategies, then regional cooperation has a chance at success.

However, if the region's

political entities perceive infringement on sovereignty,
high administrative costs or an inequitable division of
costs and benefits, then the purpose ot the association is
lost.

One of the greatest potential strengths is the united

political stand which could be taken against the outside
presence of both foreign fishing operations and their governments.

Recent developments indicate that the OECS

nations are moving in this direction.

The planned political

union of the Leeward Islands will almost certainly result in
a common program among the GECS members in the southern part
of the region (The Daily News 1988).

The consolidation of a

common fishIng zone for the purpose of foreign entry has not
been achieved for the corning season, but a harmonized fee
structure will go into effect (Joseph per. com. 1988).
Although further integration will be required in the future
in the areas of enforcement, the common fee structure and
political ties, positive steps have been taken.

Further integration of nations outside the GECS is merely
speculative at present, but it is an alternative which could
be to the region's benefit.

The OECS still has a long way

to go; however, it is probably the best starting point from
which wider regional cooperation and coordination can
evolve.
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Access Agreements
One of the most promising immediate alternatives is the
licensing of foreign vessels wishing to fish in the zones of
Eastern Caribbean Nations.

The development of a domesetic

longline fishery would demand capital, skills and access to
markets which are beyond the present capabilities of the
island states of the region.

Therefore, the granting of

entry to foreign vessels in exchange for access fees is a
strategy by which revenues could be gained by the region's
island states.

However, there are many factors related to

foreign fishing entry which must be examined, such as the
best way to maximize revenues, conditions of entry, and
enforcement and surveillance.

R~Q.r:!..a I r e.sJ s

t-.£Y.

A regional response is preferable to individual state
actions in carrying out a program of this type.

It has the

advantage of presenting a united front to the distant water
fishing nations.

A useful regional management practice in

the South Pacific has been the establishment of a regional
registry.

The Eastern Caribbeari Nations could utilize this

system by requiring that all foreign vessels operating in
the region appear on the register.

If a vessel is found to

be operating illegally, it could be removed from the
registry.

This would make the vessel ineligible for access

to any nation's zone in the region.
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A vessel could be

returned to the registry only after paying required fines
and illustrating that it will comply with conditions of
entry in the future.

The register would act as a self-

regulating strategy for those vessels which value continued
access to the fishery.

Access fees
The coastal state can obtain benefits from the resource
without extensive domestic development of the fishery
through the charging of entry fees.

Ideally, these revenues

can be utilized to provide an instrument for government to
regulate, develop, conserve and generally manage the
fishery (Doulrnan 1987a).

The coastal state wants to capture

as much of the resource rent as possible,

"the return beyond

the profits and wages necessary to keep capital and labor
employed at normal levels of remuneration" (Copes 1987 ,10).
Therefore, the resource rent can be captured through license
fees or taxes without endangering the viability of fishing
operations (Copes 1987).

Fees should be set at levels which

capture the vessel operator's willingness to pay which will
be determined by his next best alternative, but not so high
as to discourage entry into the fishery.

Therefore, vessel

entry is a mutualistic arrangement under which an optimal
number of vessels can maintain adequate returns on capital
and labor while the coastal state collects the resource
rent.
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Fees can be linked to the prevailing prices of swordfish,
species composition of landings, type and size of the
vessels and the length or number of trips, or all of these
factors.

The method of fee collection will depend on the

amount of information available, the costs of implementing
the particular program and the related surveillance and
enforcement requirements of the program.

Therefore,

choosing a method of fee determination and collection will
depend on constraints of the Eastern Caribbean nations and
the nature of fishing operations.

In 1984, the market value of landings taken by distant water
fishing fleets in the South Pacific was $662.7 million, with
total access fees paid to South Pacific countries of $15
million which is 3% of the total value of landings
(Kotobalavu 1987).

In Papua New Guinea the operational fee,

which makes up the bulk of fee payments, is based on 5% of
the fishing ground value of catch (Doulman 1987e).

This

percentage is equal to the domestic export tax on tuna and
designed to extract a financial return to the resource owner
(Doulman 1987e).

Under the U.S. government Pacific Islands Treaty, the
fee/aid package will represent approximately 9% of the total
landed value of tuna taken by U.S. vessels in the region
(Kotobalavu 1987).

However, these U.S. fees at least in
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part reflect the strategic value of the resource or the U.S.
government's, as opposed to the tuna fisherman's, willingness to pay.

In the case of the Japanese, access fees equal

about 4% of total landed value although, if direct fisheries
grants are added, this figure is somewhat higher (Kotobalavu
1987).

South Pacific examples are not directly transferable to the
Caribbean because of different fishing methods, species
composition, and the complex processing and marketing
systems present in global tuna markets.

However, it

illustrates the potential variability of access fees, from
3% to 9% of landed value.

The determination of fees is not

always based on the economic rent of the resource, but
according to convenience, former practices, negotiations or
political agreements.

This is because the information and

skills required to obtain a figure based on economic values
are not always available or relevant to the issues surrounding the fishery.

However, a foreign vessel or fleet

will not normally operate in a fishery if fees are set at
levels which result in greater costs than revenues.

The British Virgin Islands is the only case in which entry
has been granted for access fees of $7,000 per vessel
annually.

In 1986, 13 vessels reported swordfish landings

of approximately 400,000 pounds with a 1986 landed value of
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approximately $1.1 million.

The $91,000 paid in access fees

was about 8% of landed value.

In 1987, two vessels were

permitted with landings of nearly 100,000 pounds of swordfish with a 1986 value of appr.oximately $276,000 (Blok per.
corn. 1988).

The $14,000 paid in access fees was approxi-

mately 5% of landed value.

The possible reasons for

increased landings in 1987 were better reporting and a good
fishing year (Blok per. corn. 1988).

The value of total

benefits also includes the landing of by-catch in the
British Virgin Islands free of charge.

Its value is diffi-

cult to calculate, but the estimated value of over 5,000
pounds of billfish, tuna and sharks landed by two vessels in
1986 was approximately $7,500.

Therefore, the total bene-

fits obtained by· the BVI in 1987 may have approached 8% of
the total value of swordfish harvested.

The BVI case highlights two questions:

By what method and

how much do you charge; and how many vessels do you allow to
enter the fisheries zone?

The BVI case illustrates that by

charging a flat fee for entry, the island government is
assured of known returns regardless of fishing conditions.
However, without a link to the value of swordfish landed, as
fishing vessel success increases, the island government will
gain a lower percentage in returns in relation to the total
value of the harvest.

In a bad year the foreign fishermen

will be the losers since they pay a corresponding high
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percentage for access in relation to the total value of
their catch.

Therefore, for greater stability and sharing

of benefits, it may be in the interest of both parties to
relate access fees to the quantity and value of swordfish
taken in a season.

This might be accomplished through

charging a percentage of total landed value.

Cato and Lawlor studied the economics of a 36-foot Florida
longline vessel which earned $142,327 (Cato and Lawlor
1981).

After accounting for fixed costs, variable costs and

the captain's share, $16,255 remained - or approximately 12%
of the total revenues earned by the boat through swordfish
landings.

The application of this percentage to the Eastern

Caribbean could be deceptive due to a variety of factors.
The vessels operating in the Eastern Caribbean are generally
larger and make longer trips than a Florida vessel of this
type.

Therefore, they probably. take advantage of greater

economies of scale with potentially higher revenues in
relation to costs.

Swordfish stock characteristics are also

different in the Caribbean with different catch rates and
greater average carcass sizes.

There are also additional or

higher costs associated with operation in a foreign region
such as repair costs, transport, resupply and fuel.

There-

fore, it is highly speculative to associate a percentage
value with access fees, but given the BVI case and the
margin given above, it is likely that 10% of landed value is
probably a reasonable starting point.
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There are problems in linking access payments to the value
of swordfish harvested.

Administrative costs might be

increased due to information and reporting requirements.
The information required to formulate fee structures is
complicated by differing resource endowments, stock fluctuations, price volatility and the required economic
expertise to carry out the program.
porting must be truthful and timely.

Foreign vessel reThis will put greater

demands on personnel and enforcement capabilities to ensure
compliance.

In the British Virgin Islands, problems concerned with
compliance in the areas of reporting and by-catch landings
contributed to their

d~cision

to .lower the number of vessels

licensed to operate in their fishing zone.

An improvement

in cooperation was illustrated by an increase in by-catch
landings per vessel from 10,000 pounds landed by 13 vessels
in 1986 to 5,000 pounds landed by two vessels in 1988 (Blok
per. com. 1988).

Therefore, the number of vessels permitted

is in part dependent on practical limits of island state
administration and enforcement.

It is important to note

that the illegal fishing of unlicensed vessels is suspected
in BVI waters.

To maximize revenues, it would seem that a given state
should allow the entry of as many vessels as possible.
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The

question then becomes:

Assuming

d~velopment

of sufficient

enforcement and administrative capabilities, what is the
limit on the number of vessels that a given state or region
can license?

Conventional wisdom would link this question

to stock abundance and maximum economic yield.

Fishing

effort, or the number of vessels, should be set at MEY where
the greatest economic rent could be obtained from the
foreign fishing vessels.

This could be accomplished by

setting fees at the difference between costs and revenues at
MEY (see Figure 6).

At effort levels higher than MEY, the

combined costs of access fees and of fishing operations will
be greater than total revenues.

This will result in vessels

leaving the fishery until equilibrium is reached (Copes
19a7).

This economic approach would:

limit the number of

vessels in the fishery; maximize coastal state revenues;
maintain economic efficiency; and keep rates of exploitation
below levels which might contribute to a decline in stocks.

Unfortunately, the use of this model is hampered by the
characteristics of fisheries resources.

Initial

problem~

involve the large and costly information requirements of
this model.

The use of already imperfect information is

further complicated by constant variations in stock abundances and economic data.

Of greatest importance is the

character of the highly migratory swordfish resource.
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Due

to its large range and natural variations in stock abundance, it is unlikely that effort levels in the Eastern
Caribbean Nations Region can be fine-tuned to the MEY level.
Excessive exploitation levels in any region within swordfish
range have the potential to impact stock abundances.

The Eastern Caribbean states have an interest in limiting
effort below those levels which would contribute to overexploitation of the species.

However, considering the

current lack of cooperation and regulation, one alternative
is to permit as many vessels as possible to maximize
revenues in the short run.

There are also limits to the

number of vessels which can operate in a given zone due to
the

ar~a

required to

conflicts.

m~ke

40-rnile sets and potential gear

To some degree, the vessel owner's willingness

to pay becomes lower as the number of vessels permitted to
fish in a given zone increases (Merrit per. com. 1987).
Until greater international cooperation can be reached, the
setting of the optimal level of fishing effort throughout
the species range, including

tll~

Caribbean, will not become

a factor in its management.

This relies on the assumption

that it is possible to arrive at an optimal figure, given
the difficulties in understanding fish populations and the
human activities associated with them.

The current manage-

ment constraints, and potential negative effects, dictate
that the best alternative may be to continue to allow entry
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near current levels of effort until there is a better
understanding of swordfish stocks in the Eastern Caribbean
region and throughout the Atlantic range of the species.

The OECS nations recently implemented a unifor.m fee
structure as a first step in attempting to answer these
questions.

Fees consist of three basic components:

a

$25,000 payment for vessel entry for eight months and
landings of up to 100,000 pounds of swordfish; payment of 10
cents per pound for landed swordfish; and payment of $14,000
per vessel for an observer program (Joseph per. corn. 1988).
Each OECS member is limited to permit only two vessels to
operate within its zone.

Agreement on the ,application of

uniform fees in the region is a positive development. ,
However, it does not recognize the unique characteristics of
individual zones such as size. configuration and resource
endowments.
be different.

Therefore, the value of entry to each zone will
This may r.esult in a lack of applications for

fishing in those zones which offer less attractive fishing
opportunities, or the wandering of vessels into other zones
where fishing is more favorable.

In addition, the fees may

be unrealistically high regardless of the national zone
being considered or for the region as a whole.

The OECS

fisheries unit is still attempting to formulate a strategy,
based on a common fisheries zone, which could resolve some
of these problems.
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In 1986, the value of the U.S. longline landings in the
Caribbean was $5,259,335 for swordfish, $541,811 for tuna
and $16,394 for billfish, totalling $5,816,540 (SAFMC 1987).
The percentage of landings taken outside the U.S. EEZ is
unknown, although it could be substantial in light of

BV~

landings which were approximately 400,000 pounds in 1986 and
the reported interest of longliners in entry to waters
adjacent to Grenada (Blok per. com. 1988, Joseph per. com.
1988).

If it is assumed that half of U.S. swordfish land-

ings were caught inside other Caribbean Nations' fishing
zones, and 10% of the landed value could be paid to the
Caribbean nations in access fees,
be gained in revenues.

then nearly $300,000

coul~

This figure is only a gross approxi-

mation which is given to indicate the order of magnitude of
possible revenues, not an actual figure.

1ota1 benefits

could be higher if by-catch is landed in the island states
and other conditions are required of foreign vessels.
However, given the configuration and sizes of the OECS 200mile fishing zones, some vessel owners may reason that GECS
entry is not iri their interest.

Without a doubt, a more

wide-spread regional fishing area will be of greater value
to the foreign fisherman.

Without knowledge of resource

concentrations, it is impossible to state where fishing is
concentrated and access is most valued.
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It.is important to realize that in the South Pacific situation revenues are in the tens of millions, whereas in the
Eastern Caribbean benefits from the swordfish fishery are
not likely to be greater than in the hundreds of thousands
of dollars.

Potential revenues are important for under-

standing the relative costs of program implementation.

The

costs of administration, enforcement, data collection and
general management activities could easily outweigh the
benefits accrued through fees.

Care must be taken to

operate within the limits of the fishery and resource.

If a regional strategy is adopted, the allocation of
benefits among member states is another important factor.
In the case of the United States-South Pacific Islands
Treaty, a minimum payment is guaranteed to each FFA member
with the rest divided among members according to harvest
locations.

This is a possible method of dividing revenues

among members of the OECS which have different resource
endowments and EEZ sizes and configurations.
that an excess will be available after

This assumes

manag~ment

activities

have been undertaken.

Other benefits
The requirement of landing foreign longline by-catch in
island nations is another potential benefit for Eastern
Caribbean Nations.

It produces benefits by providing an
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additional source of protein for domestic consumption or, in
the case of tuna, a high-valued product for tourist hotels.
Initially, longliners cooperated by some degree in local
landing of by-catch in the BVI, except in the case of
"shack" landed in the US VI and Puerto Rico.
increase in tuna prices, due to fresh

u.s.

Recently the
markets and

bigeye demand in Japanese markets, has encouraged retention
of tuna species.

In these cases, island nations must decide

which is in their best interest:

to obtain greater revenues

through linking tuna landings with access fees, or to
require the landing of tuna and other species, including
perhaps a portion of the swordfish catch.

It may be in their best interest to retain a portion of
longliner catch for domestic consumption although, as is the
case with access fees,
age longliner entry.
the

u.s.

it cannot be so large as to discourAnother problem relates to the case of

Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico, where by-catch has

competed with local fishermen's landings.

According to the

Fisheries Officer in the British Virgin Islands, by-catch
landings had no negative side effects (Blok per. com. 1987).
Care must be taken to assimilate the added fishery supply
without disruption of traditional markets.

Most of the

Eastern Caribbean Island Nations are net importers of
fisheries products.

Therefore, the landing of longliner

catch could have potential beneficial effects if planning
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and markets are identified in advance.

Ultimately, it is up

to the specific island nation whether or not longliner
landings could have a beneficial effect under site specific
conditions.

On a wider level, perhaps a portion of long-

liner catch could be distributed, on a regional basis, to
those areas of greatest need through a regional agency such
as the OECS or wholesalers.

As in the case of the individ-

ual island states, careful planning and consideration of the
local fishery and markets must be recognized.

The OECS plan

for the earning season will require the landing of by-catch
subject to certain conditions.

Transshipment of longliner catch through Eastern Caribbean
Nations is another possibility which could provide employment and improve infrastructure for other fishery exports as
the local fishing industry develops.

Doulman identified

this as one area of potential benefits to the island states
of the South Pacific for these reasons.

Presently, most

swordfish are transshipped through the U.S. territories of
Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

"The Law of the

Sea Convention (Article 62) permits a coastal state to
require DWFN fleets to offload or to transship their catches
made in its EEZ at domestic ports" (Doulman 1987d, 304).
The landing of catches in domestic ports could also facilitate data collection and enforcement activities.

One

problem involves U.s. Mercury restrictions of 1.0 ppm.
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Swordfish landed in the United States are seldom checked,
but imports can be held up in customs or held for a period
of time for testing (Kramer 1984).

Transshipment to the

United States has been reported from Grenada and Curacao
(Joseph per. com. 1988), but

com~unication

and agreement

with Federal Food and Drug Administration procedures should
be made before further plans are made in this area.

Another potential benefit which is sometimes linked to or
considered as a part of access payments is the provision of
development aid by the distant water fishing nation.

The

general view of South Pacific Nations stressed that access
agreements should be a purely financial transaction based on
the commercial value of the resource (Doulman 1987e).

In

many cases, development aid does not produce the desired
result because of failure to understand development within
the proper environmental, economic, political and cultural
context.

Development projects initiated by outside inter-

ests are sometimes rapidly implemented and inappropriately
scaled (Towle 1985).

The introduction of inappropriate

technologies or development models can result in projects
which cannot sustain themselves after the aid is stopped,
degrade the environment, break down traditional systems and
create a greater dependence on imports.

These factors can

be magnified by the unique characteristics of small tropical
island states such as dependence, insularity and a fragile
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environment (Towle 1985).

In addition, the motivations and

perceptions of the donor nation may be very different than
those of the island nation.

It should also be noted that a

large percentage of total aid budgets are usually spent in
the donor nation for personnel, equipment and institutional
support.

This is not meant to indicate that development aid

is inherently evil, but that extreme care should be taken if
actual benefits are to accrue from this alternative.

The

host country needs to carefully study and identify those
areas in which development aid can result in benefits that
will contribute to the goals of economic development and
self-sufficiency.

Conditions of Access
The purpose of setting terms and conditions of foreign
fishing vessel access to the Eastern Caribbean Nations
fishing zones are similar to those of the South Pacific
States.

It is meant to:

"promote the orderly exploitation

of the fishery; minimize administration costs associated
with licensing FFVs; and provide a basis for scientific
monitoring and management of the 'fishery" (Doulman 1987e,
22).

The main conditions include, but are not limited to:

establishment of prohibited areas; license application
procedures; reporting requirements; maintenance of catch
records; vessel identification; domestic observers; and
agents to handle administrative matters (Doulman 1987e).
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The island nations may require closed areas to prevent
conflicts with domestic fisheries and to protect local
fishermen from competition with longliners.

In areas where

local fishermen target large pelagics in nearshore areas,
longliners may have potentially negative impacts.

However,

closed areas cannot be so extensive as to needlessly complicate or significantly reduce the profitability of fishing
operations because this will lower the value of access fees.
One possibility is to require additional conditions for
foreign fishing within the l2-mile territorial sea where
conflicts are most likely to occur.

Additional information

regarding swordfish concentrations and local fishing patterns are required if the option of closing areas is carried
out.

Licensing procedures should be kept as simple as possible to
reduce administrative costs and potential conflicts while
supplying required information and facilitating communication between parties.

One option is to require the assign-

ment of a FFV agent, or agents, in the region to handle
licensing arrangements (Doulman 1987e).

This could expedite

administrative requirements for the FFV owners while reducing administrative costs for the Eastern Caribbean Nations.

If, when a vessel enters the management area, it reports
information such as time, position and the amount of fish on
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board, this will
region.

assi~t

compliance monitoring for the

Weekly radio reports, which include position and

catch, are other possible

requi~ements

within the Region's fishing zones.

for vessels operating

In addition, the main-

tenance of fishing logs which record time, fishing location,
catch and cumulative catch should be required.

The comple-

tion and timely delivery of logs to regional and national
authorities at the conclusion of fishing activities could be
a condition for future access.

Domestic observers and

agents could be used to facilitate this process.

Fishing vessels may also be required to display their radio
call signs or international signal letters on the vessel so
that they are visible from the air.

This could assist

identification of vessels by air patrols.

Another condition of entry could include the obligation for
foreign fishing vessels to take on observers for compliance
monitoring, biological data collection, and possibly
training.

An onboard observer would be in the unique

position of observing fishing operations in areas where the
greatest concentration of fishing activity is taking place.
This would have the additional benefit of documenting
operations of other vessels which may not be registered for
operation within the area.

The observer could collect data

concerned with catch rates, species composition of landings,
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and biological data such as sex and size.

This information

could be helpful for subsequent local development, as well
as a valuable contribution to regional and international
scientific agencies.

The observer could also acquaint

himself with technical aspects of the operations such as
electronics, hydraulics and strategies used for gear sets.
First-hand examination of these operations and supplemental
training programs could allow the observer to gain the
expertise required for extension programs or to establish
his own fishing operation.

The first-hand knowledge gained

by observers has potential benefits which could range beyond
the function of compliance monitoring.

The BVI requires

observer. coverage as a condition of entry to its fishing
zone.

It has been considered as helpful in gaining a better

understanding of the swordfish fishery in the area (Blok
per. com. 1987).

The new OEeS program includes observers as

a condition of entry.

The conditions and terms of foreign fishing vessel access
will be instrumental in gaining potential benefits from the
resource.

Administrative requirements should be tailored to

minimize costs for the Eastern Caribbean Nations while
maximizing benefits.

However, requirements should be

reasonable to foreign fishing operations in respect to cost
and compliability to foster a mutualistic relationship.
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Compliance
Foreign fishing vessel compliance through the payment of
access fees and observance of access terms and conditions is
a necessary ingredient for success in obtaining the benefits
associated with resource exploitation.

Adequate surveil-

lance and enforcement will be necessary as a deterrent to
the violation of regulations or laws (Lepiz and Sutinen
1985).
"The four main modes of fishing surveillance and enforcement include:
air patrols; sea patrols; special
observers on fishing vessels; and inspection in
harbors...
The proper mode of enforcement depends on
the available resources, the type of regulations or
terms of access and the characteristics of the fishery"
(Lepiz and Sutinen 1985, 313).

The behavior and eventual decisions made by fishermen are
motivated by their interests in the fishery.

Their reaction

to a set of regulations will depend on the probability of
violating without being detected; the benefits associated
with such undetected activities; the probability of being
detected, but avoiding sanctions and the benefits associated
with it; and the probability of being detected and
sanctioned" (Becker 1968).

Each individual considers the probability of being caught
and sanctioned against the potential returns which are
associated with the illegal activity.

It is expected that

the fishermen will then compare the value of returns
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associated with illegal activity against the value of
returns associated with compliance to regulations (Hennessey
and Kaiser 1986).

If the chances of being caught and

sanctioned are very small and the potential benefits are
relatively large, fishermen will operate illegally.

This

has been the case in the Eastern Caribbean where fishermen
have operated illegally because there has been a very small
probability of being caught.

In many Eastern Caribbean

zones there was no mechanism in place to permit access
although it has been reported that local governments were
approached by U.S. fishermen.

Given the choice of operating

illegally or being excluded entirely, foreign fishermen have
generally chosen the latter.

One important factor beyond

th~

cost-benefit approach men-

tioned above'involve~ wheth~r foreign swordfish fi~hermen
are risk takers or risk adverse.

If they are generally risk

adverse, some fishermen may follow entry requirements even
when the chances of being caught and sanctioned are very
small.

Goodwill fostered by communication, explanation of

island nation policy, attitudes which voice mutual concerns
instead of differences and reasonable terms of entry, could
help to create a mutualistic, instead of adversary, relationship.

Some fishermen have indicated that they would be

willing to participate in an entry program if one existed.
However, on the other hand, most fishermen may be risk
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takers.

In this case, greater surveillance and enforcement

activities will be necessary to produce an adequate
deterrent.

An access program is currently being considered in the
Eastern Caribbean.

The question now becomes:

How can

fishermen's behavior be modified to obtain the compliance
necessary for program-success?

According to Stigler,

government authorities have the following means
compliance:

t~

improve

minimize the chances that violations will go

undetected; maximize the probability that sanctions will
follow the detection of violations; speed up the process
from the time of detection to assignment of sanction; make
the sanction large (Stigler 1970).

The Eastern Caribbean nations will use some combination of
these alternatives to achieve the greatest amount of
compliance for the least cost.

The high cost associated

with the detection of violations through sea and air patrols
indicates that concentration on measures 2 through 4 may be
more cost effective.

Therefore, one alternative is to

increase the probability that sanctions will follow violations, sanctions are processed quickly and sanctions will
consist of large fines.

It should be noted that a very high

level of compliance is not necessarily the goal of a cost
effective enforcement program (Sutinen and Anderson 1985).
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The cost of detecting all or most violations could be
greater than the value of the resource.

The following factors will determine the approach Eastern
Caribbean nations might take in making detection of
violations more likely:

1)

the available enforcement modes;

2)

the relative costs of each enforcement mode;

3)

and the relative effectiveness of each enforcement
mode.

The principle which must be recognized by Eastern Caribbeah
Island Nations is that the marginal benefits must exceed the
marginal costs of added units of enforcement

~apability.

The most important and likely violations are foreign vessel
entry to the region without payment of access fees and
under-reporting of catch if fees are linked to the value of
landings.

A combination of all four enforcement modes can be effective
in curtailing this type of activity.

Air patrols are

effective in locating concentrations of fishing vessels and
tracking their movements (Lepiz and Sutinen 1985).

This can

be valuable information for surface patrols which can follow
up on air patrol reports.

The use of a large aircraft for
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this purpose was too costly according to French experiences
in the region (WECAFC 1985).

Small commercial aircraft or

commercial flights might be a more cost effective alternative, although it is likely that the benefits from present
swordfish fishery alone are insufficient for regular
operations.

Sea surface patrols are necessary as an actual

deterrent to violations on the fishing grounds.
accomplished through

~ctions

This is

such as boarding and inspection

of vessel holds, logs and radio reports (Lepiz and Sutinen
1985).

Although this mode of enforcement is effective, it

is also potentially expensive.

Additional capital outlay

for more vessels is probably inappropriate considering the
limited resources of the region's island states.

Therefore,

the complementary use of existing air and sea patrols
through cooperation with coast guards and police may be the
best alternative until a more reasonable estimate of the
fishery's value can be calculated.

The recent Canadian

funding for the establishment of an enforcement unit wiJ.l be
used for this purpose.

The placement of observers on at least a percentage of
vessels operating in fishing zones or the management area
could be an important deterrent to underlogging.

An

observer program can be an expensive alternative when
administration, salaries and training are included.
is also some apprehension on the part of the Eastern
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There

Caribbean Nations concerning observer treatment and onboard
conditions.

The use of a combination of air patrols, sea

patrols and observers could reduce the cost of anyone
enforcement component.

If concentrations of fishing effort

can be followed by observer reports and occasional air
patrols, then sea surface patrols could be used with the
greatest potential impact.

Instead of spending long periods

of time on the fishing grounds, sea surface patrols could be
used only in the case of strongly suspected violations.
Sanctions will be another benefit which could then be used
to help finance operations.

Harbor inspection is probably the mode of the least cost
although it will usually be effective for those vessels
cbmplying with conditions of entry.

It could still be

useful for calculating landings and biOlogical data,
especially if vessels are required to land catches to be
transshipped from eastern Caribbean terminals.

Probably the two most important factors concerned with
enforcement relate to keeping costs down while using all
available resources in the most effective manner through
regional cooperation.

Air patrols, sea patrols and

observers will work best if they are used on a regional
basis where costs are spread out among member states.
Another important area which mllst accompany this cooperation
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involves the harmonization of legal requirements concerned
with conditions of entry.

Perhaps the best alternative to

improve compliance is the development of a regional
registry.

The U.S. Factor
The Eastern Caribbean swordfish fishery is dominated by the
United States both in ,respect to landings and markets.
Access agreements in the near future will depend primarily
on negotiations with

u.s.

entities.

The Eastern Caribbean

Island Nations can negotiate directly with the U.S. government, the private sector or some combination.

The South

Pacific Island States-United States Fisheries Treaty indicates that U.S. government cooperation can be a valuable
asset for the maximization of benefits.

In the South Pacific case, a major complicating factor
involved the U.S. legal stance concerning tuna jurisdiction.
The U.S. claimed that the coastal state should not have
authority over tuna resources because their highly migratory
character required an international management strategy.
Although this principle of HMS management is widely
accepted, the U.S.

legal view was actually related to the

political pressure of west coast tuna interests.

The ATA

wanted continued access to tuna stocks within other nations'
EEZs.

Swordfish are also considered a HMS, but the U.S.
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legal definition does not include them in this category
(Wade 1986).

Unlike the case of tuna, the bulk of U.S.

swordfish landings originated within the U.S. EEZ when the
MFCMA was drafted.

United States law recognizes the right

of the coastal state to carry out management authority over
swordfish.

Recent developments in the South Pacific indi-

cate that the united States can also recognize coastal state
authority over tuna within the coastal state EEZ when it is
in the interest of u.S. policy, everl when it is in conflict
with u.S. law.

Therefore, Eastern Caribbean jurisdiction

over the region's swordfish fishery and growing tuna fishery
can be recognized by the United States, and u.S. access to
it is negotiable because of the precedent established in the
South Pacific.

A United States-Easter.n Caribbean Nations Treaty, modeled
to some degree after the South Pacific Treaty, has the
potential to be mutualy beneficial.

The potential benefits

to be gained through government negotiations were realized
in the South Pacific where U.S. access fees rose from 4% of
landed value to 9% after the treaty.

It is likely that when

strategic concerns are recognized by the United States,
higher returns can be obtained through government negotiation than through dealing with individual companies and
fishermen.

A treaty could also shift a portion of compli-

ance and enforcement responsibility to the united States.
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The enforcement of the Lacey Act could assist in the
sanctioning of violators who have returned to U.S. waters.
Guaranteed U.S. cooperation in following up suspected and
documented violations would also be a less costly method of
improving compliance in the waters of the Eastern Caribbean
Nations.

The United States would benefit in several areas if a treaty
could be drafted.

It would guarantee access for U.S.

fishermen to fishing grounds during a period in which
expansion of swordfish operations is essential for continued
industry health.

Continued access provides the benefits of

employment and a greater supply of swordfish destined for
U.S. markets.

Because the bulk of swordfish consumed in the

United States is imported, the maintenance arid: growth of
U.S. production in the Caribbean should be seen as a positive development.

Other national fleets from Venezuela and

Spain, which may be lower cost producers, may be able to
outbid the U.S. for access in the future.

Therefore, it

could benefit U.S. fishermen to deal fairly for protection
of their future interests in access.

Perhaps the most important benefit which could result from
U.S. cooperation is not directly related to fisheries.
Caribbean is often viewed as strategic to U.S. security
interests.

The U.S. projection of power in the case of
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The

Grenada and development assistance and terms of trade
associated with the Caribbean Basin Initiative are two
examples which illustrate the willingness of the United
States to act according to its perceived strategic concerns.
In 1982 on the floor of the House while discussing the
Pacific Islands ~ituation, Congressman Paul McCoskey
indicated that the Pacific Islands Region is just as
important as the waters of the Caribbean (Tsamenyi 1986).
It is unfortunate that these concerns have not translated
into greater understanding and respect for the Eastern
Caribbean States as independent national entities instead of
satellite appendages.

The recent intrusion of U.S. draggers into the Canadian
portion of George's Bank has become a problem area.

A

recent incident involving the New Bedford-based "Donna Lynn"
has resulted in a NOAA General Council's Office review of
the evidence for possible civil violations under the Lacey
Act (Dennison 1988).

Unlike the Caribbean, there is greater

respect for Canada due to its greater enforcement capabilities and relative importance to U.S. relations.

This

incident indicates that prosecution under the Lacey Act is
possible in the Eastern Caribbean, if communication and
cooperation exist between the relevant government officials.
Illegal

U~S.

swordfish fishing is not a problem in Canadian

waters, although many U.S. longline vessels operate adjacent
to them.
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The problem of illegal swordfish fishing is a situation in
which the U.S.

is in the position to promote goodwill by

respecting the rights of the region's nations under the
norms of international ocean law.

Therefore, a fisheries

treaty would have the value of strengthening positive
relationships with the Eastern Caribbean.

Both sides could

benefit from the understanding that mutual respect is the
key to the proper management and exploitation of the
fishery, and better international relations.

This serves

the strategic interests of the United States government
better than a fisheries policy currently based on neglect.

Local Development of a Swordfish

Fish~.

The Eastern Caribbean Nations currently exist under
constraints which make development of a s~ordfish· longline
fishery difficult at best.
Pacific case,

As King noted in the South

"A nation's proximity to major fishing grounds

is only one of the factors influencing its competitive
position in the industry"

(King 1987, 280).

The major

problem areas include the lack of capital, expertise,
trained fishermen and marketing infrastructure.

The swordfish fishery is

a potentially

risky and expensive

commercial proposition, especially in the case of developing
countries with scarce resources.

Fishing operations require

vessels, equipment and fuel which must be imported.
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There

is a danger that the greater import and capital requirements
of development in this sector could lead to greater dependency rather than self-sufficiency (King 1987).

Swordfish

longlining is not a traditional activity of local fishermen.
New skills associated with the use of longline equipment and
finding fish mean that initial operations will work at a
disadvantage.

Local fishermen may also object to extended

periods at sea which they do not encounter in the inshore
fishery.

There are positive aspects associated with local development
such as employment, local supplies of fish products, and
potential foreign exchange earned from exports.

Although

these factors make local development attractive, they should
be weighed carefully against the cost of undertaking this
type of program.

In reality, development is not an all or nothing proposition.

It is the type of program which must take place over

years, or perhaps decades.

The time to start is the present

- by recognizing constraints, identifying achievable goals,
carrying out cost-benefit analyses and perhaps initiating
pilot projects.

Effective extension targeted on progressive

local fishermen with the adaptation of small-scale techniques could be the first step.

Methods and equipment which

are available locally may minimize import and foreign
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exchange requirements.

Since the shelf edge is relatively

close when compared to fishing grounds such as the Grand
Banks, smaller vessels might be employed.
must be a steady and methodical process.

Local development
In this way,

mistakes can be turned into learning experiences without
catastrophic results related to expending too much capital
and resources too rapidly.

The local sector can also learn

valuable information from the current foreign fishery such
as location, size and economic value of the resource.

Local development is an attractive alternative although,
given the curent constraints of the region's fisheries
operations, it is difficult if not impossible in the short
run.

However, in the long run, it has the potential to

provide greater benefits and control over the region's
destiny.

A long-term program with this objective might

include characteristics such as:

relatively small but

steady annual expenditure; extension concerned with cooperation and coordination with progressive local fishermen; and
the steady development of a data base concerned with
resource characteristics.

International development

agencies could have a role to play in this development by
recognizing that it requires a long-term commitment of
decades rather than years and small but steady revenue
requirements.
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Joint ventures are often mentioned as a vehicle by which
foreign expertise, technology and capital can be employed to
stimulate development, while profits are shared by the
resource adjacent and distant water fishing nation.

Joint

ventures can work, but the proper balance must be met on
both sides.

This is a difficult proposition given that each

side's motivations for joint venture establishment are
usually different.

A joint venture agreement is only as

good as the planning and communication between the two
parties.

Possibilities under joint venture agreements

include transshipment facilities, by-catch or a portion of
swordfish landed in the island nations, and access fee
payments.

Further cooperation in profit-sharing and local

development are possible, but careful future study and
negotiation will be required.

Economic EfficienSl
Economic efficiency is of concern to the Eastern Caribbean
Island Nations because greater economic rents mean that
greater access fees may be charged without endangering the
viability of foreign operations.

However, a great amount of

information and expertise is required to fine-tune a fishery
to an optimal stock abundance level.

This assumes that is

is possible to gain a high degree of understanding of stocks
and that cooperation between participants for the required
effort limitations can be achieved.
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The utilization of a

strategy based on transferable national quotas could satisfy
the goal of economic efficiency.

However, the cooperation

required for implementation of this type of program is most

likely impossible given the present lack of international
management of swordfish in the Western Atlantic.

One factor within the control of the Eastern Caribbean
Nations involves the entry of lower, or lowest, cost
producers.

In the future, it is possible that nations such

as Venezue12 and Spain could enter the region's swordfish
fishery.

If their costs of production are lower than those

of the u.S. producers, then potentially higher access fees
might be obtained by the Eastern Caribbean Island Nations.
In the future,

the region could attempt to gain the highest

possible market value of its resource, perhaps through
competitive bidding between fishing nations.

Local development may also be a factor in relation to the
level of economic efficiency.

As a local fleet develops,

other factors such as employment and local consumption may
become more important than profit maximization.

This is a

difficult trade-off with potential dangers such as eventual
over-capitalization and state subsidies which become a
permanent fixture within the local industry.

Nations of the

region may also grant preferential treatment for access
throughout the region to those regional nations which are
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developing

swo~dfish

fishing operations.

This would

increase the chances of success of local operations as they
follow swordfish concentrations regardless of national
boundaries.

~ulti-species

Character of the Fishery

As mentioned in the case of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin
Islands, there is concern over impacts of longlining on
species caught incidentally, especially other billfish
species such as marlin.

The growth of the recreational

fishing industry and its possible benefits to the Eastern
Caribbean Nations could be an important consideration for
future regional policies.

In the British Virgin Islands,

billfish tournaments have already become a segment of the
tourist industry.

The Eastern Caribbean Nations must decide

whether the resource is of greater value as food or as a
recreational species in the future.

It is beyond the scope

of this report to speculate on the potential benefits and
costs of recreational and commercial utilization of the
resource.

However, it should be recognized that, unlike

commercial fisheries,

the actual value of the recreational

resource cannot be measured by market values.

Although

expenditures of recreational fishermen can indicate its
importance, the actual willingness of the recreational
fisherman to pay should be measured by non-market values.
Various techniques of economic measurement and actions taken
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by the United States might be an indicator of the potential
importance of recreational fisheries.

The U.S. Billfish

Management Plan will prohibit the commercial sale of
billfish and implement size restrictions (SAFMC 1987).

The

Eastern Caribbean Nations will have to consider the implications of billfish exploitation in the region and the
future importance of the species.

Further Considerations
It is apparent that the five major categories treated above
are interrelated.

For example, benefit distribution through

foreign fishing access and local development or joint
ventures have direct effects on each other and future
developments.

Stock abundance will affect the level of

access fees and benefits associated with local development.
These interactions must be recognized as the Eastern
Caribbean develops policies to manage the swordfish fishery.

This chapter examined some of the alternatives which are
available to the Eastern Caribbean states.

The Eastern

Caribbean swordfish fishery is still filled with uncertainty
in respect to biological, economic and social characteristics.

All of these areas deserve greater attention as the

management process moves forward.

Hopefully this chapter

has highlighted some of the important questions which must
be answered as the management process evolves.
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CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Background
The Caribbean Situation
The swordfish fishery is one of the newest and most controversial fisheries of the Eastern Caribbean Region.

The

Eastern Caribbean Region, as referred to in this paper,

in-

eludes the island nations of the Lesser Antilles including
their respective zones of ocean jurisdiction, extending from
Puerto Rico to Venezuela.

During the early 1980s, the Eastern Caribbean swordfish
fishery was initiated by longline vessels owned by U.s.
companies or individuals.

Rising U.S. demand encouraged

longliners to expand fishing operations beyond traditional
fishing grounds near the United States mainland.

.

Swordfish

landings reported for the United States Caribbean Management
Region in 1986 were nearly two million pounds, with a landed
value of approximately $5.5 million (South Atlantic Fisheries Council 1987).

This was approximately one-quarter of

U.s. domestic swordfish landings in 1986.

The sudden influx

of foreign participants and technology have resulted in a
number of disputes and associated policy issues.
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The central problem hinges on two interrelated matters involving international cooperation.

Immediate concerns focus

on the distribution of benefits derived from resource
exploitation between foreign participants and resource adjacent island states.

Meanwhile, the absence of a regulatory

strategy directed toward stock management through the range
of the swordfish resource is a concern of all interested
parties for conservation and maximization of benefits in the
future.

The island nations of the Eastern Caribbean are characterized by:

small size; developing economies; limited resource

bases; negative trade balances; and a history of external
dominance and influences.

The United Nations Convention on

the Law of the Sea and accepted nation state practice under
customary international law resulted in the expansion of
their zones of ocean jurisdiction.· The region's island
nations believe that the utilization of the resources of
this zone is one strategy by which they can further their
goal of economic development and self-sufficiency.

Although

fisheries resources are limited in the region due to physical and biological factors,
contribute to this goal.

they have the potential to

However, development of the

swordfish fishery depends on technology, expertise and
capital which are beyond the present capabilities of Eastern
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Caribbean Island Nations.-

Fisheries operations of the

region are characterized by artisanal fishermen who employ
traditional fishing strategies.

Swordfish is a high valued product with growing demand in
the United States.

The bulk of Western Atlantic swordfish

is landed by U.S. longliners operating from the Grand Banks
to the Caribbean.

Although swordfish were known to exist in

the Caribbean, the first fishing efforts which indicated
that they occur in commercially viable concentrations in the
Caribbean were made by U.S. longliners.

In the mid-1980s,

U.S. longliners expanded beyond the EEZs which surround the
territories of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands to
the fishing zones of the region's island nations.

This

expansion of fishing operations beyond the U.S. EEZ is
illegal._

However, due to the lack of resources to carry out

enforcement and the absence of a unified regional management plan, fishing has continued with little opposition.
The GECS is initiating action based on a regional enforcement unit and uniform access fees.

However, this is only

the first step which is required for the region to gain a
greater share of the benefits associated with exploitation
of the swordfish resource.
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Problem Investigation Findings and Constraints
Swordfish stocks
The status of swordfish stocks in the Western Atlantic is a
very controversial sUbject among both fisheries managers and
resource users.

There is general agreement that growth over

fishing is indicated by smaller average carcass size; but
recruitment overfishing, evidenced by poor recruitment due
to a decline in spawning stock biomass, has not yet
occurred.

The controversy centers around whether recruit-

ment overfishing will occur in the near future if at all.
Over-exploitation and a decline in stocks are possible due
to the expansion of fishing operations and increased effort.
However, in the U.S. case, no agreement can be reached on
how conservation could be achieved through regulation.
inhe~ent unce~tainties

The

associated with understanding the

biology and population dynamics of swordfish leaves no
definitive answers in respect to stock condition.

In both the Eastern Caribbean and the Western Atlantic in
general, management is further complicated by the huge range
of the species which includes nearly all of the national
zones of jurisdiction of the Western Atlantic and adjacent
high seas areas.

The use of basic fisheries management

principles involving stock and bioeconomic models are confounded by the transboundary character of the highly
migratory swordfish resource.

The stock cannot be managed
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without cooperation and coordination of national policies of
all concerned states.

In order to initiate the management

process based on our current knowledge of fish stock
behavior and exploitation patterns, agreement must be
reached on a legal regime which can foster international
cooperation.

Management institutions
In the Atlantic, the International Convention for the
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas is the relevant scientific
institution for the international management of stocks such
as swordfish.

ICCAT is an important organization for the

collection of scientific data, but its effectiveness in the
management of stocks is questionable.

It is constrained by

funding and the capability to gain concensus and enforcement for management recommendations.

The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States is a subregional organization made up of the Lesser Antilles Island
States which were former British possessions.

The use of

this association as a united front in dealing with foreign
fishing operations is a positive development in gaining an
acceptable distribution of benefits from resource exploitation.

However, the size and configuration of their zones of

ocean jurisdiction limit their potential effectiveness as a
regional management agency.
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International legal aspects
Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
and customary international ocean law, the coastal state has
gained the right to manage and conserve the living resources
adjacent to it.

These rights were established by state

practice in the 1970s through the declaration of 200-mile
zones of extended ocean jurisdiction.

Although the LOS

Treaty included several articles concerned with the
management of the living resources, including a special
provision related to highly migratory species, it was not
explicit in relation to specific management requirements.
Especially in the case of highly migratory species, this has
left the subject of international cooperation and stock
management open to evolving international norms defined by
state practices and international treaties.

Management in the Pacific Islands Region
In the South Pacific, a regional approach has been taken for
the management of the Region's tuna fisheries.

The South

Pacific case is important in illustrating the gains which
can be made through regional cooperation and coordination of
policies.

This has been accomplished through access agree-

ments with foreign fishing nations culminating in the
Pacific Island Nations-United States Treaty.

Regional

entities such as the Fisheries Forum Agency and the Nauru
Group are the first step toward building the institutions
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which will be instrumental for future management challenges.
The underlying ingredients of a highly migratory resource,
developing resource adjacent island nations without sufficient harvesting capacity and foreign fishing nations are
common to both the South Pacific and Eastern Caribbean
Regions.

Although differences in resource type and endow-

ments, jurisdictional zone sizes and configuration, and
history and culture are apparent, the South Pacific Region
has relevance to the Eastern Caribbean situation.

Areas of

particular applicability to the Eastern Caribbean include:
Conditions of access such as reporting, observers, agents
and vessel identification requirements; the charging of
operational or access fees; compliance and enforcement
especially in the establishment of a vessel registry;
regional unity in dealing with distant water fishing fleets;
and the Pacific Islands Nations-United States Treaty.
Perhaps the factor of greatest importance involves the major
participant in both regions, the United States.

In both the

Eastern Caribbean and South Pacific Islands Regions, the
United States has strategic interests which may be of
greater national concern than fisheries issues.

Principles of fisheries management related to biology,
economics and international law are integ~ated with
experiences in the South Pacific to formulate management
alternatives for the Eastern Caribbean Region embodied in
the recommendations given below.
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Recommendations
The following recommendations are a set of alternatives
which the region's states may use as the management process
moves forward.

This list is not all inclusive, but should

be seen as a starting point or reference material from which
more detailed work can evolve.

As more information becomes

available and a regional unit takes a more definitive shape,
these recommendations may be incorporated or discarded.
Hopefully, they will at least encourage discussion as the
Eastern Caribbean Island Nations decide the direction
management of highly migratory pelagics should take.

Conservation of Stocks
The nations of the Eastern Caribbean Region probably have
little control over swordfish stock abundance due to the
species' wide range.

However, the Eastern Caribbean Region

can respond to conservation concerns through ICCAT and
WECAFC as a united entity.

This could be a step toward the

international cooperation which is required for future
conservation efforts.

Exploitation levels in the region and

biological information are important pieces of the pUZZle as
scientists try to gain a better undeerstanding of swordfish
stocks.

The Eastern Caribbean Region could demonstrate that

it is an essential component of any future international
management strategy.
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Specific areas where research could be carried out include:
the reporting of effo£t and landing levels in the region; a
tagging program carried out by local observers in cooperation with ICCAT; standardization of data reporting; the
reporting of other biological data such as length, sex and
by-catch data.

Funding for adequate training of personnel,

administration and salaries will be a problem especially in
light of ICCAT funding limitations.

One potential source is

the United States due to the importance of the fishery in
that country.

Another possibility which could cut costs

involves reporting requirements for foreign vessel entry.
Unlike the U.S. domestic fishery, some of the basic effort
and landings data could be maintained on a stricter basis as
a condition of entry.

The' future conser'vationof stocks will require more data,
international cooperation and the eventual coordination of
national policies throughout the swordfish species range.
The Eastern Caribbean Region should work as a united entity
in order to gain a larger voice in the eventual direction of
swordfish and other commercially important highly migratory
species management in the Atlantic.

Benefit Distribution
In order to gain a share of the benefits which accrue from
swordfish exploitatiort, the nations of the Eastern Caribbean
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may grant access to foreign fishing vessels.

Access can.be

granted under certain conditions including the payment of
fees.

In the future, cooperation between Eastern Caribbean States
should stretch beyond the current OECS membership.

This

would provide greater leverage in dealing with foreign
fishing nations and greater benefits.

I would allow for a

larger contiguous zone of ocean jurisdiction in which legal
aspects of fishing could be harmonized to some degree.
However, there is also a danger of over-extending too fast,
especially in the case of the smaller island states of the
OECS.

The larger island nations of CARICOM and the French

posess ions could overshadow the collective voices of OECS in
"negotiations with distant
~ay be gradual

wat~r

fishing nations.

The key

integration on the subregional leYelin key

areas such as a regional registry.

The future goal of legal

harmonization on a regional level will evolve as individual
island states recognize the benefits of greater and
equitable cooperation.

The OECS nation's first goal must be

a greater degree of integration related to a common fishing
zone and harmonization of legal aspects of the foreign
fishery.

Foreign vessels wishing to fish in Eastern Caribbean waters
should be char.ged access fees.
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Fees may be based on a

variety of factors such as vessel size, amount and value of
landings, time periods of operation or a combination of all
of the above.

The payment method which is chosen should be

cost effective, relatively simple to enforce and fair to
both the island states and fishing concerns.

Perhaps the

fairest method is to link access fees to the value of
landings if reasonable levels of compliance in reporting can
be attained.

To control vessels which have been granted access to island
nation jurisdictional zones, certain terms and conditions
should be required of the for.eign fishing operations.

These

eonditionsshould aid in administration, enforcement and
information collection, but not become so cumbersome that
they unreasonably restrict fishing operations.
conditions involve the following:

Terms and

the use of observers;

reporting requirements; vessel identification requirements;
agents; and administrative procedures.

Surveillance and enforcement will be required to achieve an
acceptable level of compliance among vessels given access.
The four main enforcement modes include:

surface patrols;

air patrols; observers; and dock inspections.

Another

important technique which may be both inexpensive and
effective is the maintenance of a regional registry of
vessels allowed to operate in the region.
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If a vessel

violates agreements related to access, it could be withdrawn
from the registry.

This could be effective for those

vessels which value continued access to the region's
resources.

The four modes of enforcement are generally

complimentary to each other.

Therefore, the Eastern

Caribbean nations will want to use the combination which
will result in the greatest compliance at the least cost.
Enforcement modes such as air and surface patrols will be of
greatest importance in respect to illegal entry of
unregistered vessels.

However, these modes of enforcement

are also the most expensive and the development of greater
potential in these areas must be balanced against potential
benefits.

Observers and dock inspections will be important

for the accurate reporting of total landings.

In addition to the use of enforement to improve compliance,
other factors can influence a fisherman's behavior.

The

level or size of sanctions, time between apprehension and
sanctioning and the probability of actually applying
sanctions in addition to the probability of being caught
will affect fishermen's attitudes toward breaking the law.
The Eastern Caribbean Nations may want to set strict
standards in these areas, such as high fines,
fishermen to act within the law.
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to influence

As the Eastern Caribbean nations endeavor to derive benefits
from their pelagic resources through access agreements, it
must be stressed that a basic goal must be the minimization
of costs.

The value of the swordfish fishery alone is not

sufficient for capital investments in equipment and signifi-·
cant additions in personnel.

The challenge will be to

create as much revenue as possible with the resources
currently available.

Direct government negotiation of a treaty between the U.S.
and the Eastern Caribbean Nations is one type of agreement
alternative.

The treaty could define terms and conditions

of access, set access fees, and define responsibilities of
participating governments.

This could result in benefits

for the island nations such as higher fees and a

u.s.

government role in assuring compliance of U.S. vessels.

The

U.S. would gain guarantees of access for its growing longline fleet.

Perhaps of greatest interest to the United

States, a treaty perceived as fair by the region's nations
would result in political goodwill and potential cooperation
and communication involving other sectors.

This would

indirectly, yet effectively, benefit U.s. strategic
interests in the region.

Both the Eastern Caribbean Island States and U.S. fishing
interests can gain benefits through access agreements.
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However, the proper balance must be attained to allow both
sides adequate returns to continue participation in the
program.

Common concerns and needs must be stressed to

create a mutually beneficial rather than adversary
relationship.

Other Areas of Concern
Local development of a swordfish longline fishery is not
curently feasible in the Eastern Caribbean due to technical,
economic and institutional constraints.

It is debatable

whether development in this sector will r.esult in tangible
benefits due to import, infrastructural and skill requirements of swordfish fishery development.

However, a local

longline fishery could provide foreign exchange from
exports, fish for local consumption and emloyrnent.

The

author feels that the region should begin to work in this
direction through information collection, planning and
research of strategies by which development can proceed.
Allhough progress may be slow, possibly better measured in
decades instead of years, it is questionable whether the
region can further the goals of self-sufficiency and
economic development unless local development is attempted.

Joint ventures are a commercial strategy or. agreement made
between the resource adjacent state and foreign fishing
nation.

Although a joint venture can promote local
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development, the history of this type of agreement is
patchy.

The motivations of each partner may be quite

different resulting in different expectations regarding the
agreement~

Joint ventures are potential vehicles of local

development, yet their value to both partners is only as
good as the communication between them and the agreement on
which the operation is based.

The incidental by-catch of other pelagic stocks can have
impacts on local markets and recreational fisheries.

If

an agreement specifies that incidental by-catch should be
marketed locally, care should be taken to avoid potential
detrimental effects on the markets of local fishermen.

The

recreational fishery for large pelagics may have greater
future value than ut.ilization through commercial landings.
These species, such as marlins and other billfish, may
deserve special regulations such as size limits or
prohibitions on commercial sales.

Further information will be required in all areas on an
ongoing basis.

Current emphasis is required in:

biologi-

cal studies such as tagging and better effort and landings
data to gain a better understanding of species distribution
in both the Atlantic and Caribbean; economic studies to
achieve greater efficiency in determination of access fees,
enforcemeht levels and modes and overall access program
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costs; and the continued study of a regional legal regime
which is both reasonable to all resource users and flexible
for adjustment to changing conditions.

Studies and data

collection are limited by funding constraints yet any
progress toward the building of a data base is important to
subsequent development.

Summary
The two major management goals of the Eastern Caribbean
island nations involve resource conservation and the
distribution of benefits accruing from resource
exploitation.

The Eastern Caribbean will be an important component of any
international management regime for swordfish due to its
geographic placement and resource endowments.

The conserva-

tion of highly migratory species such as swordfish is a
difficult proposition because it requires a large degree of
international cooperation and political compromise.

The

region's nations will need to participate in international
organizations such as ICCAT.

They must present a unified

voice for the region during these discussions in order to
gain some degree of balance with larger and more powerful
participants such as the United States.

International man-

agement of the species is a continuous long-term process in
which the Eastern Caribbean nations must become participants.
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The issues concerning benefit distribution can be dealt with
in both the short and long term.

The region's island

nations de not have the resources to exploit the swordfish
resource themselves.

However, they can allow the entry of

foreign vessels to their zones of national jurisdiction in
exchange for fees.

Foreign vessel entry could be allowed

under conditions or terms which help to guarantee compliance
and program administration for the least cost.

There is an

inherent danger of program cost escalation which could
easily outweigh revenues gained through fees.

It should be

recognized that perfect compliance, large data collection
requirements and large increases in fisheries personnel are
not necessarily the goals of the program.

The program

should maximize revenues which can be used tp manage the
marine environment.

Finally, the island nations must work

together to achieve these management and development goals.
Common regional conditions of foreign vessel entry are
essential to maximize economic returns from the fishery.

A

unified regional response will also give the Eastern Caribbean Island States greater leverage in negotiations with
other nations, especially the United States.

Perhaps of

greatest importance, political aspects of the relationship
far removed from fisheries can have important consequences
which are directly related to the terms of fishery
agreements.
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Applicability Beyond the Swordfish Fishery
Technical advances in the fisheries harvesting sector have
outpaced the development of the social and political cooperation required to manage world fisheries stocks.

The

extension of coastal state jurisdiction embodied in the Law
of the Sea Treaty has been a step toward greater management
control on a national level.

However, many fishery stocks

range beyond and between national zones of jurisdiction
requiring cooperation and coordination of management policies on an international level.

These requirements are

especially important in the case of highly migratory stocks.

In addition to swordfish, other highly migratory stocks such
as tunas and billfish pass through the waters of the Eastern
Caribbean.

These species are exploited by wide-ranging

fleets of Korea and Taiwan.

It is suspected that these

fleets also operate at times within the jurisdictional zones
of the Eastern Caribbean Nations.

The institutions and

regional cooperation developed to control the swordfish
fishery may be utilized to obtain benefits from these
fisheries.

As in the case of swordfish, greater cooperation

is required between the resource adjacent and distant water
fishing nations to ensure that conservation and appropriate
benefit distribution can be achieved.
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Regional cooperation has been

s~rengthened

by the perceived

threat of U.S. operations within the region.

This coopera-

tion can be built on for management of the r.egion's transboundary pelagic stocks such as flying fish and dolphin
fish.

The OEes fisheries unit has great potential in

developing a data base for regional fisheries.

In the

future, its demonstrated value might be built upon for the
gr~ater

Caribbean region through integration with CARICOM

and the French islands.

The collection and dissemination of

information and management initiatives will have great value
for the future development of the region's fisheries.

The potential

~emonstrated

benefits of regional responses to

fisheries management problems have relevance to regions in
other parts of the world.

Transboundary stocks are a common

feature of most of the world's fisheries.

As effort levels

increase beyond the carrying capacity of stocks, participating nations will continue to learn that objectives such
as the maintenance of stocks at high levels are dependent on
international cooperation.

The appropriate distribution of

benefits between the resource adjacent nations and foreign
fishing fleets is an objective which is being worked toward
throughout the world.

Many developing coastal states which

lack the capacity to exploit the stocks of their EEZs allow
distance water fishing fleets to enter their zones to
harvest the resource surplus.

Strategies concerned with
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access fees, conditions of entry, compliance and bilateral
and multilateral treaties will continue to evolve.
Therefore, management responses in each region have the
capacity to be instructive through the evaluation of
successes and failures.

It is also important to recognize that cooperation in
fisheries can involve .issues and result in benefits which
involve areas far removed from the sector.

As in the case

of the South Pacific and potentially the Eastern Caribbean,
common concerns must be built upon to achieve mutually
beneficial relationships which are in the interest of all
concerned nations.

Martin Belsky stated that "constraints

on total ecosystem management are not legal, but rather
political" (Belsky 1985, 763).

It might be added that

constraints are also not strictly biological or economic.
They are dependent on the ability of the world's nation
states to understand that political solutions must be sought
as man's technical ability to affect not only fisheries
resources, but the entire planet, continues to increase.
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